Israel and Palestine and state (un)sustainability. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 5/June 2011

This report explores the concept of state (un)sustainability in Israel and Palestine. The starting point sees conflict resolution as an independent variable for any change and progress in the area, in terms of a political, just and credible agreement between the two parties, which will then play a decisive role in the development of the Mediterranean region. These developments and prospects for a solution are then evaluated on the basis of state (un)sustainability, a broad notion that refers to the possibilities for long-term development at the political, social and economic levels. The very nature of Israel’s democracy and its relations with its Arab minority, the challenges related to the establishment of a viable and sustainable Palestinian state, and the regional dimension of all the actors involved are considered in order to evaluate future scenarios in this context. Three scenarios are tested: sustainability, which corresponds to the end of the conflict and the establishment of two viable and independent states with a tangible improvement in political and economic indicators; unsustainability, which refers to the perpetuation of the political status quo and the progressive deterioration of all political, economic and social indicators; and finally, weak stability, which entails the achievement of a sterile political stability, able to sustain the present status quo but unable to confront the main challenges for the future of the country(ies).

Keeping EU-Asia Re-engagement on track. EU Centre Singapore Policy Brief No. 8, January 2015

The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Asia is in flux. The EU intensified its economic ties to Asia and boosted its security cooperation in the region in 2011 and 2012. But new challenges, including the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, have made it difficult to sustain this incipient momentum. There are a number of steps that EU and Asian governments can and should take to continue to strengthen their relations.

Game of zones. The quest for influence in Europe’s neighbourhood. Egmont Paper No. 67, June 2014

Introduction. Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and subsequent meddling in Ukraine does not constitute a game-changer. It is just a reminder that at least since the war with Georgia in 2008 Russia has been and still is playing the same game: a “game of zones”, aimed at (re)establishing an exclusive sphere of influence. Many of us Europeans had forgotten that, or had pushed it to the back of our minds, preferring to believe that we were not engaged in a zero-sum game in our eastern neighbourhood. While we were dealing with Ukraine, we tended also to forget the crises still going on in our southern neighbourhood, in Libya, Mali, Syria and now Iraq. Spilling over from Syria, extremist militias may establish their own “zone” in the Middle East, which would de-stabilize the entire region. In order to prevent that game-changer from materializing, another game-changer may be necessary: a rapprochement with Iran. Europe must assume responsibility for security in its entire neighbourhood, both east and south. The challenge is great – but so are Europe’s means.

The impact of the withdrawal from Afghanistan on Russia’s security. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 54, March 2014

ISAF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 will directly impact the wider region. Not only is there a risk of instability spilling over to Central Asia, but the drawdown will also accelerate the ongoing shift in the balance of power in Central Asia towards China. Should a spillover occur, the burden will mainly fall on Russia and China. Russia will, however, only continue playing the dominant role in the security of the former Soviet Central Asia (FSCA) until China takes on responsibility for the security of its direct sphere of influence or “dingwei”. Russia’s Near Abroad, however, overlaps both with the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood in Europe and China’s dingwei in Central Asia and the Far East. It is, therefore, necessary to approach Russian reactions to these encroachments on its historical spheres of influence in a single context, taking into account the interrelationship between these three.

The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

Alone in virtue. The "New Turkish" ideology in Turkey's foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 49, April 2015

Once the West’s ally, Turkey has been an ever more problematic partner in recent years. The Turkish leadership no longer views the alliance with the European Union and membership in NATO as based on shared values; rather, it is now merely a cherry-picked and shaky community of interests. Turkey is also increasingly alienated politically in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the regional developments which followed, Ankara has lost much of the influence it had built in region in previous years. Turkey’s growing international isolation is a consequence of the country ever more fully subordinating its foreign policy to the ideology of the ruling AKP. The world vision offered by that ideology does not square with the diagnoses of Turkey’s partners. The objectives it sets for Turkish foreign policy are incompatible with its partners’ expectations. Moreover, a foreign policy rooted in ideology is less flexible and less capable of adjusting to current international dynamics.

Balancing realism and vision - The prospects of EU-Israel relations in times of change and uncertainty. European Policy Brief, 28 May 2015

In this joint EPC-FSD Policy Brief, Andrea Frontini and Eran Etzion assess the state of play and the future prospects of EU-Israel relations in the light of recent domestic and regional political developments. They argue that, despite frequent cacophony and recurring stalemates, the EU-Israel partnership still has the potential to pursue shared strategic objectives. The two sides have to realign their relations, taking into account new realities and common challenges in the Middle East and Northern Africa region, and the current state of the Middle East Peace Process. More careful differentiation and stronger prioritisation of the policy dossiers at stake are urgently needed. An autonomous but joined up review of the overall relationship, guided by courage, pragmatism and stronger strategic direction, is crucial in order to move ahead.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Germany’s engagement in the resolution of the Syrian conflict. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 194/25.01.2016

German Tornado Recce aircraft have been engaged in reconnaissance operations over Syria since January 2016. In December 2015 the German government and parliament decided that up to 1,200 Bundeswehr soldiers would take part in the international coalition fighting Islamic State in Syria. This decision marks a new chapter in Germany’s activity in the Middle East. The increasing destabilisation of the southern neighbourhood and the consequences this has for the EU and Germany have forced the German government to increase its level of engagement in the region. Even though Germany is a third-rate player in the Middle Eastern game, it is nonetheless ever more engaged politically and wants to be viewed as a neutral mediator between the competing actors in the region. It has also allocated more funds on regional development co-operation and humanitarian aid. Germany, whose attention has been directed towards Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, is currently turning its attention to the South. The Middle East (and Africa) is taking on increasing significance in German foreign and security policy. This may affect NATO’s eastern flank and the EU’s eastern neighbourhood since part of Germany’s instruments and funds may be redirected to the South.

EU spotlight 10.07.2015: After the nuclear agreement with Teheran: Work for peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The Middle East is currently being devastated by multiple civil wars and ISIS-led terror. Tens of thousands have had to flee – to Europe, among other places. The nuclear deal between the West and Iran from July 14 could mark the beginning of more peaceful times for the region.

Cautious and rotational – US military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank. OSW Commentary NUMBER 216 | 05.07.2016

The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 put a stop to the gradual scaling down of US military engagement in Europe, a policy that the United States had pursued since the end of the Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a watershed for the US perceptions of European security as Washington started to see the threat of a conflict between Russia and a NATO member as more probable. The United States decided that – despite the mounting challenges in the Pacific region and its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East – it had to invest more in European security. The US has stepped up the intensity of joint drills with the allies and the activities of its forces in Europe. However, its support for the allies has been subject to various limitations and should be treated as a political signal to Moscow, rather than an element in a broader strategy. The future of the policy of strengthening the eastern flank will depend on the outcome of the US presidential elections in November and on developments in the bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow.

Die Grünen and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

This paper discusses the German Greens' recent policy on Israel and Palestine, from the beginning of the first red-green federal government to the present. It looks at Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's diplomatic role in the Middle East, and the Greens' current very mild policy with regards to Israel, especially when compared to earlier Green attitudes to the region. This is explained with reference to both the continuing relevance of German history to German foreign policy, and the constraints that participation in the federal coalition - and supplying Germany's Foreign Minister - place on the Greens. The influence of history and power on the German Greens is further illustrated by a comparison of German Green attitudes to Israel with the US Greens' much more critical position.

The impact of Foreign Direct Investment and trade openness on ICT expansion: A comparative analysis of Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern countries

This study investigates the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow and trade openness on the expansion of information and communication technologies (ICTs) for the period of 1996 to 2005, in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions. The results of regression analyses conducted indicate that while dissimilarities exist among the countries included in this study in terms of their level of socio-economic and political development, factors such as trade openness, education and the growth of GDP had a positive impact on their ICT development. While FDI inflow had positive impact on the expansion of ICTs on Asia-Pacific countries its impact on Middle Eastern countries was not statistically significant. The study results also show that governmental intervention in economic activities has a negative impact on ICT expansion in both regions. In the Middle East, regional conflict imposes additional negative impact on FDI inflow and trade openness and consequently, ICT expansion. The regression results show that those countries that implemented liberalization of their ICT sector were able to not only reduce the digital divide with other developed countries, but also increase their operations in both local and global markets.

ICT diffusion and foreign direct investment:a comparative study between Asia-Pacific and the Middle Eastern economies

This chapter investigates the impact of inward and outward FDI on ICT diffusion in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions for the period 1996-2008. The results indicate that while inward FDI has generally had a positive and significant impact on ICT diffusion in Asia-Pacific economies, its impact on the Middle Eastern countries has been detrimental. In contrast, the results of this study also show that outward FDI has had, in general, the inverse effect, it has been in general positive and significant for the Middle East countries but insignificant for Asia-Pacific economies.

Do foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade openness explain the disparity in ICT diffusion between Asia-Pacific and the Islamic Middle Eastern countries?

This study investigates the impact of FDI and trade openness on ICT diffusion in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions from 1996-2005. The results indicate that while dissimilarities exist between the economies included in this study in terms of their level of socio-economic and political development, education and the growth of GDP have had a positive impact on ICT diffusion in both regions. However, while FDI has generally had a positive and significant impact on ICT diffusion in Asia-Pacific economies, its impact on Middle Eastern economies has been detrimental. The results of this study also show that trade-openness has had, in general, a positive and significant impact on ICT diffusion. Copyright © 2010, IGI Global.