Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize e

Modelos dinâmicos não lineares e aplicações de quadratura gaussiana

We propose mo deIs to analyze animal growlh data wilh lhe aim of eslimating and predicting quanlities of Liological and economical interest such as the maturing rate and asymptotic weight. lt is also studied lhe effect of environmenlal facLors of relevant influence in the growlh processo The models considered in this paper are based on an extension and specialization of the dynamic hierarchical model (Gamerman " Migon, 1993) lo a non-Iinear growlh curve sdLillg, where some of the growth curve parameters are considered cxchangeable among lhe unils. The inferencc for thcse models are appruximale conjugale analysis Lascd on Taylor series cxpallsiulIs aliei linear Bayes procedures.

Sequential auctions with continuation costs

In actual sequential auctions, 1) bidders typically incur a cost in continuing from one sale to the next, and 2) bidders decide whether or not to continue. To investigate the question "when do bidders drop out," we define a sequential auction model with continuation costs and an endogenously determined number of bidders at each sale, and we characterize the equilibria in this modele Simple examples illustrate the effect of several possible changes to this modele

O poder dos sindicatos e a lucratividade das firmas no Reino Unido

In t-his paper an attempt is made to assess the behaviour of the rate of return on sales of unionised firms as compared to the non-unionised ones in the late 1980s in the U.K. The main aim is to examine what has happened to the rela.LluH.51úp ~o::;~w=1L ul~uuisation anel }Jfolltauiiüy after the changes in the union legislation, competition environrnent and cyclical variations that took place over this period. The impact of different forms of union-firm bargaining on the union-profitability effect is also examined. The data reveal that the negative union effect on profitability exists, even after controlling for firm specific fixed effects, that it is larger where unions negotiate jointly with the firm as part of industry leveI bargaining, but that it has been sharply reduced over the 1980s.

Demand and supply: price elasticities and corporate performance in the UK

This paper investigates the relationship between consumer demand and corporate performance in several consumer industries in the UK, using two independent datasets. It uses data on consumer expenditures and the retail price index to estimate Almost Ideal Demand Systems on micro-data and compute timevarying price elasticities of demand for disaggregated commodity groups. Then, it matches the product definitions to the Standard Industry Classification and uses the estimated elasticities to investigate the impact of consumer behaviour on firm-level profitability equations. The time-varying household characteristics are ideal instruments for the demand effects in the firms' supply equation. The paper concludes that demand elasticities have a significant and tangible impact on the profitability of UK firms and that this impact can shed some light on the relationship between market structure and economic performance.

Os efeitos da redução da jornada de trabalho de 48 para 44 horas semanais sobre o mercado de trabalho no Brasil

The reduction of standard weekly working hours from the curreilt leveI of 44 hours to 40 hours has recently been proposed by the main central unions as a way to create jobs and reduce unemployment in Brazil. The idea, known as work-sharing, is that the reduction in average hours per worker allows the same tasks to be performed bymore employees. However, the notion ofwork-sharing has been challenged by the theoretical and the empirical literature. Theory says that, in general, a reduction in the duration ofthe workweek tends to decrease employment. Work-sharing is even less likely in the case of no wage restraint, when monthly wages are not proportionally reduced. Recent cautious econometric evidence also conflict with the notion of work -sharing (Hunt, 1999, and Crépon and Kramarz, 2000). The objective ofthis paper is to study the effects ofthe workweek length reduction from 48 to 44 hours, prescribed by the 1988 Constitutional change, on the Brazilian labor market. We find that: i) the reduction of standard working hours was followed by a significant decrease in actual working hours: 60,7% ofthe employees that worked between 45 and 48 weekly hours in 1988 (the affected group) and that remained employed in 1989 switched to a 40-44 hours workweek; ii) belonging to the affected group in 1988 had no statistical effect on the probability ofbecoming unemployed, exiting the labor market, or switching to an informal job in 1989; iii) the reduction in working hours implied a 8,8% increase in hourly real wages with respect to those that remained employed at 40-44 hours a week. In sum, the reduction of standard working hours in 1988 reduced actual working hours, did not affect the probability ofa typical worker to lose hisjob in 1989, and implied a relative increase in hourly real wages.

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.

The distribution of male wages in Brazil

This paper examines the evolution of wage inequality in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s . It tries to investigate the role played by changing economic returns to education and to experience over this period together with the evolution of within-group inequality. It applies a quantile regression approach on grouped data to the Brazilian case. Results using repeated cross-sections of a Brazilian annual household survey indicate that : i) Male wage dispersion remained basically constant overall in the 1980's and 1990' s but has increased substantially within education and age groups. ii) Returns to experience increased significantly over this period, with the rise concentrated on the iliterate/primary school group iii) Returns to college education have risen over time, whereas return to intermediate and high-school education have fallen iv) The apparent rise in within-group inequality seems to be the result of a fall in real wages, since the difference in wage leveIs has dec1ined substantially over the period, especially within the high-educated sample. v) Returns to experience rise with education. vi) Returns to education rise over the life-cycle. vii) Wage inequality increases over the life-cycle. The next step i~ this research will try to conciliate all these stylised facts.

The effects of uncertainty about the timing of deals on consumer behavior

I examine the effects of uncertainty about the timing of de aIs (i.e. temporary price cuts or sales) on consumer behavior in a dynamic inventory model of consumer choice. I derive implications for purchase behavior and test them empirically, using two years of scanner data for soft drinks. I fmd that loyal consumers' decisions, both about the allocation of their purchases over time and the quantity to be purchased in a particular deal, are affected by the uncertainty about the timing of the deal for the product. Loyal consumers buy a higher fraction of their overall purchases during de ais as the uncertainty decreases. This effect increases with an increase in the product' s share of a given consumer' s purchase in the same category or if the consumer stockpiles (i.e., is a shopper). During a particular deal, loyal shoppers increase the quantity they purchase the more time that has passed since the previous de aI, and the higher the uncertainty about the deals' timing. For the non-Ioyal consumers these effects are not significant. These results hold for products that are frequently purchased, like soft-drinks and yogurt, but do not hold for less frequentIy purchased products, such as laundry detergents. The fmdings suggest that manufacturers and retailers should incorporate the effects of deals' timing on consumers' purchase' decisions when deriving optimal pricing strategies.

Is there a general criterion for dynamic efficiency?

This paper analyses an overlapping generations model with absolute bequest motive. It is shown that the widely accepted criterion to verify dynamic efficiency does not apply to this case. In our model the social planner maximizes welfare by choosing a capital stock larger than the golden role and a real rate of interest smaller than the rate of growth of the economy.

Interests prices and the Barosky - Summers resolution of the Gibson paradox under the gold standard

This paper presents a structural monetary úamework featunng a demand function for non-monetary uses of gold, such as the one drawn by Barsky and Summers in their 1988 analy8ÚI of the Gibson Paradox as a natural concomitant of the gold standard period. That structural model predicts that the laws of behavior of nominal prices and interest rates are functions of the rules set by the government to command the money supply. !ta fiduciary vemon obtaina Fisherian relationships &8 particular cases. !ta gold atandard 801ution yields a modelsimilar to the Barsky and Summers model, in which interest rates are exogeneous and subject to shocb. This paper integrates governnment bonds into the analysis, treats interest rates endogenously, and ahifts the responsibility for the shocb to the government budgetary financing policies. The Gibson paradox appears as "practically" the only cl&18 of behavioral pattern open for interest rates and price movements under apure gold standard economy. Fisherian-like relationshipe are utterly ruled out.