Parking System Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplemental Information, June 30, 2006

State University Audit Report

Ice Arena Facility Revenue Note Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Report, Basic Financial Information and Supplementary Information, June 30, 2006

State University Audit Report

Indoor Multipurpose Use and Training Facility Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Report, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, June 30, 2006

State University Audit Report

Regulated Materials Facility Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Report, Basic Financial Statement and Supplementary Information, June 30, 2006

State University Audit Report

Memorial Union Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Report, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, June 30, 2006

State University Audit Report

Recognition judgments and the performance of the recognition heuristic depend on the size of the reference class

In a series of three experiments, participants made inferences about which one of a pair of two objects scored higher on a criterion. The first experiment was designed to contrast the prediction of Probabilistic Mental Model theory (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991) concerning sampling procedure with the hard-easy effect. The experiment failed to support the theory's prediction that a particular pair of randomly sampled item sets would differ in percentage correct; but the observation that German participants performed practically as well on comparisons between U.S. cities (many of which they did not even recognize) than on comparisons between German cities (about which they knew much more) ultimately led to the formulation of the recognition heuristic. Experiment 2 was a second, this time successful, attempt to unconfound item difficulty and sampling procedure. In Experiment 3, participants' knowledge and recognition of each city was elicited, and how often this could be used to make an inference was manipulated. Choices were consistent with the recognition heuristic in about 80% of the cases when it discriminated and people had no additional knowledge about the recognized city (and in about 90% when they had such knowledge). The frequency with which the heuristic could be used affected the percentage correct, mean confidence, and overconfidence as predicted. The size of the reference class, which was also manipulated, modified these effects in meaningful and theoretically important ways.

Individual vocal signatures in barn owl nestlings: does individual recognition have an adaptive role in sibling vocal competition?

To compete over limited parental resources, young animals communicate with their parents and siblings by producing honest vocal signals of need. Components of begging calls that are sensitive to food deprivation may honestly signal need, whereas other components may be associated with individual-specific attributes that do not change with time such as identity, sex, absolute age and hierarchy. In a sib-sib communication system where barn owl (Tyto alba) nestlings vocally negotiate priority access to food resources, we show that calls have individual signatures that are used by nestlings to recognize which siblings are motivated to compete, even if most vocalization features vary with hunger level. Nestlings were more identifiable when food-deprived than food-satiated, suggesting that vocal identity is emphasized when the benefit of winning a vocal contest is higher. In broods where siblings interact iteratively, we speculate that individual-specific signature permits siblings to verify that the most vocal individual in the absence of parents is the one that indeed perceived the food brought by parents. Individual recognition may also allow nestlings to associate identity with individual-specific characteristics such as position in the within-brood dominance hierarchy. Calls indeed revealed age hierarchy and to a lower extent sex and absolute age. Using a cross-fostering experimental design, we show that most acoustic features were related to the nest of origin (but not the nest of rearing), suggesting a genetic or an early developmental effect on the ontogeny of vocal signatures. To conclude, our study suggests that sibling competition has promoted the evolution of vocal behaviours that signal not only hunger level but also intrinsic individual characteristics such as identity, family, sex and age.

Altruism, dispersal, and phenotype-matching kin recognition.

We investigate the coevolution between philopatry and altruism in island-model populations when kin recognition occurs through phenotype matching. In saturated environments, a good discrimination ability is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of sociality. Discrimination decreases not only with the average phenotypic similarity between immigrants and residents (i.e., with environmental homogeneity and past gene flow) but also with the sampling variance of similarity distributions (a negative function of the number of traits sampled). Whether discrimination should rely on genetically or environmentally determined traits depends on the apportionment of phenotypic variance and, in particular, on the relative values of e (the among-group component of environmental variance) and r (the among-group component of genetic variance, which also measures relatedness among group members). If r exceeds e, highly heritable cues do better. Discrimination and altruism, however, remain low unless philopatry is enforced by ecological constraints. If e exceeds r, by contrast, nonheritable traits do better. High e values improve discrimination drastically and thus have the potential to drive sociality, even in the absence of ecological constraints. The emergence of sociality thus can be facilitated by enhancing e, which we argue is the main purpose of cue standardization within groups, as observed in many social insects, birds, and mammals, including humans.

Recognition in ants: social origin matters.

The ability of group members to discriminate against foreigners is a keystone in the evolution of sociality. In social insects, colony social structure (number of queens) is generally thought to influence abilities of resident workers to discriminate between nestmates and non-nestmates. However, whether social origin of introduced individuals has an effect on their acceptance in conspecific colonies remains poorly explored. Using egg-acceptance bioassays, we tested the influence of social origin of queen-laid eggs on their acceptance by foreign workers in the ant Formica selysi. We showed that workers from both single- and multiple-queen colonies discriminated against foreign eggs from single-queen colonies, whereas they surprisingly accepted foreign eggs from multiple-queen colonies. Chemical analyses then demonstrated that social origins of eggs and workers could be discriminated on the basis of their chemical profiles, a signal generally involved in nestmate discrimination. These findings provide the first evidence in social insects that social origins of eggs interfere with nestmate discrimination and are encoded by chemical signatures.

Get a GRIP: Should Area Revenue Coverage Be Offered through the Farm Bill or as a Crop Insurance Program? 2007

The successful expansion of the U.S. crop insurance program has not eliminated ad hoc disaster assistance. An alternative currently being explored by members of Congress and others in preparation of the 2007 farm bill is to simply remove the “ad hoc” part of disaster assistance programs by creating a standing program that would automatically funnel aid to hard-hit regions and crops. One form such a program could take can be found in the area yield and area revenue insurance programs currently offered by the U.S. crop insurance program. The Group Risk Plan (GRP) and Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) programs automatically trigger payments when county yields or revenues, respectively, fall below a producer-elected coverage level. The per-acre taxpayer costs of offering GRIP in Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa for corn and soybeans through the crop insurance program are estimated. These results are used to determine the amount of area revenue coverage that could be offered to farmers as part of a standing farm bill disaster program. Approximately 55% of taxpayer support for GRIP flows to the crop insurance industry. A significant portion of this support comes in the form of net underwriting gains. The expected rate of return on money put at risk by private crop insurance companies under the current Standard Reinsurance Agreement is approximately 100%. Taking this industry support and adding in the taxpayer support for GRIP that flows to producers would fund a county target revenue program at the 93% coverage level.

Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Report of Recommendations to the the Iowa Department of Revenue for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Department of Revenue for the year ended June 30, 2006

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Network revenue management with product-specific no-shows

Revenue management practices often include overbooking capacity to account for customerswho make reservations but do not show up. In this paper, we consider the network revenuemanagement problem with no-shows and overbooking, where the show-up probabilities are specificto each product. No-show rates differ significantly by product (for instance, each itinerary andfare combination for an airline) as sale restrictions and the demand characteristics vary byproduct. However, models that consider no-show rates by each individual product are difficultto handle as the state-space in dynamic programming formulations (or the variable space inapproximations) increases significantly. In this paper, we propose a randomized linear program tojointly make the capacity control and overbooking decisions with product-specific no-shows. Weestablish that our formulation gives an upper bound on the optimal expected total profit andour upper bound is tighter than a deterministic linear programming upper bound that appearsin the existing literature. Furthermore, we show that our upper bound is asymptotically tightin a regime where the leg capacities and the expected demand is scaled linearly with the samerate. We also describe how the randomized linear program can be used to obtain a bid price controlpolicy. Computational experiments indicate that our approach is quite fast, able to scale to industrialproblems and can provide significant improvements over standard benchmarks.