An investigation into the nature and consequences of teachers' implicit philosophies of science

The aims of this study were to investigate the beliefs concerning the philosophy of science held by practising science teachers and to relate those beliefs to their pupils' understanding of the philosophy of science. Three philosophies of science, differing in the way they relate experimental work to other parts of the scientific enterprise, are described. By the use of questionnaire techniques, teachers of four extreme types were identified. These are: the H type or hypothetico-deductivist teacher, who sees experiments as potential falsifiers of hypotheses or of logical deductions from them; the I type or inductivist teacher, who regards experiments mainly as a way of increasing the range of observations available for recording before patterns are noted and inductive generalisation is carried out; the V type or verificationist teacher, who expects experiments to provide proof and to demonstrate the truth or accuracy of scientific statements; and the 0 type, who has no discernible philosophical beliefs about the nature of science or its methodology. Following interviews of selected teachers to check their responses to the questionnaire and to determine their normal teaching methods, an experiment was organised in which parallel groups were given H, I and V type teaching in the normal school situation during most of one academic year. Using pre-test and post-test scores on a specially developed test of pupil understanding of the philosophy of science, it was shown that pupils were positively affected by their teacher's implied philosophy of science. There was also some indication that V type teaching improved marks obtained in school science examinations, but appeared to discourage the more able from continuing the study of science. Effects were also noted on vocabulary used by pupils to describe scientists and their activities.

Rethinking Open Science: The Role of Communication

The first version of this text was presented in the “Philosophy of Communication” section at the ECREA’s 5th European Communication Conference, “Communication for Empowerment,” in Lisbon in November 2014. I would like to thank the audience for the lively post-presentation discussion.

Philosophy’s shame: reflections on an ambivalent/ambiviolent relationship with science

In this paper, I take inspiration from some themes in Ann Murphy’s recent book, Violence and the Philosophical Imaginary, especially her argument that philosophy’s identity and relation to itself depends on an intimate relationship with that which is designated as not itself (e.g. other academic disciplines and non-philosophy in general), the latter of which is a potential source of shame that calls for some form of response. I argue that this shame is particularly acute in regard to the natural sciences, which have gone on in various ways to distance themselves from their progenitor discipline and to achieve both agreement and technical progress in a way that could never be said of philosophy. I trace out some of the reactions to this shame that have dominated in the twentieth century and been a factor in the so-called analytic-continental ‘divide’. The options here are many and varied, but they range from cannibalism (philosophy as queen of the sciences, thus conferring some of the prestige of science upon the philosophy, which alone can unite or ground the various ontic sciences), scientific naturalism (the philosopher defers to the sciences, and most forms of meta-philosophy are rejected as an outmoded remnant of first philosophy), or some kind of irenic separatism about methods or domains such that science and philosophy do not encroach upon the territory of each other. My aims here are mainly diagnostic, but I will indicate where I think that certain responses to this shame are unproductive and unhelpful, with divergent weaknesses associated with the traditions that have come to be labelled ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ respectively. My tacit suggestion, then, is that philosophy needs to become post-analytic and meta-continental, but I will also briefly criticize some recent efforts to do precisely this in what is sometimes called the ‘scientific turn’ in contemporary continental (or post-continental) philosophy.

Mol, science, religion and narrative identity

Significantly influencing the sociological study of religion, Hans Mol developed ideas of identity which remain thought-provoking for analyses of how religion operates within contemporary societies. Sacred Selves, Sacred Settings brings current social-religious topics into sharp focus: international scholars analyse, challenge, and apply Mol’s theoretical assertions. This book introduces the unique story of Hans Mol, who survived Nazi imprisonment and proceeded to brush shoulders with formidable intellectuals of the twentieth century, such as Robert Merton, Talcott Parsons, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Offering a fresh perspective on popular subjects such as secularization, pluralism, and the place of religion in the public sphere, this book sets case studies within an intellectual biography which describes Mol’s key influences and reveals the continuing import of Hans Mol’s work applied to recent data and within a contemporary context.

L’infrastructure de la science citoyenne : le cas eBird

Cette recherche explore comment l’infrastructure et les utilisations d’eBird, l’un des plus grands projets de science citoyenne dans le monde, se développent et évoluent dans le temps et l’espace. Nous nous concentrerons sur le travail d’eBird avec deux de ses partenaires latino-américains, le Mexique et le Pérou, chacun avec un portail Web géré par des organisations locales. eBird, qui est maintenant un grand réseau mondial de partenariats, donne occasion aux citoyens du monde entier la possibilité de contribuer à la science et à la conservation d’oiseaux à partir de ses observations téléchargées en ligne. Ces observations sont gérées et gardées dans une base de données qui est unifiée, globale et accessible pour tous ceux qui s’intéressent au sujet des oiseaux et sa conservation. De même, les utilisateurs profitent des fonctionnalités de la plateforme pour organiser et visualiser leurs données et celles d’autres. L’étude est basée sur une méthodologie qualitative à partir de l’observation des plateformes Web et des entrevues semi-structurées avec les membres du Laboratoire d’ornithologie de Cornell, l’équipe eBird et les membres des organisations partenaires locales responsables d’eBird Pérou et eBird Mexique. Nous analysons eBird comme une infrastructure qui prend en considération les aspects sociaux et techniques dans son ensemble, comme un tout. Nous explorons aussi à la variété de différents types d’utilisation de la plateforme et de ses données par ses divers utilisateurs. Trois grandes thématiques ressortent : l’importance de la collaboration comme une philosophie qui sous-tend le développement d’eBird, l’élargissement des relations et connexions d’eBird à travers ses partenariats, ainsi que l’augmentation de la participation et le volume des données. Finalement, au fil du temps on a vu une évolution des données et de ses différentes utilisations, et ce qu’eBird représente comme infrastructure.

Neuroscience and Hindu Aesthetics: A Critical Analysis of V.S. Ramachandran’s “Science of Art”

Neuroaesthetics is the study of the brain’s response to artistic stimuli. The neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran contends that art is primarily “caricature” or “exaggeration.” Exaggerated forms hyperactivate neurons in viewers’ brains, which in turn produce specific, “universal” responses. Ramachandran identifies a precursor for his theory in the concept of rasa (literally “juice”) from classical Hindu aesthetics, which he associates with “exaggeration.” The canonical Sanskrit texts of Bharata Muni’s Natya Shastra and Abhinavagupta’s Abhinavabharati, however, do not support Ramachandran’s conclusions. They present audiences as dynamic co-creators, not passive recipients. I believe we could more accurately model the neurology of Hindu aesthetic experiences if we took indigenous rasa theory more seriously as qualitative data that could inform future research.

L’infrastructure de la science citoyenne : le cas eBird

Cette recherche explore comment l’infrastructure et les utilisations d’eBird, l’un des plus grands projets de science citoyenne dans le monde, se développent et évoluent dans le temps et l’espace. Nous nous concentrerons sur le travail d’eBird avec deux de ses partenaires latino-américains, le Mexique et le Pérou, chacun avec un portail Web géré par des organisations locales. eBird, qui est maintenant un grand réseau mondial de partenariats, donne occasion aux citoyens du monde entier la possibilité de contribuer à la science et à la conservation d’oiseaux à partir de ses observations téléchargées en ligne. Ces observations sont gérées et gardées dans une base de données qui est unifiée, globale et accessible pour tous ceux qui s’intéressent au sujet des oiseaux et sa conservation. De même, les utilisateurs profitent des fonctionnalités de la plateforme pour organiser et visualiser leurs données et celles d’autres. L’étude est basée sur une méthodologie qualitative à partir de l’observation des plateformes Web et des entrevues semi-structurées avec les membres du Laboratoire d’ornithologie de Cornell, l’équipe eBird et les membres des organisations partenaires locales responsables d’eBird Pérou et eBird Mexique. Nous analysons eBird comme une infrastructure qui prend en considération les aspects sociaux et techniques dans son ensemble, comme un tout. Nous explorons aussi à la variété de différents types d’utilisation de la plateforme et de ses données par ses divers utilisateurs. Trois grandes thématiques ressortent : l’importance de la collaboration comme une philosophie qui sous-tend le développement d’eBird, l’élargissement des relations et connexions d’eBird à travers ses partenariats, ainsi que l’augmentation de la participation et le volume des données. Finalement, au fil du temps on a vu une évolution des données et de ses différentes utilisations, et ce qu’eBird représente comme infrastructure.

Making the Men of Tomorrow: American Science Fiction and the Politics of Masculinity, 1965 – 1974

Suggesting that the political diversity of American science fiction during the 1960s and early 1970s constitutes a response to the dominance of social liberalism throughout the 1940s and 1950s, I argue in Making the Men of Tomorrow that the development of new hegemonic masculinities in science fiction is a consequence of political speculation. Focusing on four representative and influential texts from the 1960s and early 1970s, Philip K. Dick’s The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch and Ubik, Robert A. Heinlein’s The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress, and Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, this thesis explores the relationship between different conceptions of hegemonic masculinity and three separate but related political ideologies: the social ethic, market libertarianism, and socialist libertarianism. In the first two chapters in which I discuss Dick’s novels, I argue that Dick interrogates organizational masculinity as part of a larger project that suggests the inevitable infeasibility of both the social ethic and its predecessor, social liberalism. In the next chapter, I shift my attention to Heinlein’s The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress as a way of showing how, unlike Dick, other authors of the 1960s and early 1970s sought to move beyond social liberalism by imagining how new political ideologies, in this case market libertarianism, might change the way men see themselves. Having demonstrated how the libertarian potential of Heinlein’s novel is ultimately undermined by its insistent and uncompromising biological determinism, I then discuss how Le Guin’s The Dispossessed uses the socialist libertarianism of the moon Anarres to suggest a more egalitarian form of masculinity, one that makes possible, to some extent at least, a future in which men might embrace not only the mutual aid of socialism, but also the primacy of individual rights that is at the heart of all forms of libertarianism and liberalism.

Merleau-Ponty’s Gordian knot: transcendental phenomenology, science, and naturalism

In this paper, I explore a series of fertile ambiguities that Merleau-Ponty's work is premised upon. These ambiguities concern some of the central methodological commitments of his work, in particular his commitment (or otherwise) to transcendental phenomenology and how he transforms that tradition, and his relationship to science and philosophical naturalism and what they suggest about his philosophical methodology. Many engagements with Merleau-Ponty's work that are more ‘analytic’ in orientation either deflate it of its transcendental heritage, or offer a "modest" rendering of its transcendental dimensions. This is also true, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, of the work of the more empirically-minded phenomenological philosophers who engage very seriously with Merleau-Ponty – e.g. Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Alva Noë, and others. At the same time, many other scholars contest these proto-scientific and more naturalistic uses of Merleau-Ponty's work on hermeneutical and exegetical grounds, and they likewise criticise the deflated reading of his transcendental phenomenology that tends to support them. By working through some of the key passages and ideas, I seek to establish that the former view captures something pivotal to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. I extend these interpretations by arguing that, at least around the time of Phenomenology of Perception, his philosophy might be reasonably regarded as a form of minimal methodological naturalism.

Diderot’s body and cognitive science: sensation, impulse and action in performer training

This essay places Diderot's materialist philosophy articulated in Paradox of the Actor in the late Nineteenth century, alongside emerging thinking from neurobiology. Taking Diderot’s pursuit for the recognition acting as an art as a point of departure, it reflects on the labour of the actor as awareness within multiple cognitions: impulse, sensation, and action. The discussion maps various examples including Stanislavsky in the early 1900s through to contemporary more regulated techniques like Susana Bloch’s Alba Emoting method and Phillip Zarrilli’s psychophysical approach. It considers the language of neuroscience in explicating the nuances of technique in acting and proposes that good acting requires a mastery of self at a neural level. ​