G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2007 (July 1, 2006 - June 30, 2007)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2005 (July 1, 2004 - June 30, 2005)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2006 (July 1, 2005 - June 30, 2006)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2004 (July 1, 2003 - June 30, 2004)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

G-1A Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 2001 (July 1, 2000 - June 30, 2001)

This report contains information on the Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs. Programs included are FIP (Iowa’s TANF program), Title IV-D (Child Support), Food Stamps (USDA Food Assistance Program), Title XIX (Medicaid), Title XX (Social Services Block Grant), Juvenile Parole, State Supplemental Assistance, Other, Food Stamp Fraud, FIP Fraud, RCA (Refugee Cash Assistance) Fraud, and a total for all the programs. This report is issued annually at the end of the fiscal year.

Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.

Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Does it cost to be virtuous? The macroeconomic effects of fiscal constraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features of macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the typical transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting is responsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

Why do differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization endure?

A notable difference between the U.S. and many countries in Europe is in the degree of fiscal decentralization. Regional (and local) governments in the U.S. have significant autonomy in setting their own taxes and determining how to spend their revenues. This is not true of their counterparts in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and many other European countries. In recent years, many countries formerly subject to dictatorshipsor communism have been considering decentralizing fiscal responsibility to sub-national governments as part of the process of democratization (see Bird and Ebel, forthcoming). Yet, much of Europe remains immune to adopting effective decentralization in which sub-national units have true taxing authority.

Price differentials in monetary unions: The role of fiscal shocks

We study the effect of regional expenditure and revenue shocks on price differentials for47 US states and 9 EU countries. We identify shocks using sign restrictions on the dynamicsof deficits and output and construct two estimates for structural price differentials dynamics which optimally weight the information contained in the data for all units. Fiscal shocks explain between 14 and 23 percent of the variability of price differentials both in the US and in the EU. On average, expansionary fiscal disturbances produce positive price differential responses while distortionary balance budget shocks produce negative price differential responses. In a number of units, price differential responses to expansionary fiscal shocks are negative. Spillovers and labor supply effects partially explain this pattern while geographical, political, and economic indicators do not.

Reforma do Sistema Fiscal em Cabo Verde

O trabalho que ora se apresenta designa – se” Reforma do Sistema Fiscal em Cabo Verde – Caso IVA (2004 a 2010) ” e enquadra-se no âmbito da licenciatura em Contabilidade e Administração – Ramo Administração e Controlo Financeiro ministrado no Instituto Superior de Ciências Económicas e Empresariais. Na elaboração deste tema pretende-se retratar a Reforma do Sistema Fiscal em Cabo Verde – caso IVA (2004 a 2010), especificamente, descrever o efeito do IVA no orçamento do Estado e na economia cabo-verdiana; identificar efeitos no mercado de bens e serviços após a implementação do IVA; analisar a sua contribuição para o nível da carga fiscal em Cabo Verde; comparar o nível de fiscalidade com a sustentabilidade das finanças públicas em Cabo Verde e por fim, recolher e analisar dados/informações relacionados com a gestão e arrecadação efectiva do IVA. O trabalho que hora se apresenta encontra-se dividido em três partes, sendo: A primeira parte, a introdução;  A segunda parte encontra-se dividida em quatro capítulos, a saber: No primeiro capítulo, retratar uma breve evolução das reformas do sistema fiscal cabo-verdiano; No segundo capitulo, a implementação do imposto sobre o valor acrescentado.  No terceiro capítulo, analisar o efeito da implementação do IVA na Economia cabo-verdiana (2004 a 2010). E por último, no quarto capítulo, analisar o efeito do Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado (IVA) no Orçamento do Estado (2004-2010).

O planeamento fiscal em sede do imposto único sobre o Rendimento nas PME´s em São Vicente

O planeamento fiscal visa principalmente à minimização dos gastos fiscais que de certa forma afectam a rendibilidade das empresas. Neste contexto consideramos que deve estar integrada na gestão normal de qualquer empreendimento. Dado a extensividade do tema, debruçamo-nos sobre o planeamento fiscal nas PME´s visto que embora desempenham um papel de suma importância na economia moderna, dado a sua dimensão, apresentam maiores dificuldades na gestão dos aspectos fiscais. Considerando que o planeamento não deve ser confundido com outras formas de minimização dos impostos procuramos distingui-lo da fraude e evasão fiscal e da manipulação dos resultados, pois o principal objectivo do nosso trabalho é contribuir para uma maior divulgação e consciencialização desta ferramenta que proporciona uma redução lícita dos gastos fiscais Na elaboração do trabalho levamos em consideração a importância do conhecimento dos principais aspectos contabilísticos e fiscais relacionados com o Imposto único sobre os Rendimentos bem como da importância da informação contabilística para a elaboração do planeamento fiscal Como instrumento para colecta de dados optamos pela aplicação de um questionário, com o intuito de perceber se as PME´s em São Vicente têm conhecimento do tema em estudo e até que ponto têm procedido a sua aplicação. De acordo com os dados recolhidos, constatamos que algumas empresas demonstraram-se à vontade em relação ao tema, mas de um modo global podemos constatar que esta prática ainda é pouco difundida e aplicada na comunidade pesquisada.

Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Report of the Iowa Communications Network, December 2008

This is the Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2007 (July 1, 2007-June 30, 2008) for the Iowa Communications Network.

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary - Fiscal 2008

Report of the letting activity of the Iowa Department of Transportation's Office of Contracts required by Iowa Code Section 307.12(15).

Iowa Department of Transportation Fiscal Year 2008 Report of Savings by Using Video Conferencing Through Iowa Communications Network to the Iowa General Assembly Pursuant to Iowa Code § II 84 Acts and Joint Resolutions Enacted at the 1994 Regular Session of the 75th General Assembly of the State of Iowa Iowa Code §8D.10 Report of Savings by State Agencies

Iowa Code § 8D.10 requires certain state agencies prepare an annual report to the General Assembly certifying the identified savings associated with that state agency’s use of the Iowa Communications Network (ICN). This report covers estimated cost savings related to video conferencing via ICN for the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT). In FY 2008, the DOT did not conduct any sessions utilizing ICN’s video conferencing system. Therefore, no cost savings were calculated for this report.