The Review of the Europe 2020 Strategy: From austerity to prosperity? CEPS Policy Brief No. 322, 28 October 2014

The future of Europe 2020 lies in its ability to become the protagonist of a new season in EU policy, in which countries can apply for more flexibility only if they can prove both structural reform and good governance, argues the author. By establishing a ‘new deal’ among member states, an improved Europe 2020 strategy can help Europe to complete its transition from austerity to prosperity. This Policy Brief makes the case for approaching the mid-term review of Europe 2020 on three different levels: i) the revision and update of the content of the Europe 2020 strategy, including its objectives, targets and major flagship initiatives; ii) the reform of the governance of the strategy; and iii) the repositioning of the strategy at the core of EU policy. The content of the strategy should be revised to include initiatives on infrastructure, the internal market and administrative capacity at all levels of government. The author sets out a number of policy recommendations for the European Commission and the member states to help realise these objectives.

Does EU regulation hinder or stimulate innovation? CEPS Special Report No. 96, 19 November 2014

Introduction. One frequently hears the question posed in the title to this report, but there is little systematic analytical literature on the issue. Fragmented evidence or anecdotes dominate debates among EU regulatory decision-makers and in European business, insofar as there is a genuine debate at all. This CEPS Special Report focuses on the multi-faceted, ambiguous and complex relationship between (EU) regulation and innovation in the economy, and discusses the innovation-enhancing potential of certain regulatory approaches as well as factors that tend to reduce incentives to innovate. It adopts an 'ecosystem' approach to both regulation and innovation, and study the interactions between the two ecosystems. This general analysis and survey are complemented by seven case studies of EU regulation enabling and disabling innovation, two horizontal and five sectoral ones. The case studies are preceded by a broader contextual analysis of trends in EU regulation over the last three decades. These trends show the significant transformation of the nature as well as improvement of the quality of EU regulation, largely in the deepened internal market, which tend to have a favourable and lasting effect on the rate of innovation in the EU (other things being equal). Among the findings include the following: Regulation can at times be a powerful stimulus to innovation. EU regulation matters at all stages of the innovation process. Different types of regulation can be identified in terms of innovation impact: general or horizontal, innovation-specific and sector-specific regulation. More prescriptive regulation tends to hamper innovative activity, whereas the more flexible EU regulation is, the better innovation can be stimulated. Lower compliance and red-tape burdens have a positive effect on innovation. The authors recommend incorporating a specific test on innovation impacts in the ex-ante impact assessment of EU legislation as well as in ex-post evaluation. There is ample potential for fostering innovation by reviewing the EU regulatory acquis.

The Juncker Plan: From €21 to €315 billion, through smoke and mirrors. CEPS Commentary, 27 November 2014

On the face of it, the €315 billion euro in additional investment announced by Juncker to kickstart Europe’s economy should make a material difference. But, explains Daniel Gros, without actually having any margin of manoeuvre in the EU budget there cannot be any financing for new investment and there cannot be any real growth impulse. The European Commission should have made the completion of the internal market, in particular the integration of Europe’s energy markets, a precondition for any new investment plan.

The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.

Testing for Subsidiarity. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 13/2006

In the EU circuit (especially the European Parliament, the Council and Coreper) as well as in national parliaments of the EU Member States, one observes a powerful tendency to regard 'subsidiarity' as a 'political' issue. Moreover, subsidiarity is frequently seen as a one-way street : powers going 'back to' Member States. Both interpretations are at least partly flawed and less than helpful when looking for practical ways to deal with subsidiarity at both EU and Member states' levels. The present paper shows that subsidiarity as a principle is profoundly 'functional' in nature and, hence, is and must be a two-way principle. A functional subsidiarity test is developed and its application is illustrated for a range of policy issues in the internal market in its widest sense, for equity and for macro-economic stabilisation questions in European integration. Misapplications of 'subsidiarity' are also demonstrated. For a good understanding, subsidiarity being a functional, two-way principle neither means that elected politicians should not have the final (political!) say (for which they are accountable), nor that subsidiarity tests, even if properly conducted, cannot and will not be politicised once the results enter the policy debate. Such politicisation forms a natural run-up to the decision-making by those elected for it. But the quality and reasoning of the test as well as structuring the information in a logical sequence ( in accordance with the current protocol and with the one in the constitutional treaty) is likely to be directly helpful for decisionmakers, confronted with complicated and often specialised proposals. EU debates and decision-making is therefore best served by separating the functional subsidiarity test (prepared by independent professionals) from the final political decision itself. If the test were accepted Union-wide, it would also assist national parliaments in conducting comparable tests in a relatively short period, as the basis for possible joint action (as suggested by the constitutional treaty). The core of the paper explains how the test is formulated and applied. A functional approach to subsidiarity in the framework of European representative democracy seeks to find the optimal assignment of regulatory or policy competences to the various tiers of government. In the final analysis, this is about structures facilitating the highest possible welfare in the Union, in the fundamental sense that preferences and needs are best satisfied. What is required for such an analysis is no less than a systematic cost/benefit framework to assess the (de)merits of (de)centralisation in the EU.

Services in European Policies. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 16/2007

This paper’s objective is twofold. Firstly, it presents the case for services-related policies in the current European Union (EU). The services economy is frequently misunderstood, due to old and new myths that stem from the classic economic tradition. These myths obscure the role of the services economy in economic development. Nonetheless, the European services economy faces specific problems, such as lack of market integration, which amplifies arguments that justify policy actions toward services within a framework where market and systemic failures do apply. Secondly, this paper focuses on existing services-policies at the EU level, paying special attention to the internal market for services policies and to the complementary role of primarily non-regulatory policies. Within a comprehensive policy framework, each individual policy will have a higher impact, improved implementation and easier acceptance. Synergies among services-related policies should be promoted; the internal market policies, enterprise and industrial policies, competition policies and regional policies may take the lead in such a framework. Since the Lisbon Strategy, services have begun to gain recognition in EU policy agendas. This paper attempts to increase their visibility and to highlight their crucial role in European integration and in economic growth and social welfare.

How Social is European Integration? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 18/2007

The social dimension of the internal market or of the EU more generally has recently been under quite fundamental attack. Calls for 'Europe' to be 'more social' have been heard repeatedly. Witness the polarized debates about the services directive, the anxieties concerning several ECJ cases about what limitations of the free movement of workers (posted or not) are justified or the assertion of a 'neo-liberal agenda' in Brussels disregarding or eroding the social dimension. This BEEP Briefing paper takes an analytical approach to these issues and to the possible 'framing' involved. Such an analysis reveals a very different picture than the negative framing in such debates has it: there is nothing particular 'a-social' about the internal market or the EU at large. This overall conclusion is reached following five steps. First, several 'preliminaries' of the social dimension have to be kept in mind (including the two-tier regulatory & expenditure structure of what is too loosely called 'social Europe' ) and this is only too rarely done or at best in partial, hence misleading, ways. Second, the social acquis at EU and Member States' levels is spelled out, broken down into four aspects (social spending; labour market regulation; industrial relations; free movements & establishment). Assessing the EU acquis in the light of the two levels of powers shows clearly that it is the combination of the two levels which matters. Member States and e.g. labour unions do not want the EU level to become deeply involved ( with some exceptions) and the actual impact of free movement and establishment is throttled by far-reaching host-country control and the requirement of a 'high level of social protection' in the treaty. Third, six anxieties about the social dimension of the internal market are discussed and few arguments are found which are attributable to the EU or its weakening social dimension. Fourth, another six anxieties are discussed emerging from the socio-economic context of the social dimension of the EU at large. The analysis demonstrates that, even if these anxieties ought to be taken serious, the EU is hardly or not the culprit. Fifth, all this is complemented by a number of other facts or arguments strengthening the case that the EU social dimension is fine.

Financial Engineering Instruments and their Assessment Under EU State Aid Rules. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 26/2013

Financial engineering instruments such as guarantees, loans and equity are increasingly used in public funding of enterprises. These instruments have three attractive features: they are repayable, they “leverage” private involvement, and they have a multiplier effect because they generate new income. At the same time, however, they are technically complex and they are subject to state aid rules. Their assessment under EU state aid rules creates two additional problems. First, under certain conditions financial instruments may not contain state aid. This is when public authorities act as “private investors”. This means that state aid cannot be presumed to exist in all financial instruments. It must first be established through market analysis. Second, when state aid is found to be present it is not always possible to quantify it. For this reason the state aid rules that apply to financial instruments differ significantly from other rules. This paper reviews how financial instruments have been assessed by the European Commission and under which conditions the state aid they may contain can be considered to be compatible with the internal market. The paper finds that by and large Member States have succeeded to design measures that have all been approved by the Commission.

European Integration and Europeanisation: Benefits and Disadvantages for Business. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 29/2013

European integration is a project of great economic importance for the 500 million consumers and 21 million companies in Europe. With the economic borders between Member States removed, Europeanisation becomes inevitable for companies. The paper proposes a framework to analyse the benefits and disadvantages for business that come with the process of European integration, structured according to the logic of the four fundamental freedoms of movement within the Internal Market (freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people) complemented by the section on technology and innovation, and the general EU regulatory environment. Whereas the business decisions need to be taken on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration firm’s own capabilities and resources as well as industry specificities, several recommendations for companies willing to Europeanise are made, based on an analysis of the regulatory macro-environment of the EU. Above all, any company willing to be successful in the EU has to become a learning organisation, responsive to the advancements of the macro-environment. The ability to anticipate the regulatory developments and to adjust one’s own business and corporate strategy accordingly is the key to achieving sustainable competitive advantage in the European Union.

Mutual Recognition: economic and regulatory logic in goods and services. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 24/June 2012

Mutual recognition is one of the most appreciated innovations of the EU. The idea is that one can pursue market integration, indeed "deep' market integration, while respecting 'diversity' amongst the participating countries. Put differently, in pursuing 'free movement' for goods, mutual recognition facilitates free movement by disciplining the nature and scope of 'regulatory barriers', whilst allowing some degree of regulatory discretion for EU Member States. This BEER paper attempts to explain the rationale and logic of mutual recognition in the EU internal goods market, its working in actual practice for about three decades now, culminating in a qualitative cost/benefit analysis and its recent improvement in terms of 'governance' in the so-called New Legislative Framework (first denoted as the 2008 Goods package) thereby ameliorating the benefits/costs ratio. For new (in contrast to existing) national regulation, the intrusive EU procedure to impose mutual recognition is presented as well, with basic data so as to show its critical importance to keep the internal goods market free. All this is complemented by a short summary of the scant economic literature on mutual recognition. Subsequently, the analysis is extended to the internal market for services. This is done in two steps, first by reminding the debate on the origin principle (which goes further than mutual recognition EU-style) and how mutual recognition works under the horizontal services directive. This is followed by a short section on how mutual recognition works in vertical (i.e. sectoral) services markets.

The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization and Differentiation. IHS Political Science Series No. 137, 10 July 2014

This paper conceptualizes the European Union (EU) as a system of differentiated integration characterized by both variation in levels of centralization (vertical differentiation) and variation in territorial extension (horizontal differentiation) across policy areas. Differentiation has been a concomitant of deepening and widening and has increased and consolidated as the EU’s powers, policy scope, and membership have grown. Turning to explanation, the paper attributes the pattern of differentiated integration in the EU to the interaction of interdependence and politicization. Differentiation among the member states (internal differentiation) results from supranational integration under conditions of high interdependence and politicization. By contrast, external differentiation (the selective policy integration of non-member states) occurs in highly interdependent but weakly politicized policy areas. These constellations are illustrated in case studies of differentiation in the internal market, monetary union, and defence.

No Move without Free Movement: The EU-Swiss controversy over quotas for free movement of persons. CEPS Policy Brief No. 331, 23 April 2015

The focus of this Policy Brief is the Swiss referendum of 2014 against ‘mass immigration’ in Switzerland. It identifies the challenges that a quota on EU citizens’ free movement rights to Switzerland would pose to EU-Swiss relations, considering: i) the value of freedom of movement in the EU and its indivisibility from the internal market and other economic freedoms; ii) the specificity of the EU legal system following the Lisbon Treaty that established democratic and judicial accountability mechanisms; iii) the lack of supranational judicial oversight of the EU-Switzerland agreements framework; and iv) the existence of the so-called guillotine mechanism, according to which the termination of the Free Movement Agreement would entail the automatic termination of the other agreements with the EU. The authors set out a number of options and consider their implications for EU-Swiss relations.

Labour Mobility in the EU: Addressing challenges and ensuring ‘fair mobility’. CEPS Special Report No. 139, July 2016

Labour mobility creates economic benefits for the EU at large and the mobile workforce. The same can be said for the special case of posted workers – a form of labour mobility that is crucial to the functioning of the internal market for services. Moreover, the number of posted workers is set to grow if the single market is further deepened. However, regulating the cross-border posting of workers – and ensuring a notion of ‘fair mobility’ – also epitomises the inherent difficulties in squaring the differences of 28 different sets of labour market regimes and regulations with the freedom to provide services in situ. In addition, the regulation has to work effectively in countries with large differences in income levels and social policies. This paper reviews the state of play with regard to posted workers and spell out the trade-offs involved to be kept in mind when considering the targeted revision of the posted workers Directive.

A study of outcomes measures in forensic mental health

Outcomes measures, which is the measurement of effectiveness of interventions and services has been propelled onto the health service agenda since the introduction of the internal market in the 1990s. It arose as a result of the escalating cost of inpatient care, the need to identify what interventions work and in what situations, and the desire for effective information by service users enabled by the consumerist agenda introduced by Working for Patients white paper. The research reported in this thesis is an assessment of the readiness of the forensic mental health service to measure outcomes of interventions. The research examines the type, prevalence and scope of use of outcomes measures, and further seeks a consensus of views of key stakeholders on the priority areas for future development. It discusses the theoretical basis for defining health and advocates the argument that the present focus on measuring effectiveness of care is misdirected without the input of users, particularly patients in their care, drawing together the views of the many stakeholders who have an interest in the provision of care in the service. The research further draws on the theory of structuration to demonstrate the degree to which a duality of action, which is necessary for the development, and use of outcomes measures is in place within the service. Consequently, it highlights some of the hurdles that need to be surmounted before effective measurement of health gain can be developed in the field of study. It concludes by advancing the view that outcomes research can enable practitioners to better understand the relationship between the illness of the patient and the efficacy of treatment. This understanding it is argued would contribute to improving dialogue between the health care practitioner and the patient, and further providing the information necessary for moving away from untested assumptions, which are numerous in the field about the superiority of one treatment approach over another.

Changing treaty and changing economic context:the dynamic relationship of the legislature and the judiciary in the pursuit of capital liberalisation

Introduction For a significant period of time (the late 1950s--1980s), a lack of capital freedom was a major obstacle to the progress of the internal market project. The free movements of goods, persons and services were achieved, and developed, primarily through the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). On the other hand, the Court played a (self-imposed) limited role in the development of the free movement of capital. It was through a progressive series of legislation that the freedom was finally achieved. John Usher has noted that the consequence of this is that ‘free movement of capital thus became the only Treaty “freedom” to be achieved in the manner envisaged in the Treaty’. For this reason, the relationship of the Court and legislature in this area is of particular importance in the broader context of the internal market. The rest of this chapter is split into four sections and will attempt to describe (and account for) the differing relationships between the legislature and the judiciary during the different stages of capital liberalisation. Section 2 will deal with the situation under the original Treaty of Rome. Section 3 will examine a single legislative intervention: Directive 88/361. It was this intervention that contained the obligation for Member States to fully liberalise capital movements. It is therefore the most important contribution to the completion of the internal market in the capital sphere. An examination will be made of whether the interpretation of the Directive demonstrates a changed (or changing attitude) of the Court towards the EU legislature. Section 4 will examine the changes brought about by the Treaty on European Union in 1993. It was at Maastricht that the Member States finally introduced into the Treaty framework an absolute obligation to liberalise capital movements. Finally, Section 5 will consider the Treaty of Lisbon and the possibility of future interventions by the legislature. By looking at the patterns that run through the different parts, this chapter will attempt to engage with the question of whether the approaches were products of their historical context, or whether they can be applied to other areas within the capital movement sphere.