The genetical theory of social behaviour.

We survey the population genetic basis of social evolution, using a logically consistent set of arguments to cover a wide range of biological scenarios. We start by reconsidering Hamilton's (Hamilton 1964 J. Theoret. Biol. 7, 1-16 (doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4)) results for selection on a social trait under the assumptions of additive gene action, weak selection and constant environment and demography. This yields a prediction for the direction of allele frequency change in terms of phenotypic costs and benefits and genealogical concepts of relatedness, which holds for any frequency of the trait in the population, and provides the foundation for further developments and extensions. We then allow for any type of gene interaction within and between individuals, strong selection and fluctuating environments and demography, which may depend on the evolving trait itself. We reach three conclusions pertaining to selection on social behaviours under broad conditions. (i) Selection can be understood by focusing on a one-generation change in mean allele frequency, a computation which underpins the utility of reproductive value weights; (ii) in large populations under the assumptions of additive gene action and weak selection, this change is of constant sign for any allele frequency and is predicted by a phenotypic selection gradient; (iii) under the assumptions of trait substitution sequences, such phenotypic selection gradients suffice to characterize long-term multi-dimensional stochastic evolution, with almost no knowledge about the genetic details underlying the coevolving traits. Having such simple results about the effect of selection regardless of population structure and type of social interactions can help to delineate the common features of distinct biological processes. Finally, we clarify some persistent divergences within social evolution theory, with respect to exactness, synergies, maximization, dynamic sufficiency and the role of genetic arguments.

Revising the Cannabis Use Disorders Identification Test (CUDIT) by means of Item Response Theory.

Cannabis use among adolescents and young adults has become a major public health challenge. Several European countries are currently developing short screening instruments to identify 'problematic' forms of cannabis use in general population surveys. One such instrument is the Cannabis Use Disorders Identification Test (CUDIT), a 10-item questionnaire based on the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test. Previous research found that some CUDIT items did not perform well psychometrically. In the interests of improving the psychometric properties of the CUDIT, this study replaces the poorly performing items with new items that specifically address cannabis use. Analyses are based on a sub-sample of 558 recent cannabis users from a representative population sample of 5722 individuals (aged 13-32) who were surveyed in the 2007 Swiss Cannabis Monitoring Study. Four new items were added to the original CUDIT. Psychometric properties of all 14 items, as well as the dimensionality of the supplemented CUDIT were then examined using Item Response Theory. Results indicate the unidimensionality of CUDIT and an improvement in its psychometric performance when three original items (usual hours being stoned; injuries; guilt) are replaced by new ones (motives for using cannabis; missing out leisure time activities; difficulties at work/school). However, improvements were limited to cannabis users with a high problem score. For epidemiological purposes, any further revision of CUDIT should therefore include a greater number of 'easier' items.

Relative price riddles in international business cycle theory: Are transport costs the explanation?

We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.

The place preference task: a new tool for studying the relation between behavior and place cell activity in rats

This study describes a task that combines random searching with goal directed navigation. The testing was conducted on a circular elevated open field (80 cm in diameter), with an unmarked target area (20 cm in diameter) in the center of 1 of the 4 quadrants. Whenever the rat entered the target area, the computerized tracking system released a pellet to a random point on the open field. Rats were able to learn the task under light and in total darkness, and on a stable or a rotating arena. Visual information was important in light, but idiothetic information became crucial in darkness. Learning of a new position was quicker under light than in total darkness on a rotating arena. The place preference task should make it possible to study place cells (PCs) when the rats use an allothetic (room frame) or idiothetic (arena frame) representation of space and to compare the behavioral response with the PCs' activity.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

A dynamic choice model of hybrid behavior in the attribute-space

This paper presents a dynamic choice model in the attributespace considering rational consumers that discount the future. In lightof the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the model isfurther extended by considering a utility function that allows for thedifferent types of behavior described in the literature: pure inertia,pure variety seeking and hybrid. The model presents a stationaryconsumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buysone product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer buys severalproducts simultane-ously. Under the inverted-U marginal utilityassumption, the consumer behaves inertial among the existing brands forseveral periods, and eventually, once the stationary levels areapproached, the consumer turns to a variety-seeking behavior. An empiricalanalysis is run using a scanner database for fabric softener andsignificant evidence of hybrid behavior for most attributes is found,which supports the functional form considered in the theory.

On a problem of Alfréd Rényi

Alfréd Rényi, in a paper of 1962, A new approach to the theory ofEngel's series, proposed a problem related to the growth of theelements of an Engel's series. In this paper, we reformulate andsolve Rényi's problem for both, Engel's series and Pierceexpansions.

Credit cycles in theory and experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.

Locating emergency services with different priorities: The priority queuing covering location problem

Previous covering models for emergency service consider all the calls to be of the sameimportance and impose the same waiting time constraints independently of the service's priority.This type of constraint is clearly inappropriate in many contexts. For example, in urban medicalemergency services, calls that involve danger to human life deserve higher priority over calls formore routine incidents. A realistic model in such a context should allow prioritizing the calls forservice.In this paper a covering model which considers different priority levels is formulated andsolved. The model heritages its formulation from previous research on Maximum CoverageModels and incorporates results from Queuing Theory, in particular Priority Queuing. Theadditional complexity incorporated in the model justifies the use of a heuristic procedure.

Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

A leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding: Complementarity in reputation building

We present a leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding. We showthat under certain conditions, co-branding that links unknown firms in a new sectorwith established firms in a mature sector allows the unknown firms to signal a highproduct quality and establish their own reputation. We compare this situationwith a benchmark in which both sectors are new and firms signal their qualityonly with prices. We investigate how this comparison is affected by the nature ofthe technology linking the two sectors and a cross-sector inference problem thatconsumers might face in identifying the true cause of product failure. We find thatco-branding facilitates the process in which a Þrm in the new sector to signal itsproduct quality only if the co-branding sectors produce complementary inputs andconsumers face a cross-sector inference problem. We apply our insight to economicsof superstars, multinational firms and co-authorship.

Work motivation and pro-social behavior in the delivery of public services : theoretical and empirical insights

This Ph.D. dissertation seeks to study the work motivation of employees in the delivery of public services. The questioning on work motivation in public services in not new but it becomes central for governments which are now facing unprecedented public debts. The objective of this research is twofold : First, we want to see if the work motivation of employees in public services is a continuum (intrinsic and extrinsic motivations cannot coexist) or a bi-dimensional construct (intrinsic and extrinsic motivations coexist simultaneously). The research in public administration literature has focused on the concept of public service motivation, and considered motivation to be uni-dimensional (Perry and Hondeghem 2008). However, no study has yet tackled both types of motivation, the intrinsic and extrinsic ones, in the same time. This dissertation proposes, in Part I, a theoretical assessment and an empirical test of a global work motivational structure, by using a self-constructed Swiss dataset with employees from three public services, the education sector, the security sector and the public administrative services sector. Our findings suggest that work motivation in public services in not uni-dimensional but bi-dimensional, the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations coexist simultaneously and can be positively correlated (Amabile et al. 1994). Our findings show that intrinsic motivation is as important as extrinsic motivation, thus, the assumption that employees in public services are less attracted by extrinsic rewards is not confirmed for this sample. Other important finding concerns the public service motivation concept, which, as theoretically predicted, represents the major motivational dimension of employees in the delivery of public services. Second, the theory of public service motivation makes the assumption that employees in public services engage in activities that go beyond their self-interest, but never uses this construct as a determinant for their pro-social behavior. In the same time, several studies (Gregg et al. 2011 and Georgellis et al. 2011) bring evidence about the pro-social behavior of employees in public services. However, they do not identify which type of motivation is at the origin of this behavior, they only make the assumption of an intrinsically motivated behavior. We analyze the pro-social behavior of employees in public services and use the public service motivation as determinant of their pro-social behavior. We add other determinants highlighted by the theory of pro-social behavior (Bénabou and Tirole 2006), by Le Grand (2003) and by fit theories (Besley and Ghatak 2005). We test these determinants on Part II and identify for each sector of activity the positive or the negative impact on pro-social behavior of Swiss employees. Contrary to expectations, we find, for this sample, that both intrinsic and extrinsic factors have a positive impact on pro-social behavior, no crowding-out effect is identified in this sample. We confirm the hypothesis of Le Grand (2003) about the positive impact of the opportunity cost on pro-social behavior. Our results suggest a mix of action-oriented altruism and out-put oriented altruism of employees in public services. These results are relevant when designing incentives schemes for employees in the delivery of public services.