Comparative International Human Rights Law

This chapter locates of international human rights in current discussion of comparative international law, and distinguishes comparative international human rights law from both the 'fragmentation' literature, and from comparative constitutional rights discourse.

The Pluralism of Human Rights Adjudication

This chapter considers judicial reasoning in ‘human rights’ cases. Are there techniques that courts share, or are different techniques adopted, to decide how human rights, in this broader sense, are protected? The chapter aims to adopt a comparative approach to the examination of this reasoning, through a detailed examination of similar human rights issues in a range of jurisdictions. The aim of the chapter is to examine the similarities and divergences in the reasoning developed by courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. The chapter shows that human rights reasoning involves distinctive and particular forms of legal reasoning, but that its form and content differ significantly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and over time within jurisdictions. Building upon these findings, the chapter explores what these similarities and differences tell us about the nature, and the direction of travel, of human rights law which comprises notionally universal norms.

Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication:The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Compared

This article examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.

Using Comparative Constitutionalism in Human Rights Discourse:Ireland’s Past and Scotland’s Future

The article considers the use of comparisons in constitutional development, specifically the use of comparative reasoning in the context of debates about human rights in newly emerging independent states, using the examples of Ireland and Scotland.

The United Kingdom, the United Nations Human Rights Council and the first cycle of the Universal Periodic Review

The introduction of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism as an innovative component of the new Human Rights Council in 2006 has suffered little academic scrutiny. This is partly because it holds as its objective an improvement in human rights situations on the ground, a goal that is difficult to test amongst so many possible causal factors attributable to law reform and policy change, and partly due to the fact that the mechanism has only completed one full cycle of review. This article seeks to remedy this absence of analysis by examining the experience of the United Kingdom during its first review. In doing so, the article first considers the conception of the UPR, before progressing to examine the procedure and recommendations made to the UK by its peers. Finally, the article considers the five year review of the UPR which occurred as a subset of the Human Rights Council Review in 2011 and the resulting changes to the process modalities.

From the Right to Life to the Right to Livability: Radically Re-approaching ‘Life’ in Human Rights Politics

This article critically reflects on current mainstream debate on abortion in international human rights discourse and the conception of life underpinning it. The public health focus on access to safe abortion which has dominated this discourse can be detected as committed to a fundamentally liberal idea of bounded and individual subjecthood which mirrors the commitments of the liberal right to life more generally. However, feminist challenges to this frame seeking to advance wider access to reproductive freedoms appear equally underpinned by a liberal conception of life. It is asserted that feminists may offer a more radical challenge to the current impasse in international debate on abortion by engaging with the concept of livability which foregrounds life as an interdependent and conditioned process. The trope of the ‘right to livability’ developed in this article presents a means to reposition the relation between rights and life and facilitate such radical engagement which better attends to the socio-political conditions shaping our interdependent living and being.

maternal health as a human right’s issue.

In September 2010, just days before a crucial UN summit to review progress on the MDGs, chair of the RCM board for Northern Ireland Shona Hamilton participated in Amnesty International’s conference on poverty, health and human rights, held at Stormont. She provided great personal insight into the daily lives of women in some of the world’s poorest regions and the role midwives can play in addressing the disproportionate impact of poverty on women. She was accompanied by midwifery teaching fellow at Queen’s University Shirley Stronge who has experience of working in Malawi and Ethiopia.

Reclaiming the Radical in Universal Human Rights: Universality as Universalisation

The universality of human rights has been a fiercely contested issue throughout their history. This article contributes to scholarly engagements with the universality of human rights by proposing a re-engagement with this concept in a way that is compatible with the aims of radical politics. Instead of a static attribute or characteristic of rights this article proposes that universality can be thought of as, drawing from Judith Butler, an ongoing process of universalisation. Universality accordingly emerges as a site of powerful contest between competing ideas of what human rights should mean, do or say, and universal concepts are continually reworked through political activity. This leads to a differing conception of rights politics than traditional liberal approaches but, moreover, challenges such approaches. This understanding of universality allows human rights to come into view as potentially of use in interrupting liberal regimes and, crucially, opens possibilities to reclaim the radical in rights.