Robustness of mutual information to inter-subject variability for automatic artefact removal from EEG

The externally recorded electroencephalogram (EEG) is contaminated with signals that do not originate from the brain, collectively known as artefacts. Thus, EEG signals must be cleaned prior to any further analysis. In particular, if the EEG is to be used in online applications such as Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) the removal of artefacts must be performed in an automatic manner. This paper investigates the robustness of Mutual Information based features to inter-subject variability for use in an automatic artefact removal system. The system is based on the separation of EEG recordings into independent components using a temporal ICA method, RADICAL, and the utilisation of a Support Vector Machine for classification of the components into EEG and artefact signals. High accuracy and robustness to inter-subject variability is achieved.

I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject

Abstract I argue for the following claims: [1] all uses of I (the word ‘I’ or thought-element I) are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I. [2] no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless [3] I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though [4] I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, and although [5] if I’m thinking about something specifically as myself, I can’t fail to be thinking of myself, and although [6] a genuine understanding use of I always involves the subject thinking of itself as itself, whatever else it does or doesn’t involve, and although [7] if I take myself to be thinking about myself, then I am thinking about myself.

Selfishness and altruism can coexist when help is subject to diminishing returns

Altruism and selfishness are 30–50% heritable in man in both Western and non-Western populations. This genetically based variation in altruism and selfishness requires explanation. In non-human animals, altruism is generally directed towards relatives, and satisfies the condition known as Hamilton's rule. This nepotistic altruism evolves under natural selection only if the ratio of the benefit of receiving help to the cost of giving it exceeds a value that depends on the relatedness of the individuals involved. Standard analyses assume that the benefit provided by each individual is the same but it is plausible in some cases that as more individuals contribute, help is subject to diminishing returns. We analyse this situation using a single-locus two-allele model of selection in a diploid population with the altruistic allele dominant to the selfish allele. The analysis requires calculation of the relationship between the fitnesses of the genotypes and the frequencies of the genes. The fitnesses vary not only with the genotype of the individual but also with the distribution of phenotypes amongst the sibs of the individual and this depends on the genotypes of his parents. These calculations are not possible by direct fitness or ESS methods but are possible using population genetics. Our analysis shows that diminishing returns change the operation of natural selection and the outcome can now be a stable equilibrium between altruistic and selfish alleles rather than the elimination of one allele or the other. We thus provide a plausible genetic model of kin selection that leads to the stable coexistence in the same population of both altruistic and selfish individuals. This may explain reported genetic variation in altruism in man.

Robust pole assignment in systems subject to structured perturbations

The problem of robust pole assignment by feedback in a linear, multivariable, time-invariant system which is subject to structured perturbations is investigated. A measure of robustness, or sensitivity, of the poles to a given class of perturbations is derived, and a reliable and efficient computational algorithm is presented for constructing a feedback which assigns the prescribed poles and optimizes the robustness measure.

The vulnerable subject of negligence law

The approach taken by English courts to the duty of care question in negligence has been subject to harsh criticism in recent years. This article examines this fundamental issue in tort law, drawing upon Canadian and Australian jurisprudence by way of comparison. From this analysis, the concept of vulnerability is developed as a productive means of understanding the duty of care. Vulnerability is of increasing interest in legal and political theory and it is of particular relevance to the law of negligence. In addition to aiding doctrinal coherence, vulnerability – with its focus on relationships and care – has the potential to broaden the way in which the subject of tort law is conceived because it challenges dominant assumptions about autonomy as being prior to the relationships on which it is dependent.