National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.4, 2002

In spite of domestic and international political changes, French and German foreign policies have displayed high degrees of continuity between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s. Over the same time period, the directions of the two states’ foreign policies have also continued to differ from each other. Why do states similar in many respects often part ways in what they want and do? This article argues that the French and German national role conceptions (NRCs) account for both of these continuities. NRCs are domestically shared understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the international arena. As internal reference systems, they affect national interests and foreign policies. This article reestablishes the NRC concept, empirically codes it for France and Germany for the time period under consideration, and demonstrates comparatively how different NRCs lead to varying interests and policies across the major policy areas in security, defense, and armament.

Disentangling the Reform Gridlock: Higher Education in Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.7, 2002

For more than a decade, bemoaning the many roadblocks to reforming important aspect of German politics has become commonplace. Explanations emphasize formal and informal veto points, such as the role of political institutions and the lack of elite and societal support for reform initiatives. Against this background, I was interested in factors that place policy issues on the political agenda and follow up with concrete courses of action; i.e., in factors that lead to a disentangling of the reform gridlock. I emphasize the importance of agenda setting in the emergence of higher education reform in Germany. Globalization, European integration and domestic pressures combined to create new pressures for change. In response, an advocacy coalition of old and new political actors has introduced a drawn-out and ongoing process of value reorientation in the direction of competition, including international competition, and greater autonomy. The result has been a burst of activities, some moderate, some more far-reaching in their potential to restructure German higher education.

European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 2003

This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.

The “New World Order”: From Unilateralism to Cosmopolitanism. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, no. 04.1, 26 January, 2004

On January 26, 2004, the topic of the CES-Berlin Dialogues was "The 'New World Order': From Unilateralism to Cosmopolitanism." It was the second in a series of four meetings organized in Berlin under the med_title 'Redefining Justice.' The session was intended to examine successful and failed arenas of cooperation between the US and Europe; political misunderstandings and conscious manipulation; and models for future transatlantic relations. The presenters were Jeffrey Herf, Professor of History, University of Maryland, and Prof. Dr. Jürgen Neyer, Professor of International Political Economy, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, and Heisenberg Fellow of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft at the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the Freie Universität Berlin. Jeffrey Herf was asked to speak on the basic tenets of U.S. foreign policy in the administration of President George W. Bush, and Jürgen Neyer focused on the European view of international relations and conduct in the period since the invasion of Iraq.

Democratic Contestation, Accountability, and Citizen Satisfaction at the Regional Level. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.2, 2004

Democratic theory tells us that competition between political parties fosters more responsive government by disciplining elected leaders. Yet party competition may not always attain the levels desirable for holding leaders accountable, notably at the sub-national level. This paper hypothesizes that variations in competition-induced accountability affect regional, or state, government behavior, and that this variation is reflected in citizen satisfaction with regional government performance. The hypothesis is confirmed using survey data from sixty-eight German state election studies. Specifically, a widening of the gap between the two main parties of each state is shown to affect subsequent individual-level satisfaction negatively. This finding presents a conjecture that should be generalizable to other countries with strong sub-national units.

How European Integration Impacts on National Legislatures: The Europeanization of The German Bundestag. CES Germany and Europe Working Papers, No. 06.2, 2006

In looking at the Europeanization of the German Bundestag, the paper brings together two different debates: the well-established debate on the democratic legitimacy of the European Union sees national Parliaments as guarantor of one branch of a "dual" legitimacy. The more recent debate on "Europeanization" addresses the impacts that European integration has had on its Member States. Analyzing the Europeanization of the German Bundestag, the paper identifies and analyzes three dimensions: legislative Europeanization – the extent to which legislative decision making by the German Bundestag has been influenced by European stipulations over the last twenty years; institutional Europeanization – how the Bundestag as an institution reacted to this loss of function by establishing institutional and procedural provisions for influencing the government's Euro-politics; and strategic Europeanization – the ways in which individual MPs started more recently to develop euro-political strategies that go beyond controlling the national government. The paper shows that the Bundestag only hesitantly reacted to the increasing loss of functions through legislative Europeanization by establishing effective institutional and procedural provisions for controlling the government's Euro-political activities. What is more, the establishment of institutions does not guarantee their effective use. All in all, Euro- politics continues to remain the activity of few MPs. These few, however, have more recently started to europeanize their strategies. The empirical findings support the claim that the traditional concept of chains of legitimacy is inadequate, both in conceptual and in empirical terms. With regard to the democ- ratic legitimacy of EU governance, this indicates that, apart from major reform projects, especially with regard to everyday legislation, not too great a burden should be placed on national Parliaments.

China on Central-Eastern Europe: ‘16+1’ as seen from Beijing. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 166/15.04.2015

From the Introduction. In 2012, China approached the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal concerning regional cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. According to Chinese analysts, the rationale behind this breakthrough decision was Beijing’s acknowledgment of the growing importance of the region’s states within the European Union as well as a partial elimination of the ideological differences which had hamstrung cooperation in previous years. It seems that the eurozone crisis may be perceived as the reason for the CEE states’ increased interest in developing their cooperation with China. These circumstances have opened a ‘window of opportunity’ which Beijing has decided to exploit to create a kind of bridgehead in the region which it could later use in its further economic expansion in Europe. Apart from opening the CEE region up for investments, the ‘16+1’ format was intended to facilitate the shaping of relations between China and the EU and to become a tool in building a positive image for China. Chinese experts agree that after three years of functioning, the ‘16+1’ regional cooperation format has helped Beijing achieve its goals only to a limited extent. The major obstacles have included: the immense diversification of the region, barriers related to EU law, insufficient expertise on the part of Chinese companies, the asymmetry of economic needs on both sides, and no willingness within the region itself to develop cooperation. Regardless of the limited effectiveness of activities carried out so far, China has continued its ‘16+1’ initiative. This continuation and the progressing institutionalisation of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ format have often seemed superficial. China has been using this multi-party formula to improve its long-term bilateral relations with selected states in the region and thereby to create a basis for Beijing’s political and economic presence in Central-Eastern Europe.

Gazprom’s evolving strategy in a new commercial and political context: how should the EU react? EPC Policy Brief, 27 April 2015

After years of unchallenged commercial domination of a sizeable portion of the EU's gas market, Gazprom is confronted with a statement of objections issued on 22 April by the EU Commission for abusing its dominant market position. The company was already prevented from going ahead with its South Stream project aimed at consolidating Gazprom's grip on Southeast Europe's markets by bypassing Ukraine – due to alleged non-compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU regulatory framework. Furthermore, it walked away from negotiations that could have allowed it to access more than 50% of the OPAL pipeline – an onshore branch of the offshore Russian German Nord Stream pipeline –, whilst its attempts to go downstream through the acquisition of European distribution and transmission operators, such as Wingas and DESFA, failed due to current political tensions and the risk of a negative Commission ruling on the operation. Does this mean that the Russian gas behemoth – so often portrayed as the energy arm of the Kremlin – is not so powerful after all? This Policy Brief aims to frame the erosion of Gazprom's power in a wider perspective, analysing its peculiar position at a time of transition, with the global gas business going from a sellers' to a buyers' market, and providing recommendations on how Europe should deal with it. It will be argued that Gazprom – despite still being affected by the Kremlin's political priorities – is moving towards more commercially sound behavior. The EU should profit from this evolution without being tempted by mercantilist options, and rather use the political momentum provided by the energy union to remove barriers to solidarity and to increase competition on the trading platforms.

Flashlight Europe N°7–09 July 2015. Greece After the Referendum: Three Possible Scenarios for the Euro Area

About ten days ago Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, announced that there was going to be a referendum, and thus terminated the negotiations on a new rescue package unilaterally. Since then the euro area has been plunged into a wholly unprecedented political crisis. Whether or not Greece can re-main in the monetary union is more uncertain than ever, and decisions that can give a new twist to the political and financial situation are being made almost every day. The Greek banks have been closed for over a week. The economic data are deteriorating rapidly. And yet a solution is nowhere to be seen. The No vote in the Greek referendum has not exactly improved the chances of reaching an agree-ment. For the time being the positions seem to have become uncompromising. At the summit of the heads of state and government on 7 July the Greek government was given five days and a “final deadline” in order to come up with viable proposals for reform. Thus the next few days are of crucial im-portance. At the weekend the heads of state and government of all 28 EU member states are going to meet in order to decide the future of Greece. This flashlight europe provides an overview of the events of the last few days, outlines possible scenarios for what may happen in the near future, and identifies factors which may exert an influence in the short term. We are not trying to give an exact forecast or to formulate action recommendations. But we are trying to shed some light on a confusing situation by identifying important patterns and some of the salient factors.

The challenge of freedom in the Southeastern Europe. OSW Report, July 2015

Over the past few decades substantial progress has been achieved in the democratisation and modernisation of the countries of Southeastern Europe. The formal democratic institutions were introduced, a liberalisation of trade resulted in the reintegration of the region into the global economy and some of them successfully applied to join the EU and NATO. But the transformation process is far from over. In the past years the achievements of the political and economic transformation have been rolled back and the quality of governance has declined in many countries. To avoid a further deterioration of the situation in the region the new impulse for institutional transformation and a change of the development model are needed. This report is the outcome of a discussion held during the conference “The Freedom Challenge in Southeastern Europe – Implications for Poland”. This joint event was developed by the Centre for Eastern Studies and Ideas Lab – the President’s Expert Programme at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland. The chapters of the report reflect the main three subjects debated during the conference. In the first chapter Spasimir Domaradzki assesses the rule of law and its influence on the consolidation of democracy in the region. In the second chapter Marta Szpala focuses on economic development in Southeastern Europe. The third chapter is written by Adam Balcer and analyses the key instruments Russia is using to build influence in this region.

spotlight europe #2015/03 — August 2015: Money or Democracy? Greece and the Euro Dilemma

The negotiations on the third bailout package for Greece are still going on, but the euro area has already paid a high price for it. The compromise on which it is based is clearly very controversial. Some of its critics believe that it does not make sense in economic terms, whereas others point out that it may have an adverse political effect. But what in fact is Greece actually supposed to be doing, and what does all this mean with regard to sovereignty and democracy?

Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts. CES Papers - Open Forum #8, 2012

How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of intervention during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? This paper analyzes comparatively what explains government responses to banking crises. Why does the type of intervention during financial crises vary to such a great extent across countries? By analyzing the variety of bailouts in Europe and North America, we will show that the strategies governments use to cope with the instability of financial markets does not depend on economic conditions alone. Rather, they take root in the institutional and political setting of each country and vary in particular according to the different types of business-government relations banks were able to entertain with public decision-makers. Still, “crony capitalism” accounts overstate the role of bank lobbying. With four case studies of the Irish, Danish, British and French bank bailout, we show that countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy-makers and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages, while countries where banks have strong interbank ties and collective negotiation capacity were able to develop solutions with a greater burden sharing from private institutions.

Citizenship in the discourse of Egyptian political parties. EUSpring Working Paper No. 6, June 2015 [also Citizenship Report no. 3]

The concept of citizenship is one of the most complicated in political and social sciences. Its long process of historical development makes dealing with it particularly complicated. Citizenship is by nature a multi-dimensional concept: there is a legal citizenship, referring first to the equal legal status of individuals, for instance the equality between men and women. Legal citizenship also refers to a political dimension, the right to start and/or join political parties, or political participation more broadly. Thirdly, it has a religious dimension relating to the right of all religious groups to equally and freely practice their religious customs and rituals. Finally, legal citizenship possesses a socio-economic dimension related to the non-marginalisation of different social categories, for instance women. All of these dimensions, far from being purely objects of legal texts and codifications, are emerging as an arena of political struggle within the Egyptian society. Citizenship as a concept has its roots in European history and, more specifically, the emergence of the nation state in Europe and the ensuing economic and social developments in these societies. These social developments and the rise of the nation state have worked in parallel, fostering the notion of an individual citizen bestowed with rights and obligations. This gradual interaction was very different from what happened in the context of the Arab world. The emerging of the nation state in Egypt was an outcome of modernisation efforts from the top-down; it coercively redesigned the social structure, by eliminating or weakening some social classes in favour of others. These efforts have had an impact on the state-society relation at least in two respects. First, on the overlapping relation between some social classes and the state, and second, on the ability of some social groups to self-organise, define and raise their demands. This study identifies how different political parties in Egypt envision the multi-dimensional concept of citizenship. We focus on the following elements: Nature of the state (identity, nature of the regime) Liberties and rights (election laws, political party laws, etc.) Right to gather and organise (syndicates, associations, etc.) Freedom of expression and speech (right to protest, sit in, strike, etc.) Public and individual liberties (freedom of belief, personal issues, etc.) Rights of marginalised groups (women, minorities, etc.)

spotlight europe #2015/01—April 2015: Turbulent Times in the Disunited Kingdom

The general election on 7th May 2015 is not only going to lead to radical changes in the political landscape. Britain will also have to come up with answers to the European, Scottish and English questions. How this can be done is a moot point. At any rate, it is not going to make EU policymaking any easier.

Flashlight Europe N°3–April 2015. Greece – What else?

The first hundred days in office have become a benchmark for every new government. Early in May, the Tsipras coalition government will reach this date. Given the difficult financial, economic and social situation in Greece, there was no such thing as a closed season for Alexis Tsipras from day one on, and he himself could not have expected one. After all, his new government acceded office with a political agenda demanding nothing less than an end to austerity and the submission to a reform programme seen as unduly imposed on Greece by its creditors, the EU and the IMF.