Ignorance of the law as a defence to rape : the destruction of a maxim

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1 (b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)-(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court's apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.

The legal profession and the business of law

‘Professional Responsibility and Ethics’ is one of the ‘Priestley 11’ law subjects compulsorily undertaken by Australian law students who aspire to be admitted to practice. Many of the brightest join the major corporate law firms. Nevertheless, there is little theoretical analysis of how those firms are functioning to affect the professional and ethical conduct of their practitioners in the neoliberal state. In this article it is argued that in the mature and highly competitive marketplace for legal services, rather than working as autonomous professionals, corporate lawyers are now finding themselves working more and more as functionaries subservient to the dictates of their corporate clients. Drawing on interviews with Australian major law firm corporate lawyers and Charles Derber’s theory on the proletarianisation of professional workers, it is argued that corporate lawyers are losing key elements of their professional identity in the impetus to maintain the client list and the profit motive. Furthermore, as the balance of power in the corporate legal sector is shifting from law firms to clients, the professional ethics of law firm lawyers are at risk of being compromised as they find themselves being reduced to little more than ‘flush’ factory fodder for the major corporations.

The nature and scope of rights of removal

The rationale underlying the fixtures and accession presumptions is the need to protect the value of the chattel as well as the need to protect third-party interests. The destruction of the independent legal status of an attached chattel is generally deemed appropriate where the value of the co-mingled asset will be diminished if the chattel retains a separate legal title and this would generate unfairness because third parties have dealt with the co-mingled asset on the basis of its overall value. Rights to remove have evolved under both common law and equity to moderate the scope of these presumptions. Common law will uphold the right of a tenant to remove chattels that have been attached to leased premises during the currency of the lease. Equity on the other hand will uphold the right to remove affixed chattels in circumstances where the enforcement of such an entitlement is consistent with contractual intention and transactional fairness. This article examines the different rights of removal that have evolved under Australian law to date and the emergent statutory framework supporting these rights. It discusses the historical purpose and structural utility of these entitlements within a land framework that supports fixtures presumptions. Rights of removal, whether validated at law or in equity, confer positive entitlements upon the holder to access and remove affixed goods in circumstances where, because of the fixtures and accession presumptions, those goods no longer retain any separate legal status. The capacity of the holder to enforce this right against third parties is illustrative of their distinctive proprietary perspective.

PLT practitioners : soldiers For “vocationalism”, or double agents?

This presentation extends on some previous work around my PhD research.
I question ways in which social structures are inscribed into legal education practices, and conversely, whether practices can modify those structures. I argue PLT practitioners are not simply soldiers for a “vocationalist” strategy. Instead, I re-imagine PLT practitioners as “double agents” or “resistance fighters”, lamplighters in a still emergent professional trajectory. It is a trajectory catalysed by the 1970s introduction of institutional PLT; just a baby really, in the context of English common law.

In Bourdieu’s terms it is possible, by revisiting past struggles in Australian legal education, to conceptualise institutional PLT as the product of judicial, professional, and academic struggles to produce a vocationalised, non-academic, and critique-free sub-field within the juridical field. Those struggles succeeded, to some extent, in the extra-individual dimension of structures, regulation, and institutions, to collectively inculcate preferred dispositions within individuals about legal education and professional identity.

That account, however, ignores the potential for agency and alterity – the ways in which individuals might appropriate, in Certeau’s terms, the resources of the legal field to explore new professional trajectories. For some, these trajectories involve struggles to enrich, and add texture to, legal education. Drawing on interviews with PLT practitioners, I identify multi-vocal and multi-perspectival themes, including notions of social justice, equality, professional ethics, personal improvement, and indeed, interest in scholarship of teaching and learning.

It is in this sense I re-imagine PLT practitioners as “double agents”, operating betwixt and between dominant domains in law. In my view, PLT practitioners can participate in conceptualising and developing emergent approaches in legal education, and to theorise “practice” as lawyers and educators. Scholarship of teaching and learning has its part to play in this. It provides a means, as lawyers and as educators, to discover information, to reflect, critique, communicate, and conceptualise, insights about “practice” and practices.

Constitutionalism, good faith and the doctrine of specific performance: rights, duties and equitable discretion

This article will explore the European roots of the doctrine of specific performance and the influence of transformative constitutionalism on these in recent times. The question whether specific performance is available as of right (as in the civil law), or only subject to judicial discretion (as in the common law), will be investigated. The demonstrated impact of constitutional rights on contract law in the mixed system of South Africa will be contrasted with developments in English and Australian contract law, where the common-law rules are more deeply entrenched and the potential scope for human rights-based development of these is arguably smaller, though still important. The article will argue, using comparative rules on specific performance as an example, that the concept of a duty of good faith or contractual fairness is likely to play a greater role in future in all three of the countries under consideration, reducing the common/civil/mixed legal systems divide.

International legal norms on the right to sexual orientation and gender identity: Australian reforms contextualised

At a time when the international momentum for sexual orientation and gender identity rights is strong it is important that scholars and activists remain vigilant to ensure that the discourses framing sexuality rights do not intentionally, or inadvertently, deepen incursions on the rights of individuals of sexual and bodily diversity. This chapter offers a critical examination of selected Australian case law and legal reform for the putative progress t offers sexual minorities. Identifying the entrenched binary determinism at the heart of the law, this chapter echoes the call of queer criminology, concluding that challenging invisibility is but part of the project. Queer scholars need also remain vigilant about the law’s constitutive power, and its role in producing sexual minorities as objects of pathology, perversion and criminality.

Beneficial owner: do direito tributário internacional ao civil law

O presente Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso se propõe a analisar o instituto denominado Beneficiário Efetivo (Beneficial Owner), levando-se em considerações doutrinas nacionais e estrangeiras, os principais casos envolvendo o referido conceito, e comparando sua aplicabilidade nos países common law e civil law. Assim, pretende-se: conceituar o instituto denominado Beneficiário Efetivo; apontar a problemática que envolve o referido instituto demonstrando a importância da sua compreensão; estudar os principais casos internacionais sobre o assunto; demonstrar a diferença de se aplicar o conceito em comento em países common e civil law, bem como analisar a sua aplicabilidade na hipótese de o tratado internacional não prever Beneficial Ownership Clause.

The Future Direction of Delaware Law (Including a Brief Exegesis on Fee Shifting Bylaws)

Delaware sets the governance standards for most public companies. The ability to attract corporations could not be explained solely by the existence of a favorable statutory regime. Delaware was not invariably the first or the only state to implement management friendly provisions. Given the interpretive gaps in the statute and the critical importance of the common law in the governance process, courts played an outsized role in setting legal standards. The management friendly nature of the Delaware courts contributed significantly to the state’s attraction to public corporations. A current example of a management friendly trend in the case law had seen the recent decisions setting out the board’s authority to adopt bylaws under Section 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), particularly those involving the shifting of fees in litigation against the corporation or its directors. The DGCL allows bylaws that address “the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” The broad parameters are, however, subject to limits. Bylaws cannot be inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation or “the law.” Law includes the common law. The Delaware courts have used the limitations imposed by “the law” to severely restrict the reach of shareholder inspired bylaws. The courts have not used the same principles to impose similar restraints on bylaws adopted by the board of directors. This can be seen with respect to bylaws that restrict or even eliminate the right of shareholders to bring actions against management and the corporation. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund the court approved a fee shifting bylaw that had littl relationship to the internal affairs of the corporation. The decision upheld the bylaw as facially valid.The decision ignored a number of obvious legal infirmities. Among other things, the decision did not adequately address the requirement in Section 109(b) that bylaws be consistent with “the law.” The decision obliquely acknowledged that the provisions would “by their nature, deter litigation” but otherwise made no effort to assess the impact of this deterrence on shareholders causes of action. The provision in fact had the practical effect of restricting, if not eliminating, litigation rights granted by the DGCL and the common law. Perhaps most significantly, however, the bylaws significantly limited common law rights of shareholders to bring actions against the corporation and the board. Given the high dismissal rates for these actions, fee shifting bylaws imposed a meaningful risk of liability on plaintiffs. Moreover, because judgments in derivative suits were paid to the corporation, shareholders serving as plaintiffs confronted the risk of liability without any offsetting direct benefit. By preventing suits in this area, the bylaw effectively insulated the behavior of boards from legal challenge. The ATP decision was poorly reasoned and overstepped acceptable boundaries. The management friendly decision threatened the preeminent role of Delaware in the development of corporate law. The decision raised the specter of federal intervention and the potential for meaningful competition from the states. Because the opinion examined the bylaw in the context of non-stock companies, the reasoning may remain applicable only to those entities and never make the leap to for-profit stock corporations. Nonetheless, the analysis reflects a management friendly approach that does not adequately take into account the impact of the provision on the rights of shareholders.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

A history of English law,

Accompanied by "Tables and index, by Edward Potton." (ix p., 1 l., 228 p. 221/2 cm.) Published: London, Methuen & co., ltd, [1932]

Popular law library, Putney ...

Examination questions in each volume

Modern American law; a systematic and comprehensive commentary on the fundamental principles of American law and procedure, accompanied by leading illustrative cases and legal forms, with a rev. ed. of Blackstone's Commentaries;

v. I. The modern democracy, the citizen and the law - Legal ethics - Law : its origin, nature, development - Courts : federal and state - Law of contracts -- v. 2. Law of torts -- v. 3. Criminal Law - Law of criminal procedure - Law of persons and domestic relations -- v. 4. Personal property and bailments - Law of liens and pledges - Law of agency - Law of sales of personal property -- v. 5. Law of real property -- v. 6. Law of descent and distribution, wills and administration, guardian and ward - Law of landlord and tenant - Law of irrigation and water rights - Law of mines and mining -- v. 7. Equity - Law of trusts - Law of quasi-contacts - Law of estoppel -- v. 8. Law of negotiable instruments - Law of suretyship and guaranty - Law of mortgages : real and chattel - Interpretation of statutes -- v. 9. Law of private corporations - Law of partnership - law of banks, banking and trust companies - Law of receivers -- v. 10. Pleadings in civil actions at common law and under modern statutes - Practice in civil actions - Law of equity pleading - Law of evidence - Laws of attachment and garnishments - Law of judgments and executions - Law of extraordinary remedies - Law of habeas corpus -- v. 11. Constitutional law : definitions and general principles - Organization and powers of the United States Government - Constitutional guaranties of fundamental rights - Eminent domain - Taxation - Naturalization -- v. 12. Conflict of laws - International law - Law of interstate commerce - Law of bankruptcy - Law of patents - Law of copyright - Law of trademarks - Unfair competition and good-will -- v. 13. Law of public service companies, especially common carriers - Law of municipal corporations - Law of public officers and elections - Parliamentary law -- v. 14. Law of damages - Law of insurance - Admiralty law - Medical jurisprudence - Forms -- v. 15. Blackstone's Commentaries.

Catalogue of the library of the Law School of Harvard University.

"Contains only the books on American and English common law"--P. vii.

New criminal procedure: or, New commentaries on the law of pleading and evidence and the practice in criminal cases,

"The general rules of practice and procedure are treated in volumes I and II, while volume III is devoted wholly to procedure and evidence in various common law crimes."--Pref, to 2d ed.