Electricity without borders: a plan to make the internal market work. Bruegel Blueprint Series 20, 5 September 2013

The most straightforward European single energy market design would entail a European system operator regulated by a single European regulator. This would ensure the predictable development of rules for the entire EU, significantly reducing regulatory uncertainty for electricity sector investments. But such a first-best market design is unlikely to be politically realistic in the European context for three reasons. First, the necessary changes compared to the current situation are substantial and would produce significant redistributive effects. Second, a European solution would deprive member states of the ability to manage their energy systems nationally. And third, a single European solution might fall short of being well-tailored to consumers’ preferences, which differ substantially across the EU. To nevertheless reap significant benefits from an integrated European electricity market, we propose the following blueprint: First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement national operation centres and help them to better exchange information about the status of the system, expected changes and planned modifications. The ultimate aim should be to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for the safe and economic operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase efficiency, electricity prices should be allowed to differ between all network points between and within countries. This would enable throughput of electricity through national and international lines to be safely increased without any major investments in infrastructure. Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at European level unless they can prove that deviations are beneficial. This boosted role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of conflicting interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the network planning process should be opened to all affected stakeholders (generators, network owners and operators, consumers, residents and others) and enable the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising referee. An ultimate political decision by the European Parliament on the entire plan will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing compensation. This ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in guaranteeing a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well suited for minimising as much as possible local opposition to new lines. Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to identify the individual long-term net benefit in an uncertain environment. A workable compromise to finance new network investments would consist of three components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through their network charges; (iii) the rest of the cost is socialised to all consumers. Such a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the well-developed countries (infrastructure-wise) to those that are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more efficient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the infrastructure that is really needed.

Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23

As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.

Energy efficiency: the ever neglected priority of the European energy strategy. Egmont Paper No. 66, June 2014

Summary. Energy saving has been a stated policy objective of the EU since the 1970s. Presently, the 2020 target is a 20% reduction of EU energy consumption in comparison with current projections for 2020. This is one of the headline targets of the European Energy Strategy 2020 but efforts to achieve it remain slow and insufficient. The aim of this paper is to understand why this is happening. Firstly, this paper examines the reasons why public measures promoting energy efficiency are needed and what form these measures should optimally take (§ 1). Fortunately, over the last 20 years, much research has been done into the famous ‘energy efficiency gap’ (or ‘the energy efficiency paradox’), even if more remains to be done. Multiple explanations have been given: market failures, modelling flaws and behavioural obstacles. Each encompasses many complex aspects. Several types of instruments can be adopted to encourage energy efficiency: measures guaranteeing the correct pricing of energy are preferred, followed by taxes or tradable white certificates which in turn are preferred to standards or subsidies. Information programmes are also necessary. Secondly, the paper analyzes the evolution of the different programmes from 2000 onwards (§ 2). This reveals the extreme complexity of the subject. It deals with quite diverse topics: buildings, appliances, public sector, industry and transport. The market for energy efficiency is as diffuse as energy consumption patterns themselves. It is composed of many market actors who demand more efficient provision of energy services, and that suppliers of the necessary goods and know-how deliver this greater efficiency. Consumers in this market include individuals, businesses and governments, and market activities cover all energy-consuming sectors of the economy. Additionally, energy efficiency is the perfect example of a shared competence between the EU and the Member States. Lastly, the legal framework has steadily increased in complexity, and despite the successive energy efficiency programmes used to build this framework, it has become clear that the gap between the target and the results remains. The paper then examines whether the 2012/27/EU Directive adopted to improve the situation could bring better results. It briefly describes the content of this framework Directive, which accompanies and implements the latest energy efficiency programme (§ 3). Although the Directive is technically complex and maintains nonbinding energy efficiency targets, it certainly represents an improvement in several aspects. However, it is also saddled with a multiplicity of exemption clauses and interpretative documents (with no binding value) which weaken its provisions. Furthermore, alone, it will allow the achievement of only about 17.7% of final energy savings by 2020. The implementation process, which is essential, also remains fairly weak. The paper also gives a glimpse of the various EU instruments for financing energy efficiency projects (§ 4). Though useful, they do not indicate a strong priority. Fourthly, the paper tries to analyze the EU’s limited progress so far and gather a few suggestions for improvement. One thing seems to remain useful: targets which can be defined in various ways (§ 5). Basically, all this indicates that the EU energy efficiency strategy has so far failed to reach its targets, lacks coherence and remains ambiguous. In the new Commission’s proposals of 22 January 2014 – intended to define a new climate/energy package in the period from 2020 to 2030 – the approach to energy efficiency remains unclear. This is regrettable. Energy efficiency is the only instrument which allows the EU to reach simultaneously its three targets: sustainability, competitiveness and security. The final conclusion appears thus paradoxical. On the one hand, all existing studies indicate that the decarbonization of the EU economy will be absolutely impossible without some very serious improvements in energy efficiency. On the other hand, in reality energy efficiency has always been treated as a second zone priority. It is imperative to eliminate this contradiction.

Immigrant labour market participation in Belgium - high time to mainstream. IES Policy Brief Issue 2015/2 March 2015

The gap in labour market participation between natives and people with an immigrant background is significant in Belgium, one of the largest in the OECD. In this Policy Brief, we present research1 that investigated one of the possible causes of this poor performance, and we propose three main policy recommendations. The research project studied whether Belgium’s complex federal state structure, and the subsequent division of responsibilities and lack of intergovernmental cooperation helps to explain this poor performance. The study concluded that governance complexity does not appear to be a main cause for Belgium’s poor results. However, more policy coordination would improve policy efficiency.

Assessment of retail and wholesale market competition in the Illinois electric industry /

In this report, the Commission examines developments relevant to the competitiveness of the retail and wholesale markets. In the retail market, two key indicators of activity are examined: The first indicator is the rate of customer switching from bundled services to "delivery services." Customers taking delivery services are either purchasing power and energy from ARES or are purchasing power and energy from the host utility on an "unbundled" basis under the utility's delivery services tariffs. Currently, bundled power sales mainly consist of sales to customers under the Sec. 16-110 "Power Purchase Option" (PPO). The second indicator of retail activity presented in this report is the number of suppliers active in the State's nine service territories.

Is the risk of product market predation a cost of disclosure?

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Macroeconomic Dynamics of Market Risk Capital Requirements and Credit Supply Interdependence

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Systemic absorptive capacity: creating early-to-market returns through R&D alliances

For most complex emergent technologies, product-market success depends on efficient linkages between changing lead innovators within the R&D process. In this paper, our unit of analysis is a complex high technology product and the system of alliance linkages formed to progress a product through R&D milestones. We present a model and evidence for advancing our understanding of how achieving early-to-market returns depends on systemic absorptive capacity. This systemic absorptive capacity is the cumulative efficiency in the use of absorptive capacity to link changing lead innovators across successive milestones in R&D product development. We advance propositions of how systemic absorptive capacity can explain performance differences between rival product development systems competing for early-to-market returns with similar products through accelerating speed to market, cost and quality advantages. These explanations are contrasted with the conclusions of previous studies that have focused on absorptive capacity of single firms or single alliances in RD.

Genetic algorithm-based spinning reserve dispatching in a competitive electricity market

Power systems rely greatly on ancillary services in maintaining operation security. As one of the most important ancillary services, spinning reserve must be provided effectively in the deregulated market environment. This paper focuses on the design of an integrated market for both electricity and spinning reserve service with particular emphasis on coordinated dispatch of bulk power and spinning reserve services. A new market dispatching mechanism has been developed to minimize the ISO's total payment while ensuring system security. Genetic algorithms are used in the finding of the global optimal solutions for this dispatching problem. Case studies and corresponding analyses haw been carried out to demonstrate and discuss the efficiency and usefulness of the proposed market.

Electronic commerce investments, the resource-based view of the firm, and firm market value

Firms have embraced electronic commerce as a means of doing business, either because they see it as a way to improve efficiency, grow market share, expand into new markets, or because they view it as essential for survival. Recent research in the United States provides some evidence that the market does value investments in electronic commerce. Following research that suggests that, in certain circumstances, the market values noninnovative investments as well as innovative investments in new products, we partition electronic commerce investment project announcements into innovative and noninnovative to determine whether there are excess returns associated with these types of announcements. Apart from our overall results being consistent with the United States findings that the market values investments in electronic commerce projects, we also find that noninnovative investments are perceived as more valuable to the firm than innovative investments. On average, the market expects innovative investments to earn a return commensurate with their risk. We conclude that innovative electronic commerce projects are most likely seen by the capital market as easily replicable, and consequently have little, if any, competitive advantage period. On the other hand, we conclude from the noninnovative investment results that these types of investments are seen as being compatible with a firm's assets-in-place, in particular, its information technology capabilities, a view consistent with the resource-based view of the firm.

Fixing the system? The experience of service users of the quasi-market in disability services in Australia

A qualitative study involving semi-structured interviews with 31 people with disabilities and 32 carers in the state of Queensland, Australia, found that their experience of supportive service delivery had not improved despite reforms of the service delivery system driven by a version of the quasi-market model. Instead of delivering increased consumer choice and improved efficiency in service delivery, service users experienced inadequate service supply, service cutbacks, and an increased emphasis on cost subsidisation and assessment processes. Additionally, few consumers felt that individualised funding arrangements had personally delivered the benefits which the quasi-market model and associated policy paradigm had indicated that they should receive. For many consumers, the notion of consumer 'choice' around service provision was fictitious and they felt that any efficiency gains were at the agency level, largely at the consumers' cost. It is concluded that there appears to be no particular benefit to service users of quasi-market reforms, particularly in policy contexts where service delivery systems are historically under-funded.

Eco-efficiency and dairy processing

The dairy industry is a global industry that provides significant nutritional benefit to many cultures. in australia the industry is especially important economically, being a large export earner, as well as a vital domestic sector. in recent years the sector has come under increased competitive pressure and has restructured to cope with the changes. the industry recently undertook an eco-efficiency project to investigate where business and environmental improvements might be found. the project involved collecting and collating previous project data and surveying 38 companies in different dairy operations, from market milk to dried products. after the survey, 10 sites in two states were visited to discuss eco-efficiency issues in detail with key players. From the surveys, visits and data compilation, a comprehensive manual was prepared to help interested companies find relevant eco-efficiency data easily and assist them in the implementation process. ten fact sheets were also produced covering the topics of water management, water recycling and re-use, refrigeration optimisation, boiler optimisation, biogas, the use of treated wastewater, yield optimisation and product recovery, optimisation of ciP systems, chemical use and membranes the project highlighted the large amount of technical and engineering expertise within the sector that could result in eco-efficiency outcomes and also identified the opportunities that exist for changes to occur in some operations to save energy, input raw materials and water.

A genetic algorithm based method for deregulated electricity market dispatch

In a deregulated electricity market, optimizing dispatch capacity and transmission capacity are among the core concerns of market operators. Many market operators have capitalized on linear programming (LP) based methods to perform market dispatch operation in order to explore the computational efficiency of LP. In this paper, the search capability of genetic algorithms (GAs) is utilized to solve the market dispatch problem. The GA model is able to solve pool based capacity dispatch, while optimizing the interconnector transmission capacity. Case studies and corresponding analyses are performed to demonstrate the efficiency of the GA model.

Energy derivative market and derivative pricing via simulation

The deregulation of power industry worldwide has delivered the efficiency gains to the society; meanwhile, the intensity of competition has increased uncertainty and risks to market participants. Consequently, market participants are keen to hedge the market risks and maintain a competitive edge in the market; and this is a good explanation to the flourish of electricity derivative market. In this paper, the authors gave a comprehensive review of derivative contract pricing methods and proposed a new framework for energy derivative pricing to suit the needs of a deregulated electricity market

Rule extraction from technology IPOs in the US stock market

Machine learning techniques for prediction and rule extraction from artificial neural network methods are used. The hypothesis that market sentiment and IPO specific attributes are equally responsible for first-day IPO returns in the US stock market is tested. Machine learning methods used are Bayesian classifications, support vector machines, decision tree techniques, rule learners and artificial neural networks. The outcomes of the research are predictions and rules associated With first-day returns of technology IPOs. The hypothesis that first-day returns of technology IPOs are equally determined by IPO specific and market sentiment is rejected. Instead lower yielding IPOs are determined by IPO specific and market sentiment attributes, while higher yielding IPOs are largely dependent on IPO specific attributes.