Capital Accumulation in the Presence of Informal Credit Contracts: Does the Incentive Mechanism Work Better than Credit Rationing Under Asymmetric Information?

Credit markets with asymmetric information often prefer credit rationing as a profit maximizing device. This paper asks whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing, that is, whether it can alleviate the impact of asymmetric information based on the available information. We used a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents to assess this. Using Indian credit market data our study shows that the presence of informal credit market can reduce the cost of credit rationing by separating high risk firms from the low risk firms in the informal market. But even after this improvement, the steady state capital accumulation is still much lower as compared to incentive based market clearing rates. Through self revelation of each firm's type, based on the incentive mechanism, banks can diversify their risk by achieving a separating equilibrium in the loan market. The incentive mechanism helps banks to increase capital accumulation in the long run by charging lower rates and lending relatively higher amount to the less risky firms. Another important finding of this study is that self-revelation leads to very significant welfare improvement, as measured by consumptiuon equivalence.

A Case Study of an Agency's Three Family Preservation Contracts

This article presents a case study of a nonprofit child welfare agency that delivered family preservation services under three different purchase-of-service (POS) contracts. The research specifically focuses on how certain POS contract provisions and reimbursement rates influence the delivery of family preservation services. The three contacts examined differed on criteria, such as reimbursement mechanism, service volume, definition of clientele, and reimbursement rate. The study found that as reimbursement rates decline and as administrative costs increase, the service provider struggled with cash flow, staffing, fundraising, and service provision, among other things. It is concluded that contract-related resources, policies, and procedures impact provider agencies in multiple, significant ways that are critical to the provision of services and the accomplishment of positive client outcomes.

Incentives Embedded in Institutions: The Case of Share Contracts in Ghanaian Cocoa Production

Providing price incentives to farmers is usually considered essential for agricultural development. Although such incentives are important, regarding price as the sole explanatory factor is far from satisfactory in understanding the complex realities of agricultural production in Africa. By analyzing the share contracts widely practiced in Ghana, this article argues that local institutions such as land tenure systems and agrarian contracts provide strong incentives and disincentives for agricultural production. Based on data derived from fieldwork in the 1990s, the study analyzes two types of share contracts and the incentive structures embedded in them. The analysis reveals that farmers' investment behavior needs to be understood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase yield and long-term incentive to strengthen land rights. The study concludes that the role of price incentives in agricultural production needs to be reconsidered by placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions.

The secret to legal foretelling: generic and inter-generic aspects of vagueness in contracts, patents and regulations

In this genre analysis research paper, we compare U.S. patents, contracts, and regulations on technical matters with a focus upon the relation between vagueness and communicative purposes and subpurposes of these three genres. Our main interest is the investigation of intergeneric conventions across the three genres, based on the software analysis of three corpora (one for each genre, 1 million words per corpus). The result of the investigation is that intergeneric conventions are found at the level of types of expressed linguistic vagueness, but that intergeneric conventions at the level of actual formulations are rare. The conclusion is that at this latter level the influence from the situation type underlying the individual genre is more important than the overarching legal character of the genres, when we talk about introducing explicit vagueness in the text.

Option contracts for allocating water in inter-basin transfers: the case of the Tagus-Segura Basin in Spain

Users in the Mediterranean region face significant water supply risks. Water markets mechanisms can provide flexibility to water systems run in tight situations. The largest water infrastructure in the Iberian Peninsula connects the Segura and Tagus Basins. Stakeholders and politicians in the Tagus Basin have asked that water transfers between the two basins be eventually phased out. The need to increase the statutory minimum environmental flow in the middle Tagus and to meet new urban demands is going to result in a redefinition of the Transfer?s management rules, leading to a reduction in the transferable volumes. To minimise the consequences of such restrictions to irrigators in the Segura Basin who depend on the transferred volumes, we propose the establishment of water option contracts between both basins that represents an institutional innovation with respect to previous inter-basin spot market experiences. Based on the draft of the new Tagus Basin Plan, we propose both a modification of the Transfer?s management rule and an innovative inter-basin option contract. The main goal of the paper is to define this contract and evaluate it with respect to non-market scenarios. We also assess the resulting impact on environmental flows in the Tagus River and water availability for users in the Segura Basin, together with the economic impacts of such contract on both basins. Our results show that the proposed option contract would reduce the impact of a change in the transfer?s management rule, and reduce the supply risks of the recipient area.

Analysis of the Optimal Sharing of Construction Risk in Public Procurement Contracts

This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyze the optimal transfer of construction risk in public works contracts. The base assumption is that of a contract between a principal (public authority) and an agent (firm), where the payment mechanism is linear and contains an incentive mechanism to enhance the effort of the agent to reduce construction costs. A theoretical model is proposed starting from a cost function with a random component and assuming that both the public authority and the firm are risk averse. The main outcome of the paper is that the optimal transfer of construction risk will be lower when the variance of errors in cost forecast, the risk aversion of the firm and the marginal cost of public funds are larger, while the optimal transfer of construction risk will grow when the variance of errors in cost monitoring and the risk aversion of the public authority are larger

Optimization of water procurement decisions in an irrigation district: the role of option contracts

Water supply instability is one of the main risks faced by irrigation districts and farmers. Water procurement decision optimisation is essential in order to increase supply reliability and reduce costs. Water markets, such as spot purchases or water supply option contracts, can make this decision process more flexible. We analyse the potential interest in an option contract for an irrigation district that has access to several water sources. We apply a stochastic recursive mathematical programming model to simulate the water procurement decisions of an irrigation district?s board operating in a context of water supply uncertainty in south-eastern Spain. We analyse what role different option contracts could play in securing its water supply. Results suggest that the irrigation district would be willing to accept the proposed option contract in most cases subject to realistic values of the option contract financial terms. Of nine different water sources, desalination and the option contract are the main substitutes, where the use of either depends on the contract parameters. The contract premium and optioned volume are the variables that have a greater impact on the irrigation district?s decisions. Key words: Segura Basin, stochastic recursive programming, water markets, water supply option contract, water supply risk.