The Polish Competition Authority Submits a Draft Amendment to the Polish Competition Act: Revolution or Fine-Tuning?

This piece highlights and offers a brief analysis of the most important of the
proposed changes to Polish competition law. The draft proposal envisages introduction of, inter alia, financial penalties for individuals, two-stage merger review process, important changes to the leniency program (including introduction of leniency plus), as well as such new tools as remedies and settlements.

The Polish Competition Authority Publishes its Annual Report for 2012

In May 2013 the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), the Polish Competition Authority, published its Annual Report for 2012. This piece provides an overview of the reported activities within the competition law & policy domain, and comments on some of them.

University Competition, Grading Standards, and Grade Inflation

We develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities. Universities choose grading standards to maximize the total wages of graduates, taking into account how the grading standards affect firms' productivity assessment and job placement. We identify conditions under which better universities set lower grading standards, exploiting the fact that firms cannot distinguish between good and badA''s. In contrast, a social planner sets stricter standards at better universities. We show how increases in skilled jobs drive grade inflation, and determine when grading standards fall faster at better schools. (JEL I21)

Bogeymen, lunatics and fanatics: collective actions and the private enforcement of European competition law

The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.