Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia:Policy for Intervening in Ownership in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 　　　In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. 　　　Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.

Industrialization in Indonesia since the 1970s

Introduction: During the period from the latter half of the 1980s until just before the Asian currency crisis in 1997, Indonesia’s economic development had drawn expectations and attention from various quarters, along with Malaysia and Thailand within the same Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In fact, the 1993 report by the World Bank, entitled “East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy,” recognized Indonesia as one of the East Asian economies with the strong economic performance, i.e. sustained economic growth (World Bank [1993]). And it was the manufacturing industry that had been the driving force behind Indonesia’s economic growth during that period. Since the 1997 outbreak of the Asian currency crisis, however, the manufacturing sector in Indonesia has been mired in a situation that rules out the kind of bright prospects it had emanated previously. The Indonesian economy is still in the developing stage, and in accordance with the history of industrial structural changes in other countries, Indonesia’s manufacturing industry can still be expected to serve as the engine of the country’s economic development. But is it really possible in an environment where economic liberalization and globalization are forging ahead? And, what sort of problems have to be dealt with to make it possible? To answer these questions, it is necessary to know the current conditions of Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, and to do that, it becomes important to think back on the history of the country’s industrialization. Thus, this paper is intended to retrace and unlock the track of Indonesia’s industrialization up until the establishment of the manufacturing sector in its present form, with the ultimate goal being to give answers to the above-mentioned questions. Subject to an analysis in this paper is the period from the installment of President Soeharto’s administration onward when industrialization of the modern industrial sector2 moved into high gear. 　　　The composition of this paper is outlined below. Section 1 first shows why it is important to examine import substitution and export orientation, both of which are used as the measures of the analysis in this paper, in tracking the history of the industrialization, and then discuss indicators of import substitution and export orientation as well as statistical data and resources needed to develop those indicators. Section 2 clarifies the status of the manufacturing industry among all industries by looking at the composition ratio of the manufacturing industry in terms of value added, imports and exports. Section 3 to 5 cover three periods between 1971 and 1995 and make an analysis of import substitution, export orientation and changes in the industrial structure for each period. Section 3 analyzes the period from 1971 through 1985, when Indonesia pursued the import substitution policy amid the oil boom. Section 4 covers the period from 1985 through 1990, when the packages of deregulatory measures were announced successively under structural adjustment policies made necessary by the fall in oil prices. Section 5 examines the period from 1990 through 1995, which saw the alternate shifts between the overheating of the economy by sharply rising investment by both domestic and foreign investors in the wake of the liberalization of investment, trade and financial services, and polices to cool down the economy. Section 6, which covers the 1995-1999 period straddling the economic crisis, is designed for an analysis of the changes in production trends before and after the economic crisis as well as the changes in the industrial structure. Section 7, after summing up the history of Indonesia’s industrialization examined in the previous sections, discusses problems found in respective sectors and attempts to present future prospects for the country’s manufacturing industry.

Transformation of the Financial Sector in Indonesia

Introduction : The source and deployment of finance are central issues in economic development. Since 1966, when the Soeharto Administration was inaugurated, Indonesian economic development has relied on funds in the form of aid from international organizations and foreign countries. After the 1990s, a further abundant inflow of capital sustained a rapid economic development. Foreign funding was the basis of Indonesian economic growth. This paper will describe the mechanism for allocating funds in the Indonesian economy. It will identify the problems this mechanism generated in the Indonesian experience, and it will attempt to explain why there was a collapse of the financial system in the wake of the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997. History of the Indonesian Financial system The year 1966 saw the emergence of commercial banks in Indonesia. It can be said that before 1966 a financial system hardly existed, a fact commonly attributed to economic disruptions like the consecutive runs of fiscal deficit and hyperinflation under the Soekarno Administration. After 1996, with the inauguration of Soeharto, a regulatory system of financial legislation, e.g. central banking law and banking regulation, was introduced and implemented, and the banking sector that is the basis of the current financial system in Indonesia was built up. 　　　The Indonesian financial structure was significantly altered at the first financial reform of 1983. Between 1966 and 1982, the banking sector consisted of Bank Indonesia (the Central Bank) and the state-owned banks. There was also a system for distributing the abundant public revenue derived from the soaring oil price of the 1970s. The public finance distribution function, incorporated in Indonesian financial system, changed after the successive financial reforms of 1983 and 1988, when there was a move away from the monopoly-market style dominated by state-owned banks (which was a system of public finance distribution that operated at the discretion of the government) towards a modern market mechanism. The five phases of development The Indonesian financial system developed in five phases between 1966 and the present time. The first period (1966-72) was its formative period, the second (1973-82) its policy based finance period under soaring oil prices, the third (1983-91) its financial-reform period, the fourth (1992-97) its period of expansion, and the fifth (1998-) its period of financial restructuring. The first section of this paper summarizes the financial policies operative during each of the periods identified above. In the second section changes to the financial sector in response to policies are examined, and an analysis of these changes shows that an important development of the financial sector occurred during the financial reform period. In the third section the focus of analysis shifts from the general financial sector to particular commercial banks’ performances. In the third section changes in commercial banks’ lending and fund-raising behaviour after the 1990s are analysed by comparing several banking groups in terms of their ownership and foundation time. The last section summarizes the foregoing analyses and examines the problems that remain in the Indonesian financial sector, which is still undergoing restructuring.

Is South Sulawesi a Center of Growth in Eastern Indonesia? : Japanese ODA Strategy Revisited

Japanese ODA, especially that undertaken by JICA, has targeted South Sulawesi Province as a core area of development in eastern Indonesia, with hope that the economic growth of South Sulawesi will bring about spillover effects in other regions. This paper tests the validity of the strategy using a framework of Vector Autoregressive model. The results show that South Sulawesi’s economy Granger causes other regions in eastern Indonesia, but not vice versa, implying that South Sulawesi drives the development of other regions in eastern Indonesia. Further analysis shows that the development of the agricultural sector in South Sulawesi potentially has the highest spillover effects than other sectors and that the magnitude of spillover effect from South Sulawesi on eastern Indonesia is higher than other economically important regions, such as Eastern Java and Kalimantan.

Related Lending and Bank Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, it was confirmed that banks lend to their related parties in many countries. The question examined in this article is whether related lending functions to alleviate the problems of asymmetric information or transfers profits from depositors and minority shareholders to related parties. The effects of related lending on the profitability and risk of banks in Indonesia are examined using panel data from 1994 to 2007 comprising a total of 74 Indonesian banks. The effects on return on asset (ROA) varied at different periods. Before and right after the crisis, a higher credit allocation to related parties increased ROA. In middle of the crisis, it turned to negative; and this has also been the case in the most recent period as the Indonesian economy has normalized. Effects of related lending on bank risk measured by the Z-score and non-performing loan is not clear. After undergoing bank restructuring, related lending has decreased and the profit structure of banks has changed.

Critical connections : Islamic politics and political economy in Indonesia and Malaysia

This article explores Islamic politics in two Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia, by linking their trajectories, from late colonial emergence to recent upsurge, to broad concerns of political economy, including changing social bases, capitalist transformation, state policies, and economic crises. The Indonesian and Malaysian trajectories of Islamic politics are tracked in a comparative exercise that goes beyond the case studies to suggest that much of contemporary Islamic politics cannot be explained by reference to Islam alone, but to how Islamic identities and agendas are forged in contexts of modern and profane social contestation.

Consensus and democracy in Indonesia : Musyawarah-Mufakat revisited

This paper analyzes customary practices of consensus decision making, called musyawarah-mufakat, as a basis of democratic stability in Indonesia. Musyawarah and mufakat (deliberation and consensus) are a traditional decision-making rule in Indonesia which has often been observed in village meetings. This paper argues that this traditional decision-making rule is still employed even in a modernized and democratized Indonesia, not only at rural assemblies but in the national parliament as well. Furthermore, this consensus way of decision making provides an institutional basis for democratic stability by giving every parliamentary player, whether big or small, an equal opportunity to express his/her interests. On the other hand, this system of musyawarah‐mufakat decreases political efficiency in the sense that it takes a long time to deliberate drafted laws in the parliament.

Inflation targeting in Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines : the impact on business cycle synchronization between each country and the world

This paper empirically analyzes whether and to what extent the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) in Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines has affected their business cycle synchronization with the rest of the world. By employing the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model developed by Engle (2002), we find that IT in Asia has little effect on international business cycle synchronization and the effect is positive in some of the countries, if any. These findings basically seem to be consistent with the evidence from relevant literature.

The inverted Chinese / China problem in Indonesia : a preliminary analysis on the 2011 Surabaya incident

A clash between the police and journalists covering a Falun Gong gathering in Surabaya 2011 have shown a significant change in understanding the triangular relationship between Indonesia, China and the Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. During the Suharto period, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and China as a foreign state were the problems for the Indonesian government. After the political reforms in Indonesia together with the Rise of China in 2000s, in some situation, it is the Indonesian government together with the Chinese government which is the problem for some ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Ethnic Chinese people were seen to be close with China and their loyalty to the nation was doubted. But now it is the Indonesian government which is viewed as being too close to China and thus harming national integrity, and suspected of being unnationalistic.

Presidentialism and political parties in Indonesia : why are all parties not presidentialized?

This paper analyzes whether the "presidentialization of political parties" is occurring in newly democratizing Indonesia, as argued by Samuels and Shugart (2010). In Indonesia not all parties are becoming presidentialized. Parties are presidentialized when they have a solid organizational structure and have the potential to win presidential elections. Parties established by a presidential candidate need not face an incentive incompatibility between their executive and legislative branches, since the party leader is not the "agent" but the "principal". On the other hand, small and medium-sized parties, which have few prospects of winning presidential elections, are not actively involved in the election process, therefore party organization is not presidentialized. As the local level, where the head of government has been directly elected by the people since 2005 in Indonesia, the presidentialization of political parties has begun to take place.

Voting behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 : religious cleavage or economic performance?

In this study, we examine the voting behavior in Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2014. After summarizing the changes in Indonesian parties' share of the vote from a historical standpoint, we investigate the voting behavior with simple regression models to analyze the effect of regional characteristics on Islamic/secular parties' vote share, using aggregated panel data at the district level. Then, we also test the hypothesis of retrospective economic voting. The results show that districts which formerly stood strongly behind Islamic parties continued to select those parties, or gave preference to abstention over the parties in some elections. From the point of view of retrospective economic voting, we found that districts which experienced higher per capita economic growth gave more support to the ruling parties, although our results remain tentative because information on 2014 is not yet available.

Excess capital and bank behavior : evidence from Indonesia

The Indonesian banking sector has been restructured since Asian financial crisis and restored to soundness. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) returned to a sound level; however, the average excess capital has become too high, while credit disbursement has remained low. This paper investigates the determinants of excess capital among Indonesian banks and its effects on credit growth during the 2000s. The results indicate that the determinants of excess capital vary widely depending on bank type. Return on equity (ROE) affects excess capital negatively among domestic banks, and the effect of non-performing loans is mixed, differing for various bank types. Excess capital affects credit growth positively, except among foreign banks.

Early Pleistocene 40Ar/39Ar ages for Bapang Formation hominins, Central Jawa, Indonesia

The Sangiran dome is the primary stratigraphic window for the Plio-Pleistocene deposits of the Solo basin of Central Jawa. The dome has yielded nearly 80 Homo erectus fossils, around 50 of which have known findspots. With a hornblende 40Ar/39Ar plateau age of 1.66 ± 0.04 mega-annum (Ma) reportedly associated with two fossils [Swisher, C.C., III, Curtis, G. H., Jacob, T., Getty, A. G., Suprijo, A. & Widiasmoro (1994) Science 263, 1118–1121), the dome offers evidence that early Homo dispersed to East Asia during the earliest Pleistocene. Unfortunately, the hornblende pumice was sampled at Jokotingkir Hill, a central locality with complex lithostratigraphic deformation and dubious specimen provenance. To address the antiquity of Sangiran H. erectus more systematically, we investigate the sedimentary framework and hornblende 40Ar/39Ar age for volcanic deposits in the southeast quadrant of the dome. In this sector, Bapang (Kabuh) sediments have their largest exposure, least deformation, and most complete tephrostratigraphy. At five locations, we identify a sequence of sedimentary cycles in which H. erectus fossils are associated with epiclastic pumice. From sampled pumice, eight hornblende separates produced 40Ar/39Ar plateau ages ranging from 1.51 ± 0.08 Ma at the Bapang/Sangiran Formation contact, to 1.02 ± 0.06 Ma, at a point above the hominin-bearing sequence. The chronological sequence of 40Ar/39Ar ages follows stratigraphic order across the southeast quadrant. An intermediate level yielding four nearly complete crania has an age of about 1.25 Ma.