954 resultados para the quasi-steady-state method
Resumo:
Risk management is of paramount importance in the success of tunnelling works and is linked to the tunnelling method and to the constraints of the works. Sequencial Excavation Method (SEM) and Tun-nel Boring Machine (TBM) method have been competing for years. This article, part of a wider study on the influence of the â Safety and Healthâ criterion in the choice of method, reviews the existing literature about the criteria usually employed to choose the tunnelling method and on the criterion â Safety and Healthâ . This crite-rion is particularly important, due to the financial impacts of work accidents and occupational diseases. This article is especially useful to the scientific and technical community, since it synthesizes the relevance of each one of the choice criteria used and it shows why â Safety and Healthâ must be a criterion in the decision mak-ing process to choose the tunnelling method.
Resumo:
v.1 (1875)
Resumo:
v.2 (1879)
Resumo:
v.3 (1882)
Resumo:
v.4 (1885)
Resumo:
v.5 (1890)
Resumo:
v.6 (1894)
Resumo:
v.7 (1897)
Resumo:
v. 9, 1909
Resumo:
"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
Resumo:
"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
Resumo:
In Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) the intended steady state is locally but not globally stable under adaptive learning, and unstable deflationary paths can arise after large pessimistic shocks to expectations. In the current paper a modified model is presented that includes a locally stable stagnation regime as a possible outcome arising from large expectation shocks. Policy implications are examined. Sufficiently large temporary increases in government spending can dislodge the economy from the stagnation regime and restore the natural stabilizing dynamics. More specific policy proposals are presented and discussed.
Resumo:
Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the timeinconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.
Resumo:
Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the timeinconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.