The Liberal Way of War? French representations of the Allies, 1944-2008

This chapter looks at the ways in which Anglo-American participants in the Liberation of France have been represented in French narratives in the decades since the Second World War, through the developing French historiography of Allied participation in the War, and through the various roles assigned to the Allies in key postwar memorialisation ceremonies in France.

Financialisation, the valuation of investment property and the urban built environment in the UK

The financialisation literature has been criticised for its limited empirical base and its failure adequately to link the everyday world with that of high finance. The paper addresses these shortcomings by examining the calculative practice of property valuation. The way that valuations are performed affects their results and, therefore, the operation of the property market. The paper traces the evolving influence of finance capital on the valuation of commercial property in the UK by constructing a historiography of investment valuation since 1960. Traditional approaches to valuation have been increasingly challenged by those derived from financial economics. However, the former remains the dominant method for undertaking market valuation. Its grounding in comparison – a centring and standardising process – offers an explanation for some of the changes in the urban built environment that are ascribed to financialisation. This suggests that a more detailed and historically sensitive interpretation of financialisation is required.

Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions

Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve to a grain to which we are sensitive in our everyday philosophising. The reason is that, unless we do so, we don’t get what we want from philosophical methodology. I argue that what we want is information that will aid us in formulating practical advice concerning how to do philosophy responsibly/well/better.

A revenge problem without the concept of truth

The vast majority of putative solutions to the liar paradox face the infamous revenge problem. In recent work, however, Kevin Scharp has extensively developed an exciting and highly novel ‘inconsistency approach’ to the paradox that, he claims, does not face revenge. If Scharp is right, then this represents a significant step forward in our attempts to solve the liar paradox. However, in this paper, I raise a revenge problem that faces Scharp’s inconsistency approach.

“Very sore nights and days”: the child’s experience of illness in early modern England, c. 1580-1720

Sick children were ubiquitous in early modern England, and yet they have received very little attention from historians. Taking the elusive perspective of the child, this article explores the physical, emotional, and spiritual experience of illness in England between approximately 1580 and 1720. What was it like being ill and suffering pain? How did the young respond emotionally to the anticipation of death? It is argued that children’s experiences were characterised by profound ambivalence: illness could be terrifying and distressing, but also a source of emotional and spiritual fulfilment and joy. This interpretation challenges the common assumption amongst medical historians that the experiences of early modern patients were utterly miserable. It also sheds light on children’s emotional feelings for their parents, a subject often overlooked in the historiography of childhood. The primary sources used in this article include diaries, autobiographies, letters, the biographies of pious children, printed possession cases, doctors’ casebooks, and theological treatises concerning the afterlife.

Plato's legacy : How to do philosophy

Although it has its origins earlier, philosophy as we know it in the West took its shape from the Socrates of Plato's Dialogues. It is not implausible to regard the Dialogues as heuristic devices designed for engaging in philosophical inquiry. As such, they would model the process of philosophical inquiry as well as illustrate the common pitfalls or errors to avoid when engaging in such inquiry. So it will not be surprising to see Socrates, the character of the Dialogues, modeling questionable, even poor, inquiry techniques as well as good; admonishing other characters for poor technique and reminding them of lessons they should have learned earlier in their tuition. Plato presumably would expect students reading and role-playing a Dialogue to recognise when and where such instances occur. It is instructive then to take a close look at one of the longer dialogues featuring Socrates engaging in such inquiry, not with an untutored interlocutor, but with a professional, the sophist Protagoras, in order to identify the features of the inquiry itself. For this will reveal something of what Plato conceived to be the activity of philosophy to which we are the heirs. The Protagoras can be read as an illustration (not a definition) of how to do philosophy. And to aid this reading, I propose to focus on the logical form of the inquiry, the moves made by the characters and the techniques displayed, rather than the adequacy of the substantive arguments they mount.

The evidential problem of evil

The evidential problem of evil is the problem of determining whether and (if so) to what extent the existence of evil (or certain instances, kinds, quantities, or distributions of evil) constitutes evidence against the existence of God, that is to say, a being perfect in power, knowledge and goodness. Evidential arguments from evil attempt to show that, once we put aside any evidence there might be in support of the existence of God, it becomes unlikely, if not highly unlikely, that the world was created and is governed by an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being. Such arguments are not to be confused with logical arguments from evil, which have the more ambitious aim of showing that, in a world in which there is evil, it is logically impossible – and not just unlikely – that God exists.

This entry begins by clarifying some important concepts and distinctions associated with the problem of evil, before providing an outline of one of the more forceful and influential evidential arguments developed in contemporary times, viz., the evidential argument advanced by William Rowe. Rowe’s argument has occasioned a range of responses from theists, including the so-called "skeptical theist" critique (according to which God’s ways are too mysterious for us to comprehend) and the construction of various theodicies, that is, explanations as to why God permits evil. These and other responses to the evidential problem of evil are here surveyed and assessed.

Gregory Palamas on the relationship between philosophy and theology

The relationship between philosophy and theology has rarely been a harmonious and fruitful one. The two disciplines are often segmented into mutually exclusive compartments. On the one hand, philosophers, particularly contemporary philosophers working within the Anglo-American analytic tradition, widely agree that the claims made by theologians – such as the claim that there is a God and that God is a trinity of persons – are meaningless, or false, or irrational, or unsupported by evidence, or in some other way epistemically below par. On the other hand, it is not unusual to find theologians following in the footsteps of writers such as Tertullian, Kierkegaard and Barth in arguing that, when it comes to theology, faith suffices and reason merely perverts.

The philosophy-theology dispute was no stranger to fourteenth-century Byzantium, particularly in the writings of the most prominent spiritual and intellectual figure of this period, viz., Gregory Palamas (c.1296-1359). In his debates with Barlaam of Calabria (c.1290-1348), Gregory Akindynos (c.1300-1348) and Nikephoros Gregoras (c.1290-c.1358), the issue of the appropriateness of employing philosophical terms and modes of reasoning in theology occupied a central place.[1] But before looking at how Palamas tackled this issue, it will be helpful, firstly, to briefly outline how the Christian world (especially in the East) prior to Palamas tended to see the relationship between secular learning (including philosophy) and theology; and secondly, to ascertain what exactly was Palamas’ conception of philosophy.

Dialogue with Hans-Georg Gadamer : the contribution of hermeneutics to understanding what a person is saying

This thesis reviews the development of philosophy of interpretation since the nineteenth century exemplified in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, It recognizes Gadamer as the foremost philosopher of hermeneutics in the twentieth century, who draws together the contributions of his predecessors into a major new development. The theme upon which this thesis engages in dialogue with Gadamer is concentrated on the problem of making experience the sole object of hermeneutics to the exclusion of persons and what they say, considered objectively. The problem with this is to express the role of interpretative practices philosophically if non-objectifying thinking is normative for hermeneutics. A solution is found by following up Gadamer’s insight into the influence of tradition on understanding, I show that tradition and its truth, as well as not being separable from the understanding subject's thinking, are also not detached from an author's intentions and are shared by human beings understanding one another. The transmissive nature of tradition discloses its own method for understanding what a person is saying and the ethical requirements of truth are forwarded by following that method.

Constructing the monster : notions of the monstrous in classical antiquity

Focussing on humaniod monsters, this thesis uses insights from Foucault's theory about the "archaeology" of discourses and Derrida's practice of deconstruction to examine how monstrosity was spoken of in antiquity, and how the various "sciences" dealt with anomalous monsters without jeopardising their epistemological credibility. Discussion begins with a survey of the semantic field of teras and monstrum. Since portentousness was central to both terms, the signification of monstrous portents in divinatory practice is next aalysed in the historiography of Herodotus, Livy, and others. Cicero's De divinatione reveals the theory and the problem for that science posed by accidental monstrosities. Chance and novelty are also issues in mythical and scientific cosmogonies < of Hesiod, and Orphism, Empedo-cles, and Lucretius> , where monsters arise and are dealt with while cosmic regularities, reproductive and ethical, are being established. Teleology and the stability of species'forms emerge as important concerns. These issues are further considered in Aristotle's bioogy and in medical writings from Hippocrates to Galen. There, theories are produced about monstrous embryology which attempt to answer the question of how deformities occur if species' forms are perpetuated through repro-duction. Biological and taxonomic--as well as ethical--boundaries are violated also by mythic human-beast hybrids. Narratives about such anomalies clarify the nature of monstrous deviance and enact solutions to the problem. Their strategies have much in common with other modes of discourse. Ethnography is posed similar questions about monstrous races' physical and ethical deviations from the civilised norm; it speaks of those issues in terms of invariance of form through generations, geographical remoteness and the codes which situate those races ethically. Finally, Augustine’s discourse on monstrous individuals and races is examined as Christianity’s belief in God’s governance reformulates the ancient’s discussions of chane or novelty and the invariance of species. In all these discourses founded on determinate meaning, the persistant paradox of monstrosity need offer no challenge to rationality provided its indefinable diversity is unacknowledged and the notion is constructed in such a way as to reaffirm the certainties.

Crisis in Clio's family : a study of the discipline of Australian economic history 1918-1965

This thesis presents an intellectual history of the historiography of Australian Economic History between 1918 and 1965. More specifically, it is a contribution to a relatively novel area of research into 'disciplinary history’. It takes as its basic analytical material the four books widely used for significant lengths of time for undergraduate teaching during the period of the study. The thesis consists of five main chapters, plus an appendix which surveys the institutional development of Australian Economic History and provides the empirical basis for the selection of the works named above. After a brief introduction and overview, the next four chapters consist of a detailed study of one of these works, the historical context in which each was written, and an intellectual biography. The fifth chapter is largely theoretical and conceptual. It analyses the epistemological bases of History and Economics and explores the implications of different models of knowledge for the relationship between Economic History and its two antecedent disciplines, History and Economics. Current perceptions of the state of the discipline in Australia and overseas are also examined. There are three main propositions advanced and their implications explored in the fifth chapter. First, that changes which occurred in Australian Economic History during the period 1918-1965 shifted the discipline from the broad area of History to the broad area of Economics. Second, that the inherent tension and fundamental differences between the two disciplinary areas of History and Economics have profound and complex implications for Australian Economic History at a number of levels and in a number of areas. The third proposition posits that the paradigm shift of the 1950s/1960s in Australian Economic History, and the paradigm shift of the 1960s/1970s in Economic History respectively have resulted in crisis. The final part of the chapter summarises the contents of the preceding chapters, and draws some conclusions based on those detailed studies.

Encounters with silence : toward a pedagogics of silence in the education of adults

Educational theory, if distanced from experience, positions silence as a problem rather than as a site of possibility. This thesis presents and analyses experiences of silence in the lives of a composer, a novelist, a meditation teacher, an Orthodox priest, a high school teacher, an Anglican priest, an actor, a grief counsellor, and a university lecturer. It draws upon discourses of philosophy, theology, language, the arts and the environment. By focussing on silence as experience, it suggests new ways of enriching pedagogical practice.

We need one district government to be set up to replace other district governments : the beginnings of Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea

Decentralisation, provincial government, and regional autonomy continue as influential factors in Papua New Guinea’s political economy.  The role played in creating PNG’s provincial government system by separatist movements in East New Britain, Bougainville and elsewhere is acknowledged.  However, as the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) discovered during its program of consultations with the Papua New Guinean people from 1972 to 1974, there was a strong groundswell around the country for district-level governments.  This article investigates how the CPC stimulated discussion of this issue through its own activities, and how the people in their discussion groups responded to the CPC’s ‘Discussion Paper on Relations Between the Central Government and Other Levels of Government’.