Structural health monitoring: a practical approach to achieving in-situ and site-specific warning of pipeline corrosion and coating failure

An approach to achieving the ambitious goal of cost effectively extending the safe operation life of energy pipelines to, for instance, 100 years is the application of structural health monitoring and life prediction tools that are able to provide long-term remnant pipeline life prediction and in-situ pipeline condition monitoring. A critical step in pipeline structural health monitoring is the enhancement of technological capabilities that are required for quantifying the effects of key factors influencing buried pipeline corrosion and environmentally assisted materials degradation, and the development of condition monitoring technologies that are able to provide in-situ monitoring and site-specific warning of pipeline damage. This paper provides an overview of our current research aimed at developing new sensors for monitoring, categorising and quantifying the level and nature of external pipeline and coating damages under the combined effects of various inter-related variables and processes such as localised corrosion, coating damage and disbondment, cathodic shielding. The concept of in-situ monitoring and site-specific warning of pipeline corrosion is illustrated by a case of monitoring localised corrosion under disbonded coatings using a new corrosion monitoring probe. A basic principle that underpins the use of sensors to monitor localised corrosion has been presented: Localised corrosion and coating failure are not an accidental occurrence, it occurs as the result of fundamental thermodynamic instability of a metal exposed to a specific environment. Therefore corrosion and coating disbondment occurring on a pipeline will also occur on a sensor made of the same material and exposed to the same pipeline condition. Although the exact location of localised corrosion or coating disbondment could be difficult to pinpoint along the length of a buried pipeline, the ‘worst-case scenario’ and high risk pipeline sections and sites are predictable. Sensors can be embedded at these strategic sites to collect data that contain ‘predictor features’ signifying the occurrence of localised corrosion, CP failure, coating disbondment and degradation. Information from these sensors will enable pipeline owners to prioritise site survey and inspection operations, and to develop maintenance strategy to manage aged pipelines, rather than replace them.

Fire Hazard in Coconino County, Arizona

Fire is a major management issue in the southwestern United States. Three spatial models of fire risk for Coconino County, Northern Arizona. These models were generated using thematic data layers depicting vegetation, elevation, wind speed and direction, and precipitation for January (winter), June (summer), and July (start of monsoon season). ArcGIS 9.0 was used to weight attributes in raster layers to reflect their influence on fire risk and to interpolate raster data layers from point data. Final models were generated using the raster calculator in the Spatial Analyst extension of ArcGIS 9.0. Ultimately, the unique combinations of variables resulted in three different models illustrating the change in fire risk during the year.

Hazard Areas Associated with Major Volcanoes in the Cascade Mountain Range

The Cascade Mountain Range in Washington State is the site of several active volcanoes that have the potential to erupt which would deeply affect the lives of those who live near them. This study explores the hazard areas associated with the five largest volcanoes in the region: Mt. Baker, Glacier Peak, Mt. Rainier, Mt. Adams and Mt. St. Helens. It was determined which geographic regions would be affected by tephra, pyroclastic blasts and lahar flows and the associated populations that live in each of these areas. The level of emergency preparedness necessary for a volcanic eruption could be better determined based on the findings of this study.

Development Of Water Pollution Early Warning System For Oyster Harvesting Areas

The objective of this study is to develop a Pollution Early Warning System (PEWS) for efficient management of water quality in oyster harvesting areas. To that end, this paper presents a web-enabled, user-friendly PEWS for managing water quality in oyster harvesting areas along Louisiana Gulf Coast, USA. The PEWS consists of (1) an Integrated Space-Ground Sensing System (ISGSS) gathering data for environmental factors influencing water quality, (2) an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) model for predicting the level of fecal coliform bacteria, and (3) a web-enabled, user-friendly Geographic Information System (GIS) platform for issuing water pollution advisories and managing oyster harvesting waters. The ISGSS (data acquisition system) collects near real-time environmental data from various sources, including NASA MODIS Terra and Aqua satellites and in-situ sensing stations managed by the USGS and the NOAA. The ANN model is developed using the ANN program in MATLAB Toolbox. The ANN model involves a total of 6 independent environmental variables, including rainfall, tide, wind, salinity, temperature, and weather type along with 8 different combinations of the independent variables. The ANN model is constructed and tested using environmental and bacteriological data collected monthly from 2001 – 2011 by Louisiana Molluscan Shellfish Program at seven oyster harvesting areas in Louisiana Coast, USA. The ANN model is capable of explaining about 76% of variation in fecal coliform levels for model training data and 44% for independent data. The web-based GIS platform is developed using ArcView GIS and ArcIMS. The web-based GIS system can be employed for mapping fecal coliform levels, predicted by the ANN model, and potential risks of norovirus outbreaks in oyster harvesting waters. The PEWS is able to inform decision-makers of potential risks of fecal pollution and virus outbreak on a daily basis, greatly reducing the risk of contaminated oysters to human health.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.

Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor's incentives leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures and relate this to the current debate on revising international financial architecture. Paper prepared for Bank of England Conference on "The Role of the Official and Private Sectors in Resolving International Financial Crises", London, and for the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil. (Preliminary draft circulated for comments, please do not cite without reference to the authors).

Renegociação de dívidas e moral hazard: uma análise do efeito da política de descontos no pagamento de dívidas de cartões de crédito

O Brasil vem vivenciando um aumento na demanda por cartões de crédito, principalmente nas classes baixas. Entretanto, a população de menor renda e menor qualificação representa maior riscos para a operação. Este fato é evidenciado pelas altas taxas de inadimplência. Exposto isso, empresas se utilizam de estratégias de renegociação de dívida na tentativa de recuperar parte do investimento realizado. Entretanto, poucos foram os estudos acerca da consequência no longo prazo destas estratégias. Utilizando os experimentos realizados por uma empresa de cartão de crédito, cujas campanhas de renegociação variavam mês a mês, este estudo, procurou evidências de que as ofertas de renegociação de dívidas podem afetar a reputação da firma, fazendo com que clientes da rede mesma rede social deste que recebeu a oferta de renegociação também fiquem inadimplentes. Concluímos que o aumento do desconto nas negociações tem um efeito significativo sobre o incentivo do cliente em honrar suas obrigações junto a empresa, ou seja, o aumento de 0,01 p.p. no desconto dado aos clientes aumenta em 0,05 sua probabilidade em atrasar sua fatura no próximo período.

Implied Hazard Rates Analysis Through Brazilian Corporate Debt

No Brasil, o mercado de crédito corporativo ainda é sub-aproveitado. A maioria dos participantes não exploram e não operam no mercado secundário, especialmente no caso de debêntures. Apesar disso, há inúmeras ferramentas que poderiam ajudar os participantes do mercado a analisar o risco de crédito e encorajá-los a operar esses riscos no mercado secundário. Essa dissertação introduz um modelo livre de arbitragem que extrai a Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita nos preços de mercado. É uma forma reduzida do modelo proposto por Duffie and Singleton (1999) e modela a estrutura a termo das taxas de juros através de uma Função Constante por Partes. Através do modelo, foi possível analisar a Curva de Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita através dos diferentes instrumentos de emissores corporativos brasileiros, utilizando Títulos de Dívida, Swaps de Crédito e Debêntures. Foi possível comparar as diferentes curvas e decidir, em cada caso analisado, qual a melhor alternativa para se tomar o risco de crédito da empresa, via Títulos de Dívida, Debêntures ou Swaps de Crédito.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

APPLICATION of THE HAZARD ANALYSIS and CRITICAL CONTROL POINT (HACCP) SYSTEM on THE MUSHROOM PROCESSING LINE FOR FRESH CONSUMPTION

The Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) is a preventive system that intends to guarantee the safety and harmlessness of food. It improves the quality of products as it eliminates possible defects during the process, and saves costs by practically eliminating final product inspection. This work describes the typical hazards encountered on the mushroom processing line for fresh consumption. Throughout the process, only the reception stage of mushrooms has been considered a critical control point (CCP). The main hazards at this stage were: the presence of unauthorised phytosanitary products; larger doses of such products than those permitted; the presence of pathogenic bacteria or thermo-stable enterotoxins. Putting into practice such knowledge would provide any industry that processes mushrooms for fresh consumption with a self-control HACCP-based system for its own productions.