868 resultados para crisis bancarias
Resumo:
This paper explores transparency in the decision-making of the European Central Bank (ECB). According to ECB´s definition, transparency means that the central bank provides the general public with all relevant information on its strategy, assessments and policy decisions as well as its procedures in an open, clear and timely manner. In this paper, however, the interpretation of transparency is somewhat broader: Information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by the decisions. Moreover, the individuals shall be able to master this material. ECB´s negative attitude towards publication of documents has demonstrated central bank´s reluctance to strive towards more extensive transparency. By virtue of the definition adopted by the ECB the bank itself is responsible for determining what is considered as relevant information. On the grounds of EU treaties, this paper assesses ECB`s accountability concentrating especially on transparency by employing principal-agent theory and constitutional approach. Traditionally, the definite mandate and the tenet of central bank independence have been used to justify the limited accountability. The de facto competence of the ECB has, however, considerably expanded as the central bank has decisively resorted to non-standard measures in order to combat the economic turbulences facing Europe. It is alleged that non-standard monetary policy constitutes a grey zone occasionally resembling economic policy or fiscal policy. Notwithstanding, the European Court of Justice has repeatedly approved these measures. This dynamic interpretation of the treaties seems to allow temporarily exceptions from the central bank´s primary objective during extraordinary times. Regardless, the paper suggests that the accountability nexus defined in the treaties is not sufficient in order to guarantee the accountability of the ECB after the adoption of the new, more active role. Enhanced transparency would help the ECB to maintain its credibility. Investing in the quality of monetary dialogue between the Parliament and the ECB appears to constitute the most adequate and practicable method to accomplish this intention. As a result of upgraded transparency the legitimacy of the central bank would not solely rest on its policy outputs.
Resumo:
The 1980s' debt crisis is a landmark in developing economies' growth and stabilization. According to the most quoted empirical articles, external shocks and vicissitudes gave rise to crisis just because of delays in stabilization policies, engendered by internal conflicts and institutional immaturity. I review some of these papers, and find out some problems - in the measurement of shocks and foreign indebtedness, namely - whose corrections lead to opposite results: external shocks and foreign indebtedness explain that crisis regardless of domestic policies. At the same time, the strong correlation of income distribution to terms of trade changes and foreign indebtedness suggest that inequality may have contributed differently to that crisis: either through an economic channel, or through a political channel based on delays in reforms.
Resumo:
Finnish Defence Studies is published under the auspices of the National Defence College, and the contributions reflect the fields of research and teaching of the College. Finnish Defence Studies will occasionally feature documentation on Finnish Security Policy. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily imply endorsement by the National Defence College.
Resumo:
The 2008 global financial crisis was the consequence of the process of financialization, or the creation of massive fictitious financial wealth, that began in the 1980s, and of the hegemony of a reactionary ideology, namely, neoliberalism, based on self-regulated and efficient markets. Although capitalism is intrinsically unstable, the lessons from the stock-market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s were transformed into theories and institutions or regulations that led to the "30 glorious years of capitalism" (1948-1977) and that could have avoided a financial crisis as profound as the present one. It did not because a coalition of rentiers and "financists" achieved hegemony and, while deregulating the existing financial operations, refused to regulate the financial innovations that made these markets even more risky. Neoclassical economics played the role of a meta-ideology as it legitimized, mathematically and "scientifically", neoliberal ideology and deregulation. From this crisis a new capitalism will emerge, though its character is difficult to predict. It will not be financialized but the tendencies present in the 30 glorious years toward global and knowledge-based capitalism, where professionals will have more say than rentier capitalists, as well as the tendency to improve democracy by making it more social and participative, will b e resumed.
Resumo:
The aim of this article is to analyze the current phase of the global crisis and the way it has manifested itself in Latin America. The global crisis is the most important capitalist crisis since World War II. It is a new type of debt-deflation crisis, highlighting the limits of the finance-dominated regime of accumulation and characterized by securitization. Latin American countries have not been immune to the global crisis. Since it sets limits on globalization, the impossibility of maintaining export-driven accumulation sustained by restrictive monetary and fiscal policies becomes clear. This time, there will be no way out in external markets for any country. That fact will force them to restructure productive systems and search for a way out in domestic markets and in regional spaces for integration.
Resumo:
The paper investigates the recent financial crisis within a historical and comparative perspective having in mind that it is ultimately a confidence crisis, initially associated to a chain of high risk loans and financial innovations that spread thorough the international system culminating with impressive wealth losses. The financial market will eventually recover from the crisis but the outcome should be followed by a different and more disciplined set of international institutions. There will be a change on how we perceive the widespread liberal argument that the market is always efficient, or at least, more efficient than any State intervention, overcoming the false perception that the State is in opposition to the market. A deep financial crisis brings out a period of wealth losses and an adjustment process characterized by price corrections (commodities and equity price deflation) and real effects (recession and lower employment), and a period of turbulences and end of illusions is in place.
Resumo:
In this short article, it is analyzed as to whether financial flows and credit concessions explain the behavior of investment in the Brazilian economy during the 2008 crisis. Beyond the importance of demand, changes in expectations seem to be an important source of instability in investment and, as a consequence, in the economy.
Resumo:
Germany's socio-economic model, the "social market economy", was established in West Germany after World War II and extended to the unified Germany in 1990. During a prolonged recession after the adoption of the Euro in 1998, major reforms (Agenda 2010) were introduced which many consider as the key of Germany's recent success. The reforms had mixed results: employment increased but has consisted to a large extent of precarious low-wage jobs. Growth depended on export surpluses based on an internal real devaluation (low unit labour costs) which make Germany vulnerable to global recessions as in 2009. Overall inequality increased substantially.
Resumo:
The aim of this study is to analyze the current state of the Mexican economy in the face of the international crisis. Two questions are asked: Is the international crisis over? Is the Mexican economy strong and resilient enough to face the crisis in the eurozone? The first of these questions is answered in the first part. The answer to the second question is discussed in the second part of this study. Also examined are the large number of short, medium and long term problems that the Mexican economy will have to face in 2012 and perhaps 2013.
Resumo:
The purpose of this article is twofold. The first is to explain the time inconsistencies of the convertibility regime that led to the 2001 crisis. The argument suggests that the credibility requirements for convertibility induced a dynamic of legal, fiscal, financial and external commitments that increased exit costs and time inconsistencies. The second objective is to explain the tensions of the floating regime that replaced convertibility in 2002. We describe the effects of a floating exchange rate on macroeconomic imbalance and the growing tension between competitiveness and inflation.