Bootstrap and Fast Double Bootstrap Tests of Cointegration Rank with Financial Time Series

The likelihood ratio test of cointegration rank is the most widely used test for cointegration. Many studies have shown that its finite sample distribution is not well approximated by the limiting distribution. The article introduces and evaluates by Monte Carlo simulation experiments bootstrap and fast double bootstrap (FDB) algorithms for the likelihood ratio test. It finds that the performance of the bootstrap test is very good. The more sophisticated FDB produces a further improvement in cases where the performance of the asymptotic test is very unsatisfactory and the ordinary bootstrap does not work as well as it might. Furthermore, the Monte Carlo simulations provide a number of guidelines on when the bootstrap and FDB tests can be expected to work well. Finally, the tests are applied to US interest rates and international stock prices series. It is found that the asymptotic test tends to overestimate the cointegration rank, while the bootstrap and FDB tests choose the correct cointegration rank.

How Do Different Types of Investors React to New Financial Statement Information?

The study contributes to our understanding of the forces that drive the stock market by investigating how different types of investors react to new financial statement information. Using the extremely comprehensive official register of share holdings in Finland, we find that the majority of investors are more probable to sell (buy) stocks in a company after a positive (negative) earnings surprise, and show a bias towards buying after the disclosure of new financial statement information. Large investors, on the other hand, show behavior opposite to that of the majority of investors in the market. Further, foreign investors show behavior similar to that of domestic investors. We suggest investor overconfidence and asymmetric information as possible explanations for the documented behavior.

The Power of Bootstrap Tests of Cointegration Rank with Financial Time Series

Bootstrap likelihood ratio tests of cointegration rank are commonly used because they tend to have rejection probabilities that are closer to the nominal level than the rejection probabilities of the correspond- ing asymptotic tests. The e¤ect of bootstrapping the test on its power is largely unknown. We show that a new computationally inexpensive procedure can be applied to the estimation of the power function of the bootstrap test of cointegration rank. The bootstrap test is found to have a power function close to that of the level-adjusted asymp- totic test. The bootstrap test estimates the level-adjusted power of the asymptotic test highly accurately. The bootstrap test may have low power to reject the null hypothesis of cointegration rank zero, or underestimate the cointegration rank. An empirical application to Euribor interest rates is provided as an illustration of the findings.

Tax havens and their impacts on the non-haven countries

Tax havens have attracted increasing attention from the authorities of non-haven countries. The financial crisis exacerbates the negative attitude to tax havens. Offshore zones are now under strong pressure from the international, both financial and political institutions. Thus, the thesis will focus on the current problem of the modern economy, namely tax havens and their impact on the non-haven countries. This thesis will be based on the several articles, in particular “Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens” by Joel Slemrod and John D. Wilson (University of Michigan, 2009) and “Do Havens Divert Economic Activity” by James R. Hines Jr., C. Fritz Foley and Mihir A. Desai (Ross School of Business, 2005). This paper provides two completely different and contradictory viewpoints on the problem of coexisting tax havens and non-haven countries. There are two models, examined in this work, present two important researches. The first one will be concentrated on the positive effect from tax havens whereas the last model will be focused on the completely negative effect from offshore jurisdictions. The first model gives us a good explanation and proof of its statement why tax havens can positively influence on nearby high-tax countries. It describes that the existence of offshore jurisdictions can stimulate the growth of operations and facilitates economic activity in non-haven countries. In contrast to above mentioned, the model with quite opposite view was presented. This economic model and its analysis confirms the undesirability of the existence of offshore areas. Taking into consideration, that the jurisdictions choose their optimal policy, the elimination of offshores will have positive impact on the rest of countries. The model proofs the statement that full or partial elimination of tax havens raises the equilibrium level of the public good and increases country welfare. According to the following study, it can be concluded that both of the models provide telling arguments to prove their assertions. Thereby both of these points of view have their right to exist. Nevertheless, the ongoing debate concerning this issue still will raise a lot of questions.

Factors Affecting Knowledge Sharing in Strategic Alliances: The Role of Knowledge Sharing as Strategic Control Behavior among Multinational Enterprises

International strategic alliances (ISAs) have become increasingly important for the stability, growth, and long-term viability of modern business organizations. Alliance partnerships as inter-firm cooperative ventures represent an influential mechanism for asserting corporate strategic control among autonomous multinational enterprises. These different cooperative arrangements are made of equity investments or contractually-based partnerships. Different alliance forms represent different approaches that partner firms adopt to control their mutual dependence on the alliance and on other partners. Earlier research shows that the partner characteristics could provide an explanation for alliance strategic behavior and see alliances as alternative forms to markets or hierarchies for addressing specific strategic needs linked to partners’ characteristics and their subsequent strategic motives. These characteristics of the partners’ and subsequent strategic motives are analyzed as knowledge sharing factors and how these influence inter-firm control in alliances within the context of the focal-firm STMicroelectronics and its alliance partners Nokia, Ericsson and IBM. This study underline that as contracts are incomplete, they are therefore required to maintain mutual dependence based control mechanisms in addition to a contract. For example, mutual dependence based control mechanisms could be joint financial investments and the building of an ownership structure between the parties (e.g., JVs). However, the present study clarifies that subsequent inter-firm control is also exercised through inter-firm knowledge sharing. The present study contributes by presenting a dynamic interplay between competitive and cooperative rent seeking behavior. Such coopetition behavior describes the firm's strategic orientation to achieve a dynamic balance between competitive and cooperative strategies. This balance is seen in knowledge sharing based cooperation and competition behavior. Thus this study clarifies coopetition strategies by introducing the role of inter-firm cooperation and the competitive nature of knowledge sharing. Simultaneous cooperative and competitive behavior is also seen as synergetic rent-seeking behavior. Therefore, this study extends the perspective of previous studies on competitive and cooperative seeking behavior.