Launch plan for a new magazine for Pangea Lda. Company

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Business Hostel: A new opportunity for the hostel industry

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Exit strategies of Pharmaceutical multinational companies from Portugal and the successful implementation of new Portuguese companies

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Market analysis of a new business opportunity in mobile-casual gaming: Partnership between Nmusic and Rovio Entertainment Ltd

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Noise traders, rational traders, and the rest: A new approach to efficient financial markets

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Strategy definition of a new business opportunity in mobile-casual gaming: Partnership between Nmusic and Rovio Entertainment Ltd.

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.

Changes in institutional governance and management of higher education in Laos: National University of Laos

PhD thesis in Educational Sciences (specialization in Politics of Education).

Ecological economics

Ecological economics is a recently developed field, which sees the economy as a subsystem of a larger finite global ecosystem. Ecological economists question the sustainability of the economy because of its environmental impacts and its material and energy requirements, and also because of the growth of population. Attempts at assigning money values to environmental services and losses, and attempts at correcting macroeconomic accounting, are part of ecological economics, but its main thrust is rather in developing physical indicators and indexes of sustainability. Ecological economists also work on the relations between property rights and resource management, they model the interactions between the economy and the environment, they study ecological distribution conflicts, they use management tools such as integrated environmental assessment and multi-criteria decision aids, and they propose new instruments of environmental policy.

Technological trampolines for new venture creation in Catalonia: the case of the University of Girona

Recent trends in technology transfer show an intensification of spin-off creation as a modality of university research commercialisation, complementary to the conventional ones, contract research and licensing. In this paper we analyse the evolution, objectives, resources and activities of a specialised unit –Technological Trampoline (TT) - in charge of new venture creation at the University of Girona (Catalonia-Spain). Based on two theoretical frameworks, Resource-based-view and Institutional Theory, we adopt a multi-dimensional approach to study the strategy of spinning-off new ventures at the University of Girona in terms of resources and activities, how this process is organised and if the outputs fit with this UdG’s objectives and the local environment. Our main contribution is an in-depth analysis of the spin-off creation unit with special emphasis on its variety of resources and activities. The results have a series of implications and recommendations at both university and TT level.

Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

Political economics and normative analysis

The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the last 60 years. We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the other tradition. In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and perhaps more piecemeal. We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of UK government policy-making.

New Evidence on Allyn Young’s Style and Influence as a Teacher

This paper publishes the hitherto unpublished correspondence between Allyn Abbott Young’s biographer Charles Blitch and 17 of Young’s former students or associates. Together with related biographical and archival material, the paper shows the way in which this adds to our knowledge of Young’s considerable influence as a teacher upon some of the twentieth century’s greatest economists. The correspondents are as follows: James W Angell, Colin Clark, Arthur H Cole, Lauchlin Currie, Melvin G de Chazeau, Eleanor Lansing Dulles, Howard S Ellis, Frank W Fetter, Earl J Hamilton, Seymour S Harris, Richard S Howey, Nicholas Kaldor, Melvin M Knight

Scotland: A New Fiscal Settlement

Executive Summary Many commentators have criticised the strategy currently used to finance the Scottish Parliament – both the block grant system, and the small degree of fiscal autonomy devised in the Calman report and the UK government’s 2009 White Paper. Nevertheless, fiscal autonomy has now been conceded in principle. This paper sets out to identify formally what level of autonomy would be best for the Scottish economy and the institutional changes needed to support that arrangement. Our conclusions are in line with the Steel Commission: that significantly more fiscal powers need to be transferred to Scotland. But what we can then do, which the Steel Commission could not, is to give a detailed blueprint for how this proposal might be implemented in practice. We face two problems. The existing block grant system can and has been criticised from such a wide variety of points of view that it effectively has no credibility left. On the other hand, the Calman proposals (and the UK government proposals that followed) are unworkable because, to function, they require information that the policy makers cannot possibly have; and because, without borrowing for current activities, they contain no mechanism to reconcile contractual spending (most of the budget) with variable revenue flows – which is to invite an eventual breakdown. But in its attempt to fix these problems, the UK White Paper introduces three further difficulties: new grounds for quarrels between the UK and Scottish governments, a long term deflation bias, and a loss of devolution.

Institutions and Economic Development. New tests and new doubts.

Is institutional quality a major driver of economic development? This paper tackles the question by focusing on the within-country variation of growth rates of GDP per capita. While previous attempts using this methodology have controlled for many of the standard de- terminants of the empirical growth literature, we argue that such ap- proach is not adequate if good institutions are the main reason behind decisions to invest in human or physical capital accumulation or to engage in international trade. Our regressions exclude the proximate causes of growth in order to estimate the overall e¤ect of institutional quality. Perhaps surprisingly, we nd no support for the thesis that institutional quality improves economic growth. These results encourage a reconsideration of the evidence provided elsewhere in the literature.