Intervir através da educação física na coeducação: realidade ou intenção?

Intervir de forma consciente e organizada em prol da promoção da igualdade de oportunidades na escola tem sido, nas últimas décadas, um dos propósitos da Educação Física (EF) na Europa. Através das rotinas e das oportunidades que se proporcionam, rapazes e raparigas têm acesso a uma prática de atividade física e desportiva (AFD) que lhes possibilita aperfeiçoar capacidades, competências e atitudes. Consideramos que o contributo da EF na educação é de um valor significativo, viabilizando às crianças e jovens construir a sua imagem corporal e os estereótipos de género, desenvolver afectos e emoções, cultivar a sua relação com os outros, criar capacidades e valores, ajudando deste modo uma formação das atitudes individuais ou coletivas, que respeitem a igualdade de género e, por isso, os direitos humanos. Este estudo foi realizado a partir da informação recolhida, através da aplicação de um questionário, a uma amostra de 993 crianças, 57.5% raparigas e 42.5% rapazes, com idades compreendidas entre os 10 e 12 anos, pertencentes a várias escolas do ensino público e ambicionou comparar as perceções e preferências de rapazes e raparigas relativamente às práticas AFD que decorrem na disciplina de EF, para se poderem apresentar alternativas de práticas mais flexíveis e integradoras. A partir dos nossos resultados podemos concluir que a AFD na escola continua a ser muito marcada por práticas de técnicas de movimento, jogos e competições desportivas, vivências muito identificadas com os estereótipos masculinos e que, nem sempre ajudam à formação de um bom esquema corporal e de comportamentos que se tendem a manter ao longo da vida, para muita(o)s jovens. Sugerimos que as atividades oferecidas às crianças e jovens nas escolas sejam mais diversificadas e inclusivas, impondo um nível de desempenho e de satisfação mais adequado a cada caso em particular, devendo estar mais centradas quer em atividades de ar livre, quer em práticas que desenvolvem também as dimensões sensitiva, expressiva e corporal do(a)s aluno(a)s.

Laboratory assessment of the hypertensive individual. Value of the main guidelines for high blood pressure

OBJECTIVE: To determine if abnormal laboratory findings are more common in individuals with hypertension and in those with other risk factors, such as obesity, smoking and alcohol ingestion. METHODS: A study was carried out in the general outpatient clinics of a university hospital (145 individuals without previous diagnosis of hypertension) and the following variables were assessed: high blood pressure (as defined by the VI Joint National Committee on Prevention, Detection and Treatment of High Blood Pressure - VI JNC), obesity [calculated using body mass index (BMI)], tobacco use, and alcoholic ingestion. The laboratory examinations consisted of the following tests: hemogram, glycemia, uric acid, potassium, total/HDL-fraction cholesterol, triglycerides, calcium and creatinine. RESULTS: High blood pressure was not associated with a higher number of abnormal laboratory tests. Hypertensive individuals with a BMI > or = 25kg/m² or normotensive obese individuals, however, had a higher frequency of diabetes (12X), hypertriglyceridemia (3X), and hypercholesterolemia (2X), as compared with hypertensive individuals with BMI <25kg/m² and preobese/normal weight normotensive individuals. CONCLUSION: High blood pressure is not associated with a higher frequency of abnormal laboratory tests. The association of high blood pressure and obesity, however, increases the detection of diabetes and dyslipidemias.

Organização do tempo do estudo musical: sugestões pedagógicas para a gestão do tempo do estudo individual do oboé

Relatório de estágio de mestrado em Ensino de Música

economics of happiness : an empirical analysis of the effects of (un-)employment on individual life satisfaction

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2010

Microhabitats de mosquitos (Diptera, Culicidae) em internódios de taquara na Mata Atlântica, Paraná, Brasil

During two consecutive years, from January 1985 to December 1986, a comparative study of mosquitoes preferences for breeding habitat was carried out in the Atlantic Forest of the Serra do Mar, Paraná State, Brazil. To achieve it, 1875 bamboo internodes aligned vertically in live green, bamboo plants Merostachys speciosa Munro and Merostachys sp. were used, in which metabolic water was exuded from the plant itself, and presenting different size/pattern holes at their lateral walls, bored by the local sylvan fauna. Another group of 1200 individual internode traps was used as comparative element, carved out with a transversal cut by a saw, filled with local stream water and held in branches at different heights in the vegetal strata nearby. At both microhabitat types, a total of 17 culicid species was registered. Culex (Microculex) neglectus Lutz, 1904, Cx. (Carrollia) soperi Antunes & Lane, 1937, Sabethes (Sabethes) batesi Lane & Cerqueira, 1942 and Sa. (Sabethinus) melanonymphe (Dyar, 1924)colonized exclusively live plant internodes, while Culex (Microculex) elongatus Rozeboom & Lane, 1950, Cx. (Carrollia) iridescens (Lutz, 1905), Cx. (Carrollia) kompi Valencia,1973and Trichoprosopon (Trichoprosopon) soaresi Dyar & Knab, 1907 bred only in internode traps. The remaining nine species colonized both habitats indistinctly. Quantitatively, was detected the abundance of 60.1% at live green internodes, against 39.9% for internode traps. Concerning the different patterns of bored live internode holes, 40.3% of the total computed specimens were collected in square or rectangular holes, 31.9% in two hole internodes, one minute circular, the other wider, and the remaining 28.8% of specimens distributed in other pattern type internodes. The mosquitoes breeding at these microhabitats fall in the culicid entomofauna specialized at locating and detecting peculiar and propitious mesogen conditions for breeding purposes.

A Characterization of single-peaked preferences

We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order $L$ over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are single-peaked with respect L. The first property states that for any subset of alternatives the set of alternatives considered as the worst by all agents cannot contains more than 2 elements. The second property states that two agents cannot disagree on the relative ranking of two alternatives with respect to a third alternative but agree on the (relative) ranking of a fourth one. Classification-JEL: D71, C78

Corrigendum stable matchings and preferences of couples

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Approval voting ion dichotomous preferences

The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.

Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule

We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners always exist. We model situations where a set of individuals must choose one individual in the group. Agents are connected through some relationship that can be interpreted as expressing neighborhood, and which is formalized by a graph. Our restriction on preferences is as follows: each agent can freely rank his immediate neighbors, but then he is indifferent between each neighbor and all other agents that this neighbor "leads to". Hence, agents can be highly perceptive regarding their neighbors, while being insensitive to the differences between these and other agents which are further removed from them. We show quasi-transitivity of the majority relation when the graph expressing the neighborhood relation is a tree. We also discuss a further restriction allowing to extend the result for more general graphs. Finally, we compare the proposed restriction with others in the literature, to conclude that it is independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.

Environmental management problems, future generations and social decisions

The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.