957 resultados para Economics, Finance|Transportation
Resumo:
The intention of this paper is to analyse how audit courts affect tax morale, controlling in a multivariate analysis for a broad variety of potential factors. Switzerland, with its variety of audit-court competence among the cantons, has been analysed. With data from the ISSP [1998] (Swiss data 1999), evidence has been found that higher audit-court competence has a significantly positive effect on tax morale. Thus, the results in Switzerland suggest that in the cantons where audit courts are not just knights without swords; they help improve taxpayers' tax morale and thus citizens' intrinsic motivation to pay taxes.
Resumo:
It is now well known that pesticide spraying by farmers has an adverse impact on their health. This is especially so in developing countries where pesticide spraying is undertaken manually. The estimated health costs are large. Studies to date have examined farmers’ exposure to pesticides, the costs of ill-health and their determinants based on information provided by farmers. Hence, some doubt has been cast on the reliability of such studies. In this study, we rectify this situation by conducting surveys among two groups of farmers. Farmers who perceive that their ill-health is due to exposure to pesticides and obtained treatment and farmers whose ill-health have been diagnosed by doctors and who have been treated in hospital for exposure to pesticides. In the paper, cost comparisons between the two groups of farmers are made. Furthermore, regression analysis of the determinants of health costs show that the quantity of pesticides used per acre per month, frequency of pesticide use and number of pesticides used per hour per day are the most important determinants of medical costs for both samples. The results have important policy implications.
Resumo:
The idea of collective unintelligence is examined in this paper to highlight some of the conceptual and practical problems faced in modeling groups. Examples drawn from international crises and economics provide illustrative problems of collective failures to act in intelligent ways, despite the inputs and efforts of many skilled and intelligent parties. Choices made of “appropriate” perceptions, analysis and evaluations are examined along with how these might be combined. A simple vector representation illustrates some of the issues and creative possibilities in multi-party actions. Revealed as manifest (un-)intelligence are the resolutions of various problems and potentials that arise in dealing with the “each and all” of a group (wherein items are necessarily non-parallel and of unequal valency). Such issues challenge those seeking to model collective intelligence, but much may be learned.
Resumo:
Fishers are faced with multiple risks, including unpredictability of future catch rates, prices and costs. While the latter are largely beyond the control of fisheries managers, effective fisheries management should reduce uncertainty about future catches. Different management instruments are likely to have different impacts on the risk perception of fishers, and this should manifest itself in their implicit discount rate. Assuming licence and quota values represent the net present value of the flow of expected future profits, then a proxy for the implicit discount rate of vessels in a fishery can be derived by the ratio of the average level of profits to the average licence/quota value. From this, an indication of the risk perception can be derived, assuming higher discount rates reflect higher levels of systematic risk. In this paper, we apply the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to determine the risk premium implicit in the discount rates for a range of Australian fisheries, and compare this with the set of management instruments in place. We test the assumption that rights based management instruments lower perceptions of risk in fisheries. We find little evidence to support this assumption. although the analysis was based on only limited data.
Resumo:
Authorised users (insiders) are behind the majority of security incidents with high financial impacts. Because authorisation is the process of controlling users’ access to resources, improving authorisation techniques may mitigate the insider threat. Current approaches to authorisation suffer from the assumption that users will (can) not depart from the expected behaviour implicit in the authorisation policy. In reality however, users can and do depart from the canonical behaviour. This paper argues that the conflict of interest between insiders and authorisation mechanisms is analogous to the subset of problems formally studied in the field of game theory. It proposes a game theoretic authorisation model that can ensure users’ potential misuse of a resource is explicitly considered while making an authorisation decision. The resulting authorisation model is dynamic in the sense that its access decisions vary according to the changes in explicit factors that influence the cost of misuse for both the authorisation mechanism and the insider.
Resumo:
Capacity reduction programs in the form of buybacks or decommissioning programs have had relatively widespread application in fisheries in the US, Europe and Australia. A common criticism of such programs is that they remove the least efficient vessels first, resulting in an increase in average efficiency of the remaining fleet. The effective fishing power of the fleet, therefore, does not decrease in proportion to the number of vessels removed. Further, reduced crowding may increase efficiency of the remaining vessels. In this paper, the effects of a buyback program on average technical efficiency in Australia’s Northern Prawn Fishery are examined using a multi-output distance function approach with an explicit inefficiency model. The results indicate that average efficiency of the remaining vessels was greater than that of the removed vessels, and that average efficiency of remaining vessels also increased as a result of reduced crowding.
Resumo:
The stylized facts that motivate this thesis include the diversity in growth patterns that are observed across countries during the process of economic development, and the divergence over time in income distributions both within and across countries. This thesis constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model in which technology adoption is costly and agents are heterogeneous in their initial holdings of resources. Given the households‟ resource level, this study examines how adoption costs influence the evolution of household income over time and the timing of transition to more productive technologies. The analytical results of the model constructed here characterize three growth outcomes associated with the technology adoption process depending on productivity differences between the technologies. These are appropriately labeled as „poverty trap‟, „dual economy‟ and „balanced growth‟. The model is then capable of explaining the observed diversity in growth patterns across countries, as well as divergence of incomes over time. Numerical simulations of the model furthermore illustrate features of this transition. They suggest that that differences in adoption costs account for the timing of households‟ decision to switch technology which leads to a disparity in incomes across households in the technology adoption process. Since this determines the timing of complete adoption of the technology within a country, the implications for cross-country income differences are obvious. Moreover, the timing of technology adoption appears to be impacts on patterns of growth of households, which are different across various income groups. The findings also show that, in the presence of costs associated with the adoption of more productive technologies, inequalities of income and wealth may increase over time tending to delay the convergence in income levels. Initial levels of inequalities in the resources also have an impact on the date of complete adoption of more productive technologies. The issue of increasing income inequality in the process of technology adoption opens up another direction for research. Specifically increasing inequality implies that distributive conflicts may emerge during the transitional process with political- economy consequences. The model is therefore extended to include such issues. Without any political considerations, taxes would leads to a reduction in inequality and convergence of incomes across agents. However this process is delayed if politico-economic influences are taken into account. Moreover, the political outcome is sub optimal. This is essentially due to the fact that there is a resistance associated with the complete adoption of the advanced technology.
Resumo:
This paper explores what determines the survival of people in a life–and-death situation. The sinking of the Titanic allows us to inquire whether pro-social behavior matters in such extreme situations. This event can be considered a quasi-natural experiment. The empirical results suggest that social norms such as ‘women and children first’ are persevered during such an event. Women of reproductive age and crew members had a higher probability of survival. Passenger class, fitness, group size, and cultural background also mattered.
Resumo:
This paper explores the conditions of acceptability of differing allocation systems under scarcity and evaluates what makes a price system more or less fair. We find that fairness in an allocation arrangement depend on the institutional settings inherent in the situation, such as information, transparency and competition and the perceived institutional quality e.g., fiscal exchange and institutional trust). Results also indicate that the solution “weak people first” is seen as the fairest approach to an excess demand situation, followed by “first come, first serve”, the price system and an auction system. On the other hand, a random procedure or an allocation through the government is not perceived to be fair. Moreover, economics students seemed to be less sceptical towards the price system than other subjects although we observe that female students are more sceptical than male students.
Resumo:
The topics of corruption and tax evasion have attracted significant attention in the literature in recent years. We build on that literature by investigating empirically: (1) whether attitudes toward corruption and tax evasion vary systematically with gender and (2) whether gender differences decline as men and women face similar opportunities for illicit behavior. We use data on eight Western European countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. The results reveal significantly greater aversion to corruption and tax evasion among women. This holds across countries and time, and across numerous empirical specifications. (JEL H260, D730, J160, Z130)
Resumo:
To understand human behavior, it is important to know under what conditions people deviate from selfish rationality. This study explores the interaction of natural survival instincts and internalized social norms using data on the sinking of the Titanic and the Lusitania. We show that time pressure appears to be crucial when explaining behavior under extreme conditions of life and death. Even though the two vessels and the composition of their passengers were quite similar, the behavior of the individuals on board was dramatically different. On the Lusitania, selfish behavior dominated (which corresponds to the classical homo oeconomicus); on the Titanic, social norms and social status (class) dominated, which contradicts standard economics. This difference could be attributed to the fact that the Lusitania sank in 18 minutes, creating a situation in which the short-run flight impulse dominates behavior. On the slowly sinking Titanic (2 hours, 40 minutes), there was time for socially determined behavioral patterns to re-emerge. To our knowledge, this is the first time that these shipping disasters have been analyzed in a comparative manner with advanced statistical (econometric) techniques using individual data of the passengers and crew. Knowing human behavior under extreme conditions allows us to gain insights about how varied human behavior can be depending on differing external conditions.
Resumo:
This paper uses a multivariate analysis to examine how countries‘ tax morale and institutional quality affect the shadow economy. The literature strongly emphasizes the quantitative importance of these factors in understanding the level of and changes in the shadow economy. Newly available data sources offer the unique opportunity to further illuminate a topic that has received increased attention. After controlling for a variety of potential factors, we find strong support that a higher tax morale and a higher institutional quality lead to a smaller shadow economy.
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Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is an alternative bottom-up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems. This paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).
Resumo:
This article reviews what international evidence exists on the impact of civil and criminal sanctions upon serious tax noncompliance by individuals. This construct lacks sharp definitional boundaries but includes large tax fraud and large-scale evasion that are not dealt with as fraud. Although substantial research and theory have been developed on general tax evasion and compliance, their conclusions might not apply to large-scale intentional fraudsters. No scientifically defensible studies directly compared civil and criminal sanctions for tax fraud, although one U.S. study reported that significantly enhanced criminal sanctions have more effects than enhanced audit levels. Prosecution is public, whereas administrative penalties are confidential, and this fact encourages those caught to pay heavy penalties to avoid publicity, a criminal record, and imprisonment.
Resumo:
In this reply we show that the Nüesch (2009) comment paper to our initial contribution (Torgler and Schmidt 2007) has several shortcomings. He suggests that professional soccer wages seem to buy talent rather than motivation. We therefore provide a larger set of talent proxies and estimations to check whether this assertion is correct. Our results indicate that his conclusion is problematic. We still observe a strong motivational effect, and in some cases the effect is even larger than the talent effect. A further key problem in Nüesch’s contribution is the fact that he neglects to consider the relevance of the relative salary situation.