Fisheries : Zoological results of the fishing experiments carried out by F.I.S. "Endeavor" 1909-10 under H.C. Dannevig, / Commonwealth Director of Fisheries.

5

Fisheries : Zoological results of the fishing experiments carried out by F.I.S. "Endeavor" 1909-10 under H.C. Dannevig, / Commonwealth Director of Fisheries.

2

Fisheries : Zoological results of the fishing experiments carried out by F.I.S. "Endeavor" 1909-10 under H.C. Dannevig, / Commonwealth Director of Fisheries.

1

The mutation theory; experiments and observations on the origin of species in the vegetable kingdom, by Hugo de Vries ... tr. by Prof. J. B. Farmer and A. D. Darbishire ...

2

Precipitation of barium sulphate nanoparticles in microemulsion : experiments and modelling

Nanopartikel, BaSO4, Mikroemulsion, Fällung, Modellierung

Incentive structures in economic experiments : a neuroeconomic analysis of decision making under risk

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2013

Experiments in square lattice with a common treatment in all blocks

This paper deals with a generalization of square lattice designs, with k² treatments in blocks of k + 1 plots, the extra plot in each block receiving a standard treatment, the same for all blocks. The new design leads to lower variances for contrasts between adjusted treatment means

On the design of peer punishment experiments

We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial parameter is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the fee the punishing subject has to pay to inflict punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it confounds the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.