Caribbean Information System for Economic and Social Planning: CARISPLAN

Includes bibliography

Caribbean Information System for Economic and Social Planning (CARISPLAN): Institution Authority File

Breve reseña del archivo de autoridad de autores institucionales del Sistema de Información para el Caribe en Materia de Planificación Económica y Social.

Caribbean Information System-Economic and Social Planning (CARISPLAN): final report: phase I, period 1 May 1979-31 December 1980

Includes bibliography

Os parâmetros curriculares nacionais do ensino médio e o trabalho: o ideário pedagógico e a realidade social

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

The Chilean system of contributory pensions as locus of rivalry and of a new social compact

This study assesses the contributory pension system in Chile and offers some recommendations for reform, from the viewpoint of social rights that generate expectations of satisfaction. The primary objective of any pension system is to provide income security to the elderly, and contributory pensions must reflect the savings achieved throughout working life in order to guarantee that, for similar levels of effort, similar and proportionate protection will be obtained.

A Spatial Propensity Score Matching Evaluation of the Social Impacts of Sugarcane Growing on Municipalities in Brazil

The expansion of sugarcane growing in Brazil, spurred particularly by increased demand for ethanol, has triggered the need to evaluate the economic, social, and environmental impacts of this process, both on the country as a whole and on the growing regions. Even though the balance of costs and benefits is positive from an overall standpoint, this may not be so in specific producing regions, due to negative externalities. The objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of growing sugarcane on the human development index (HDI) and its sub-indices in cane producing regions. In the literature on matching effects, this is interpreted as the effect of the treatment on the treated. Location effects are controlled by spatial econometric techniques, giving rise to the spatial propensity score matching model. The authors analyze 424 minimum comparable areas (MCAs) in the treatment group, compared with 907 MCAs in the control group. The results suggest that the presence of sugarcane growing in these areas is not relevant to determine their social conditions, whether for better or worse. It is thus likely that public policies, especially those focused directly on improving education, health, and income generation/distribution, have much more noticeable effects on the municipal HDI.

Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching

This dissertation mimics the Turkish college admission procedure. It started with the purpose to reduce the inefficiencies in Turkish market. For this purpose, we propose a mechanism under a new market structure; as we prefer to call, semi-centralization. In chapter 1, we give a brief summary of Matching Theory. We present the first examples in Matching history with the most general papers and mechanisms. In chapter 2, we propose our mechanism. In real life application, that is in Turkish university placements, the mechanism reduces the inefficiencies of the current system. The success of the mechanism depends on the preference profile. It is easy to show that under complete information the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for a given profile. In chapter 3, we refine our basic mechanism. The modification on the mechanism has a crucial effect on the results. The new mechanism is, as we call, a middle mechanism. In one of the subdomain, this mechanism coincides with the original basic mechanism. But, in the other partition, it gives the same results with Gale and Shapley's algorithm. In chapter 4, we apply our basic mechanism to well known Roommate Problem. Since the roommate problem is in one-sided game patern, firstly we propose an auxiliary function to convert the game semi centralized two-sided game, because our basic mechanism is designed for this framework. We show that this process is succesful in finding a stable matching in the existence of stability. We also show that our mechanism easily and simply tells us if a profile lacks of stability by using purified orderings. Finally, we show a method to find all the stable matching in the existence of multi stability. The method is simply to run the mechanism for all of the top agents in the social preference.