Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.

The power of the purse : what do the data say on US federal budget allocation to the states?

This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the allocation of the US federal budget to the states and tests the capability of congressional, electoral and partisan theories to explain such allocation. We find that socio-economic characteristics are important explanatory variables but are not sufficient to explain the disparities in the distribution of federal monies. First, prestige committee membership is not conducive to pork-barrelling. We do not find any evidence that marginal states receive more funding; on the opposite, safe states tend to be rewarded. Also, states that are historically "swing" in presidential elections tend to receive more funds. Finally, we find strong evidence supporting partisan theories of budget allocation. States whose governor has the same political affiliation of the President receive more federal funds; while states whose representatives belong to a majority opposing the president party receive less funds.

Budget reform in OECD member countries: common trends

Includes bibliography

Structural budget balance: methodology and estimation for the Chilean central government 1987-2001

Includes bibliography

Methodology of the national economic budget

Includes bibliography

Phosphorus and potassium budget in the soil-plant system in crop rotations under no-till

Soil management and crop rotations can affect P and K budget in soil, decreasing losses, and increasing fertilizer use efficiency. The P and K budget in the soil-plant system at depths up to 60. cm was studied for different soil managements and crop rotations under no-till for three years in Botucatu, São Paulo, Brazil. The investigated crop rotations were: triticale (X Triticosecale) and sunflower (Helianthus annuus) cropped in autumn-winter; pearl millet (Pennisetum glaucum), forage sorghum (Sorghum bicolor), and Sunn hemp (Crotalaria juncea) were grown in the spring, as well as an additional treatment with chiseling followed by a fallow period; and soybean (Glycini max, L., Merril) was cropped in the summer. Each year triticale and sunflower were grown in plots and pearl millet, forage sorghum, Sunn hemp and of chisel/fallow in sub-plots. The triticale/millet rotation led to the largest decrease in available P within the 0-0.60. m layer of the soil profile and the largest K increase within the 0-0.05. m layer. Potassium mobility in the soil profile and the increases in the available K content in the 0.40-0.60. m layer were independent of the management system. Crop rotations with or without chiseling are not effective in preventing soil P losses. There is considerable K leaching below 0.60. m, but chiseling and the use of high K accumulating plants as triticale results in lower K losses. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

Equity in the public budget

Includes bibliography

IDB lending to budget oversight institutions

Includes bibliography

Revised budget of the CCST for 1983

Includes bibliography