Too much information? : Drama teachers’ perceptions of the value of subject knowledge

This paper reports on research into what drama teachers consider they really need to know as drama specialists. In the first instance the very concept of knowledge is discussed as it pertains to education in the arts as is the current situation in England regarding the extent to which new drama teachers’ subject specialist knowledge has been formally accredited and what the implications of this may be to an evolving curriculum. The research itself initially involved using a questionnaire to investigate the way in which drama teachers prioritised different aspects of professional knowledge. Results of this survey were deemed surprising enough to warrant further investigation through the use of interviews and a multiple-sorting exercise which revealed why the participants prioritised in the way they did. Informed by the work of Bourdieu, Foucault and Kelly, a model is proposed which may help explain the tensions experienced by drama teachers as they try to balance and prioritise different aspects of professional knowledge.

Resilience or resistance? The value of subject knowledge for drama teachers

This paper reports on research undertaken by the author into what secondary school drama teachers think they need to possess in terms of subject knowledge in order to operate effectively as subject specialists. ‘Subject knowledge’ is regarded as being multi faceted and the paper reports on how drama teachers prioritise its different aspects. A discussion of what ‘subject knowledge’ may be seen to encompass reveals interesting tensions between aspects of professional knowledge that are prescribed by statutory dictate and local context, and those that are valued by individual teachers and are manifest in their construction of a professional identity. The paper proposes that making judgements that associate propositional and substantive knowledge with traditionally held academic values as ‘bad’ or ‘irrelevant’ to drama education, and what Foucault has coined as ‘subjugated knowledge’ (i.e. local, vernacular, enactive knowledge that eludes inscription) as ‘good’ and more apposite to the work of all those involved in drama education, fails to reflect the complex matrices of values that specialists appear to hold. While the reported research focused on secondary school drama teachers in England, Bourdieu’s conception of field and habitus is invoked to suggest a model which recognises how drama educators more generally may construct a professional identity that necessarily balances personal interests and beliefs with externally imposed demands.

The representation of delayed intentions: a prospective subject-performed task?

To-be-enacted material is more accessible in tests of recognition and lexical decision than material not intended for action (T. Goschke J. Kuhl, 1993; R. L. Marsh, J. L. Hicks, & M. L. Bink, 1998). This finding has been attributed to the superior status of intention-related information. The current article explores an alternative (action-superiority) account that draws parallels between the intended enactment effect (IEE) and the subject-performed task effect. Using 2 paradigms, the authors observed faster recognition latencies for both enacted and to-be-enacted material. It is crucial to note that there was no evidence of an IEE for items that had already been executed during encoding. The IEE was also eliminated when motor processing was prevented after verbal encoding. These findings suggest an overlap between overt and intended enactment and indicate that motor information may be activated for verbal material in preparation for subsequent execution.

Perceiving time to collision activates the sensorimotor cortex

The survival of many animals hinges upon their ability to avoid collisions with other animals or objects or to precisely control the timing of collisions. Optical expansion provides a compelling impression of object approach and in principle can provide the basis for judgments of time to collision (TTC) [1]. It has been demonstrated that pigeons [2] and houseflies [3] have neural systems that can initiate rapid coordinated actions on the basis of optical expansion. In the case of humans, the linkage between judgments of TTC and coordinated action has not been established at a cortical level. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we identified superior-parietal and motor-cortex areas that are selectively active during perceptual TTC judgments, some of which are normally involved in producing reach-to-grasp responses. These activations could not be attributed to actual movement of participants. We demonstrate that networks involved in the computational problem of extracting TTC from expansion information have close correspondence with the sensorimotor systems that would be involved in preparing a timed motor response, such as catching a ball or avoiding collision.

Robustness of mutual information to inter-subject variability for automatic artefact removal from EEG

The externally recorded electroencephalogram (EEG) is contaminated with signals that do not originate from the brain, collectively known as artefacts. Thus, EEG signals must be cleaned prior to any further analysis. In particular, if the EEG is to be used in online applications such as Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) the removal of artefacts must be performed in an automatic manner. This paper investigates the robustness of Mutual Information based features to inter-subject variability for use in an automatic artefact removal system. The system is based on the separation of EEG recordings into independent components using a temporal ICA method, RADICAL, and the utilisation of a Support Vector Machine for classification of the components into EEG and artefact signals. High accuracy and robustness to inter-subject variability is achieved.

I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject

Abstract I argue for the following claims: [1] all uses of I (the word ‘I’ or thought-element I) are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I. [2] no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless [3] I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though [4] I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, and although [5] if I’m thinking about something specifically as myself, I can’t fail to be thinking of myself, and although [6] a genuine understanding use of I always involves the subject thinking of itself as itself, whatever else it does or doesn’t involve, and although [7] if I take myself to be thinking about myself, then I am thinking about myself.