On Multi-Dimensional Random Walk Models Approximating Symmetric Space-Fractional Diffusion Processes

Mathematics Subject Classification: 26A33, 47B06, 47G30, 60G50, 60G52, 60G60.

Time-Fractional Derivatives in Relaxation Processes: A Tutorial Survey

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 26A33, 33E12, 33C60, 44A10, 45K05, 74D05,

Rudolf Lassahn/Birgit Ofenbach (Hrsg.): Bildung in Europa. Frankfurt a. M./Bern: Lang 1993. 162 S. [...] [Sammelrezension]

Sammelrezension von: 1. Rudolf Lassahn/Birgit Ofenbach (Hrsg.): Bildung in Europa. Frankfurt a. M./Bern: Lang 1993. 162 S. 2. Walter Hornstein/Gerd Mutz unter Mitarbeit von Irene Kühnlein und Angelika Poferl: Die europäische Einigung als gesellschaftlicher Prozeß. Soziale Problemlagen, Partizipation und kulturelle Transformation. Baden-Baden: Nomos 1993. 275 S.

Karl-Heinz Arnold / Tina Hascher / Rudolf Messner / Alois Niggli / Jean-Luc Patry / Sibylle Rahm: Empowerment durch Schulpraktika. Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt 2011 [Rezension]

Rezension von: Karl-Heinz Arnold / Tina Hascher / Rudolf Messner / Alois Niggli / Jean-Luc Patry / Sibylle Rahm: Empowerment durch Schulpraktika, Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt 2011 (279 S.; ISBN 978-3-7815-1780-6)

Experts vs. Discounters: Consumer Free Riding and Experts Withholding Advice in Markets for Credence Goods

This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable, and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis. The unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters; we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free-riding on experts' advice; and we discuss policy options to solve the free-riding consumers–cheating experts problem.

The economics of credence goods: An experimental investigation of the role of verifiability, liability, competition and reputation in credence goods markets

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated.

The impact of distributional preferences on (experimental) markets for expert services

Theory predicts that efficiency prevails on credence goods markets if customers are able to verify which quality they receive from an expert seller. In a series of experiments with endogenous prices we observe that verifiability fails to result in efficient provision behaviour and leads to very similar results as a setting without verifiability. Some sellers always provide appropriate treatment even if own money maximization calls for over- or undertreatment. Overall our endogenous-price-results suggests that both inequality aversion and a taste for efficiency play an important role for experts’ provision behaviour. We contrast the implications of those two motivations theoretically and discriminate between them empirically using a fixed-price design. We then classify experimental experts according to their provision behaviour.

Process mining manifesto

Process mining techniques are able to extract knowledge from event logs commonly available in today’s information systems. These techniques provide new means to discover, monitor, and improve processes in a variety of application domains. There are two main drivers for the growing interest in process mining. On the one hand, more and more events are being recorded, thus, providing detailed information about the history of processes. On the other hand, there is a need to improve and support business processes in competitive and rapidly changing environments. This manifesto is created by the IEEE Task Force on Process Mining and aims to promote the topic of process mining. Moreover, by defining a set of guiding principles and listing important challenges, this manifesto hopes to serve as a guide for software developers, scientists, consultants, business managers, and end-users. The goal is to increase the maturity of process mining as a new tool to improve the (re)design, control, and support of operational business processes.

Verifiability in Markets for Credence Goods

Theory predicts that efficiency prevails on credence goods markets if customers are able to verify which quality they receive from an expert seller. In a series of experiments with endogenous prices we observe that variability fails to result in efficient provision behavior and leads to very similar results as a setting without variability. Some sellers always provide appropriate treatment even if own money maximization calls for over- or undertreatment. Overall our endogenous price-results suggests that both inequality aversion and a taste for efficiency play an important role for experts provision behavior. We contrast the implications of those two motivations theoretically and discriminate between them empirically using a �xed-price design. We then classify experimental experts according to their provision behavior.