A communication and information technology infrastructure for real time monitoring and management of type 1 diabetes patients

This paper is focused on the integration of state-of-the-art technologies in the fields of telecommunications, simulation algorithms, and data mining in order to develop a Type 1 diabetes patient's semi to fully-automated monitoring and management system. The main components of the system are a glucose measurement device, an insulin delivery system (insulin injection or insulin pumps), a mobile phone for the GPRS network, and a PDA or laptop for the Internet. In the medical environment, appropriate infrastructure for storage, analysis and visualizing of patients' data has been implemented to facilitate treatment design by health care experts.

Professionalism and Information Technology: Positioning and Mediation

The starting point of this paper is the assumption that - on the one hand - information technology (IT) is increasingly shaping the professional knowledge base and on the other the relation between organisation and profession. IT is changing the role, responsibilities and practices of social workers and therefore it is important to deal with the impact of IT on social work (representative for many: Harlow and Webb 2003; Burton and van den Broek 2008). Hence, the general aim of this paper is to stimulate a basic discussion on “IT application in social work“, or rather, in a more general way, on „technology and professions“. Secondly, it is about an analytical differentiation of the process of informatisation, respectively formalisation. Thirdly we want to discuss the assumption and overall combination of efficiency, effectiveness and IT. Therefore this paper is arranged as follows: After some opening remarks (chapter 1) we outline case management systems as research object (2). Further on, we confront the approach of reflexive professionalism (3) with the process of formalization (4). Subsequently, we touch on the debate of “technologies of care” (5) and conclude with some short remarks on a research program (6).

Information provision and information needs in adult survivors of childhood cancer

BACKGROUND Knowledge about their past medical history is central for childhood cancer survivors to ensure informed decisions in their health management. Knowledge about information provision and information needs in this population is still scarce. We thus aimed to assess: (1) the information survivors reported to have received on disease, treatment, follow-up, and late effects; (2) their information needs in these four domains and the format in which they would like it provided; (3) the association with psychological distress and quality of life (QoL). PROCEDURE As part of the Follow-up survey of the Swiss Childhood Cancer Survivor Study, we sent a questionnaire to all survivors (≥18 years) who previously participated to the baseline survey, were diagnosed with cancer after 1990 at an age of <16 years. RESULTS Most survivors had received oral information only (on illness: oral: 82%, written: 38%, treatment: oral: 79%, written: 36%; follow-up: oral: 77%, written: 23%; late effects: oral: 68%, written: 14%). Most survivors who had not previously received any information rated it as important, especially information on late effects (71%). A large proportion of survivors reported current information needs and would like to receive personalized information especially on late effects (44%). Survivors with higher information needs reported higher psychological distress and lower QoL. CONCLUSIONS Survivors want to be more informed especially on possible late effects, and want to receive personalized information. Improving information provision, both qualitatively and quantitatively, will allow survivors to have better control of their health and to become better decision makers. Pediatr Blood Cancer 2014;61:312-318. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Vertical integration and information sharing — an empirical investigation in the German apparel industry

Despite the astounding success of the fast fashion retailers, the management practices leading to these results have not been subject to extensive research so far. Given this background, we analyze the impact of information sharing and vertical integration on the performance of 51 German apparel companies. We find that the positive impact of vertical integration is mediated by information sharing, i.e. that the ability to improve the information flow is a key success factor of vertically integrated apparel supply chains. Thus, the success of an expansion strategy based on vertical integration critically depends on effective ways to share logistical information.

Enquiry into the Notion of Cultural Protectionism in the Media and its Dimensions in Cyberspace

Cultural protectionism has been an element of national and foreign policies, as an extension of state sovereignty expressed both in a defensive and offensive manner. While the generic protectionist formula in the sense of restraining trade between states through measures such as import tariffs or quotas and through privileging domestic production has somewhat disintegrated over time under the rationale for free trade and the strong practical evidence of its benefits, the particular case of cultural protectionism has persevered. As we reveal in this paper, however, it has been modified, or at least its rhetoric has changed. The enquiry into the notion of cultural protectionism or cultural diversity, as the current political jargon would have it, is but one of the paper’s objectives. Its second and certainly more ambitious goal is the search for the normative dimensions of cultural diversity policies in the global digital space, asking what adjustments are needed and how feasible the entire project of diversity regulation in this environment may be. Taking into account the specificities of cyberspace and in a forward-looking manner, we propose some adjustments to current media policy practices that could better serve the goal of a sustainably diverse cultural environment.

Book Review: M. Holoubek, D. Damjanovic, M. Trainer: Regulating Content. The European Regulatory Framework for the Media and Related Creative Sectors

Review of 'Regulating Content - The European Regulatory Framework for the Media and Related Creative Sectors', by M. Holoubek, D. Damjanovic, M. Trainer (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2007), including some thoughts on contemporary media regulation.

Book Review: Public Service Media and Policy in Europe

Much has happened in the past fifty years, and the broadcasting system and in fact the entire media landscape have changed in many significant ways. Yet, the debate on the role of public service media and the involvement of the state in them still perseveres. It has indeed been reinvigorated due to the tectonic shifts in media production, distribution, access and consumption caused by digital technologies in general, and the Internet in particular. The gist of the debates has however curiously remained almost the same and is still focused on a set of economic arguments that call for state intervention in public media, and not unimportantly, on the various political interpretations of these economic arguments. In Europe, the debate has another essential core too, as Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) has been traditionally entrusted to serve some higher goals intrinsically related to key democratic and cultural processes. Accordingly, PSB in Western Europe has developed as the core media institution at the national level and has become deeply embedded in many facets of the nation’s economic, political, social and cultural life. Against the backdrop of PSB’s history, its vital tasks in society, as well as the dramatic changes brought about by the digitally networked environment, the question on the future of PSB and its transition into Public Service Media (PSM) is very interesting, to say the least, and highly challenging at the same time. The book by Karen Donders, Public Service Media and Policy in Europe (Palgrave, 2012), makes an essential contribution to these complex debates, and more importantly, adds some new value to an otherwise saturated discourse.

The Quiet Eye and Information Processing: Facilitation of Stimulus Identification and Response Selection

Background: A prerequisite for high performance in motor tasks is the acquisition of egocentric sensory information that must be translated into motor actions. A phenomenon that supports this process is the Quiet Eye (QE) defined as long final fixation before movement initiation. It is assumed that the QE facilitates information processing, particularly regarding movement parameterization. Aims: The question remains whether this facilitation also holds for the information-processing stage of response selection and – related to perception crucial – stage of stimulus identification. Method: In two experiments with sport science students, performance-enhancing effects of experimentally manipulated QE durations were tested as a function of target position predictability and target visibility, thereby selectively manipulating response selection and stimulus identification demands, respectively. Results: The results support the hypothesis of facilitated information processing through long QE durations since in both experiments performance-enhancing effects of long QE durations were found under increased processing demands only. In Experiment 1, QE duration affected performance only if the target position was not predictable and positional information had to be processed over the QE period. In Experiment 2, in a full vs. no target visibility comparison with saccades to the upcoming target position induced by flicker cues, the functionality of a long QE duration depended on the visual stimulus identification period as soon as the interval falls below a certain threshold. Conclusions: The results corroborate earlier findings that QE efficiency depends on demands put on the visuomotor system, thereby furthering the assumption that the phenomenon supports the processes of sensorimotor integration.

Insights to Indigenous Media and collaborative Video Work

Indigenous media as a phenomenon cannot be reduced to a reaction to western hegemony and colonial legacies, but is often rooted in the context of resistance, empowerment, self-determination and the reclaiming of symbolic representation. Therefore I would like to reflect on different cases of indigenous film and participatory video work in an attempt to highlight the multiple dynamics that arise due to the desideratum of self-representation and to finally locate us as anthropologists in that context.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.