The Combination of Multiple Classifiers Using an Evidential Reasoning Approach

In many domains when we have several competing classifiers available we want to synthesize them or some of them to get a more accurate classifier by a combination function. In this paper we propose a ‘class-indifferent’ method for combining classifier decisions represented by evidential structures called triplet and quartet, using Dempster's rule of combination. This method is unique in that it distinguishes important elements from the trivial ones in representing classifier decisions, makes use of more information than others in calculating the support for class labels and provides a practical way to apply the theoretically appealing Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence to the problem of ensemble learning. We present a formalism for modelling classifier decisions as triplet mass functions and we establish a range of formulae for combining these mass functions in order to arrive at a consensus decision. In addition we carry out a comparative study with the alternatives of simplet and dichotomous structure and also compare two combination methods, Dempster's rule and majority voting, over the UCI benchmark data, to demonstrate the advantage our approach offers. (A continuation of the work in this area that was published in IEEE Trans on KDE, and conferences)

An extended framework for evidential reasoning systems.

Use of the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence to deal with uncertainty in knowledge-based systems has been widely addressed. Several AI implementations have been undertaken based on the D-S theory of evidence or the extended theory. But the representation of uncertain relationships between evidence and hypothesis groups (heuristic knowledge) is still a major problem. This paper presents an approach to representing such knowledge, in which Yen’s probabilistic multi-set mappings have been extended to evidential mappings, and Shafer’s partition technique is used to get the mass function in a complex evidence space. Then, a new graphic method for describing the knowledge is introduced which is an extension of the graphic model by Lowrance et al. Finally, an extended framework for evidential reasoning systems is specified.

Constructing probabilistic ATMS using extended incidence calculus

This paper discusses the relations between extended incidence calculus and assumption-based truth maintenance systems (ATMSs). We first prove that managing labels for statements (nodes) in an ATMS is equivalent to producing incidence sets of these statements in extended incidence calculus. We then demonstrate that the justification set for a node is functionally equivalent to the implication relation set for the same node in extended incidence calculus. As a consequence, extended incidence calculus can provide justifications for an ATMS, because implication relation sets are discovered by the system automatically. We also show that extended incidence calculus provides a theoretical basis for constructing a probabilistic ATMS by associating proper probability distributions on assumptions. In this way, we can not only produce labels for all nodes in the system, but also calculate the probability of any of such nodes in it. The nogood environments can also be obtained automatically. Therefore, extended incidence calculus and the ATMS are equivalent in carrying out inferences at both the symbolic level and the numerical level. This extends a result due to Laskey and Lehner.

Inductive reasoning and semantic cognition: More than just different names for the same thing?

We describe evidence that certain inductive phenomena are associated with IQ, that different inductive phenomena emerge at different ages, and that the effects of causal knowledge on induction are decreased under conditions of memory load. On the basis of this evidence we argue that there is more to inductive reasoning than semantic cognition.

Deciding between theories of how reasoning develops is hard

Although Sloutsky agrees with our interpretation of our data, he argues that the totality of the evidence supports his claim that children make inductive generalisations on the basis of similarity. Here we take issue with his characterisation of the alternative hypotheses in his informal analysis of the data, and suggest that a thorough Bayesian analysis, although practically very difficult, is likely to result in a more finely balanced outcome than he suggests. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Rarity, pseudodiagnosticity and Bayesian reasoning

Three experiments investigated the effect of rarity on people's selection and interpretation of data in a variant of the pseudodiagnosticity task. For familiar (Experiment 1) but not for arbitrary (Experiment 3) materials, participants were more likely to select evidence so as to complete a likelihood ratio when the initial evidence they received was a single likelihood concerning a rare feature. This rarity effect with familiar materials was replicated in Experiment 2 where it was shown that participants were relatively insensitive to explicit manipulations of the likely diagnosticity of rare evidence. In contrast to the effects for data selection, there was an effect of rarity on confidence ratings after receipt of a single likelihood for arbitrary but not for familiar materials. It is suggested that selecting diagnostic evidence necessitates explicit consideration of the alternative hypothesis and that consideration of the possible consequences of the evidence for the alternative weakens the rarity effect in confidence ratings. Paradoxically, although rarity effects in evidence selection and confidence ratings are in the spirit of Bayesian reasoning, the effect on confidence ratings appears to rely on participants thinking less about the alternative hypothesis.

Searching and planning: Young children's reasoning about past and future event sequences

Six experiments examined children's ability to make inferences using temporal order information. Children completed versions of a task involving a toy zoo; one version required reasoning about past events (search task) and the other required reasoning about future events (planning task). Children younger than 5 years failed both the search and the planning tasks, whereas 5-year-olds passed both (Experiments 1 and 2). However, when the number of events in the sequence was reduced (Experiment 3), 4-year-olds were successful on the search task but not the planning task. Planning difficulties persisted even when relevant cues were provided (Experiments 4 and 5). Experiment 6 showed that improved performance on the search task found in Experiment 3 was not due to the removal of response ambiguity.

Young children's reasoning about the order of past events

Four studies are reported that employed an object location task to assess temporal-causal reasoning. In Experiments 1-3, successfully locating the object required a retrospective consideration of the order in which two events had occurred. In Experiment 1, 5- but not 4-year-olds were successful; 4-year-olds also failed to perform at above-chance levels in modified versions of the task in Experiments 2 and 3. However, in Experiment 4, 3-year-olds were successful when they were able to see the object being placed first in one location and then in the other, rather than having to consider retrospectively the sequence in which two events had happened. The results suggest that reasoning about the causal significance of the temporal order of events may not be fully developed before 5 years. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The Rhetorical Construction of Corporate Logos

This research is set in the context of today’s societies, in which the corporate visual symbology of a business, corporation or institution constitutes an essential way to transmit its corporate image. Traditional discursive procedures can be discovered in the development of these signs. The rhetorical strategies developed by the great classical authors appear in the logo-symbols expressing the corporate values of today’s companies. Thus, rhetoric is emerging once again in the sense it had many centuries ago: A repertory of rules that, paradoxically, standardizes the deviations of language and whose control is synonymous with power. The main objective of this study is to substantiate the rhetorical construction of logos using as a model of analysis the classical process of creating discourse. This involves understanding logos as persuasive discourses addressed to a modern audience. Our findings show that the rhetorical paradigm can be considered as a creative model for the con­struction of an original logo consistent with a company’s image.