How geographic distance and depth drive ecological variability and isolation of demersal fish communities in an archipelago system (Cape Verde, Eastern Atlantic Ocean)

Cape Verde is a tropical oceanic ecosystem, highly fragmented and dispersed, with islands physically isolated by distance and depth. To understand how isolation affects the ecological variability in this archipelago, we conducted a research project on the community structure of the 18 commercially most important demersal fishes. An index of ecological distance based on species relative dominance (Di) is developed from Catch Per Unit Effort, derived from an extensive database of artisanal fisheries. Two ecological measures of distance between islands are calculated: at the species level, DDi, and at the community level, DD (sum of DDi). A physical isolation factor (Idb) combining distance (d) and bathymetry (b) is proposed. Covariance analysis shows that isolation factor is positively correlated with both DDi and DD, suggesting that Idb can be considered as an ecological isolation factor. The effect of Idb varies with season and species. This effect is stronger in summer (May to November), than in winter (December to April), which appears to be more unstable. Species react differently to Idb, independently of season. A principal component analysis on the monthly (DDi) for the 12 islands and the 18 species, complemented by an agglomerative hierarchical clustering, shows a geographic pattern of island organization, according to Idb. Results indicate that the ecological structure of demersal fish communities of Cape Verde archipelago, both in time and space, can be explained by a geographic isolation factor. The analytical approach used here is promising and could be tested in other archipelago systems.

Iowa Department of Corrections Strategic Plan and Plan, Performance, 2007

Annual Report, Strategic Plan and Performance Plan

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Report on the Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services (DAS)

Report on the Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services (DAS)

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Risk reduction practices in men who have sex with men in Switzerland: serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation.

The aim of this study was to identify predictors of intentional use of the HIV risk reduction practices of serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation during unprotected anal intercourse (UAI) with casual partners. A cross-sectional survey pertaining to the Swiss HIV behavioral surveillance system, using an anonymous self-administered questionnaire, was conducted in 2007 in a self-selected sample of men having sex with other men (MSM). Analysis was restricted to participants with UAI with casual partner(s) (N = 410). Logistic regression was used to estimate factors associated with intentional use of serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation. In the previous 12 months, 71% of participants reported having UAI with a casual partner of different or unknown HIV-status. Of these, 47% reported practicing withdrawal, 38% serosorting, and 25% strategic positioning. In the 319 participants with known HIV-status, serosorting was associated with frequent Internet use to find partners (OR = 2.32), STI (OR = 2.07), and HIV testing in the past 12 months (OR = 1.81). Strategic positioning was associated with HIV-status (OR = 0.13) and having UAI with a partner of different or unknown HIV-status (OR = 3.57). Withdrawal was more frequently practiced by HIV-negative participants or participants reporting high numbers of sexual partners (OR = 2.48) and having UAI with a partner of unknown or different serostatus (OR = 2.08). Risk reduction practices are widely used by MSM, each practice having its own specificities. Further research is needed to determine the contextual factors surrounding harm reduction practices, particularly the strategic or opportunistic nature of their use.

Improving Transition Outcomes: State Transition Plan: Iowa's Youth Development Strategic Plan 2007-2010 developed by the Iowa Collaboration for Youth Development team

Iowa's youth development plan for fulfilling Iowa's Promise.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Influence of photoperiod on body weight and depth of burrowing in larvae of Chrysomya megacephala (Fabricius) (Diptera, Calliphoridae) and implications for forensic entomology

Blowflies use discrete, ephemeral breeding sites for larval nutrition. After exhaustion of the food supply, the larvae disperse in search of sites to pupate or to seek other sources of food in a process known as post-feeding larval dispersal. In this study, some of the most important aspects of this process were investigated in larvae of the blowflies Chrysomya megacephala exposed to a variety of light: dark (LD) cycles (0:0 h, 12:12 h and 24:0 h) and incubated in tubes covered with vermiculite. For each pupa, the body weight and depth of burrowing were determined. Statistical tests were used to examine the relationship of depth of burrowing and body weight to photoperiod at which burrowing occurred. The study of burial behavior in post-feeding larval dispersing can be useful for estimating the postmortem interval (PMI) of human corpses in forensic medicine.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Department of Administrative Services Strategic Plan, 2008-2011

This report outlines the strategic plan for Department of Administrative Services, including, motto, goals and mission.