The Family Partners Credit Card: A Token Economy System Adapted for Intensive Family Preservation Services to Enable Families to Manage Difficult Behavior of Adolescents

Increasingly, families referred for Intensive Family Preservation Services have not experienced a crisis of maltreatment, focused on the parent; rather these families have children with chronic behavioral difficulties for which their parents lack the skills to cope. These are the same families whose children were formerly placed in residential programs. This paper presents The Family Partners Credit Card System, incorporating behavioral techniques developed to treat children in out-of-home placements into a family preservation model. Two case examples illustrate how the system has been modified to train biological or adoptive parents in parenting skills, enable them to teach their children pro-family behaviors, and reinforce new behaviors through a credit card that monitors an ongoing balance of credits and fines.

Veröffentlichungen des Bureaus für Statistik der Juden [Rezension]

L. H.

Die Zukunft des Seidenbaues in Palästina : Mitteilungen des Agronomisch-kulturtechnischen Bureaus für Palästina

Selig Eugen Soskin

Die Kolonieen in Argentinien : Spezial-Bericht des Beratenden Bureaus des Zentral-Komitees der "Ica"

Jewish Colonisation Association / Zentralkomitee / Beratendes Büro

Capital Accumulation in the Presence of Informal Credit Contracts: Does the Incentive Mechanism Work Better than Credit Rationing Under Asymmetric Information?

Credit markets with asymmetric information often prefer credit rationing as a profit maximizing device. This paper asks whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing, that is, whether it can alleviate the impact of asymmetric information based on the available information. We used a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents to assess this. Using Indian credit market data our study shows that the presence of informal credit market can reduce the cost of credit rationing by separating high risk firms from the low risk firms in the informal market. But even after this improvement, the steady state capital accumulation is still much lower as compared to incentive based market clearing rates. Through self revelation of each firm's type, based on the incentive mechanism, banks can diversify their risk by achieving a separating equilibrium in the loan market. The incentive mechanism helps banks to increase capital accumulation in the long run by charging lower rates and lending relatively higher amount to the less risky firms. Another important finding of this study is that self-revelation leads to very significant welfare improvement, as measured by consumptiuon equivalence.