800 resultados para programming environments
Resumo:
The primary purpose of this exploratory empirical study is to examine the structural stability of a limited number of alternative explanatory factors of strategic change. On the basis of theoretical arguments and prior empirical evidence from two traditional perspectives, we propose an original empirical framework to analyse whether these potential explanatory factors have remained stable over time in a highly turbulent environment. This original question is explored in a particular setting: the population of Spanish private banks. The firms of this industry have experienced a high level of strategic mobility as a consequence of fundamental changes undergone in their environmental conditions over the last two decades (mainly changes related to the new banking and financial regulation process). Our results consistently support that the effect of most explanatory factors of strategic mobility considered did not remain stable over the whole period of analysis. From this point of view, the study sheds new light on major debates and dilemmas in the field of strategy regarding why firms change their competitive patterns over time and, hence, to what extent the "contextdependency" of alternative views of strategic change as their relative validation can vary over time for a given population. Methodologically, this research makes two major contributions to the study of potential determinants of strategic change. First, the definition and measurement of strategic change employing a new grouping method, the Model-based Cluster Method or MCLUST. Second, in order to asses the possible effect of determinants of strategic mobility we have controlled the non-observable heterogeneity using logistic regression models for panel data.
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We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
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Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.
Resumo:
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
Resumo:
In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.
Resumo:
Purpose - This paper focuses on analyzing the effect that public reforms have on the efficiency of state-owned enterprises in regulated environments. Design/methodology/approach - The research is focused in the postal sector where public and private companies must obey a legal framework related to provide a universal service. The analysis is carried out using a panel of 7 European postal operators for the period 1997-2003. The activity analyzed was the letter mail division; we take as key variable the unit cost of a letter and use a translog cost function where as independent variables we include traffic levels, labor cost per employee, quality and availability of the service as well as the type of ownership (public or private). Additionally, in a second stage the geographical differences among countries are considered. Findings - Results indicate that postal operators that experienced organizational changes without being privatized, such as the Spanish and Greek operators, do not have higher unit costs than privatized postal operators like the one of Germany and the Netherlands. Moreover, we find that in all cases the operator of Ireland appear to be the most efficient. In this case restructuring process has been carried out giving an important leadership role to workers. This suggests us that labor culture could be a key variable to study when analyzing reform processes in public enterprises. Originality/value - Our findings show that in a regulated environment like in the postal sector, public and private companies can obtain similar efficiency levels in term of unit costs.
Resumo:
In the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the entire working horizon, when the absolute risk-aversion index is negative and constant. From this perspective, the risk is totally exogenous, and thus independent of endogenous risks. The classic procedure is "myopic" with regard to potential changes in the future behavior of the agent due to inherent random fluctuations of the system. The agent's attitude to risk is rigid. Although often criticized, the most widely used hypothesis for the analysis of economic behavior is risk-neutrality. This borderline case must be envisaged with prudence in a dynamic stochastic context. The traditional measures of risk-aversion are generally too weak for making comparisons between risky situations, given the dynamic �complexity of the environment. This can be highlighted in concrete problems in finance and insurance, context for which the Arrow-Pratt measures (in the small) give ambiguous.
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The objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the attitude to effort of a risk-averse decision-maker in an evolving environment. In the classic analysis, the space of efforts is generally discretized. More realistic, this new approach emploies a continuum of effort levels. The presence of multiple possible efforts and performance levels provides a better basis for explaining real economic phenomena. The traditional approach (see, Laffont, J. J. & Tirole, J., 1993, Salanie, B., 1997, Laffont, J.J. and Martimort, D, 2002, among others) does not take into account the potential effect of the system dynamics on the agent's behavior to effort over time. In the context of a Principal-agent relationship, not only the incentives of the Principal can determine the private agent to allocate a good effort, but also the evolution of the dynamic system. The incentives can be ineffective when the environment does not incite the agent to invest a good effort. This explains why, some effici
Resumo:
The stable isotope composition of waters (delta H-2, delta O-18) can be used as a natural tracer of hydrologic processes in systems affected by acid mine drainage. We investigated the delta H-2 and delta O-18 values of pore waters from four oxidizing sulfidic mine tailings impoundments in different climatic regions of Chile (Piuquenes at La Andina with Alpine climate, Cauquenes and Caren at El Teniente with Mediterranean climate, and Talabre at the Chuquicamata deposit with hyperarid climate). No clear relationship was found between altitude and isotopic composition. The observed displacement of the tailings pore waters from the local meteoric water line toward higher delta O-18 values (by similar to +2% delta O-18 relative to delta H-2) is partly due to water-rock interaction processes, including hydration and O-isotope exchange with sulfates and Fe(III) oxyhydroxides produced by pyrite oxidation. In most tailings, from the saturated zone toward the surface, isotopically different zones can be distinguished. Zone I is characterized by an upward depletion of H-2 and O-18 in the pore waters from the saturated zone and the lowermost vadose zone, due to ascending diffused isotopically light water triggered by the constant loss of water vapor by evaporation at the surface. In zone II, the capillary flow of a mix of vapor and liquid water causes an evaporative isotopic enrichment in H-2 and O-18. At the top of the tailings in dry climate a zone III between the capillary zone and the surface contains isotopically light diffused and atmospheric water vapor. In temperate climates, the upper part of the profile is affected by recent rainfall and zone III may not differ isotopically from zone II.
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In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games
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In the line opened by Kalai and Muller (1997), we explore new conditions on prefernce domains which make it possible to avoid Arrow's impossibility result. In our main theorem, we provide a complete characterization of the domains admitting nondictorial Arrovian social welfare functions with ties (i.e. including indifference in the range) by introducing a notion of strict decomposability. In the proof, we use integer programming tools, following an approach first applied to social choice theory by Sethuraman, Teo and Vohra ((2003), (2006)). In order to obtain a representation of Arrovian social welfare functions whose range can include indifference, we generalize Sethuraman et al.'s work and specify integer programs in which variables are allowed to assume values in the set {0, 1/2, 1}: indeed, we show that, there exists a one-to-one correspondence between solutions of an integer program defined on this set and the set of all Arrovian social welfare functions - without restrictions on the range.
Resumo:
Using the integer programming approach introduced by Sethuraman, Teo, and Vohra (2003), we extend the analysis of the preference domains containing an inseparable ordered pair, initiated by Kalai and Ritz (1978). We show that these domains admit not only Arrovian social welfare functions \without ties," but also Arrovian social welfare functions \with ties," since they satisfy the strictly decomposability condition introduced by Busetto, Codognato, and Tonin (2012). Moreover, we go further in the comparison between Kalai and Ritz (1978)'s inseparability and Arrow (1963)'s single-peak restrictions, showing that the former condition is more \respectable," in the sense of Muller and Satterthwaite (1985).
Resumo:
Performance analysis is the task of monitor the behavior of a program execution. The main goal is to find out the possible adjustments that might be done in order improve the performance. To be able to get that improvement it is necessary to find the different causes of overhead. Nowadays we are already in the multicore era, but there is a gap between the level of development of the two main divisions of multicore technology (hardware and software). When we talk about multicore we are also speaking of shared memory systems, on this master thesis we talk about the issues involved on the performance analysis and tuning of applications running specifically in a shared Memory system. We move one step ahead to take the performance analysis to another level by analyzing the applications structure and patterns. We also present some tools specifically addressed to the performance analysis of OpenMP multithread application. At the end we present the results of some experiments performed with a set of OpenMP scientific application.
Resumo:
Bacteria often possess multiple siderophore-based iron uptake systems for scavenging this vital resource from their environment. However, some siderophores seem redundant, because they have limited iron-binding efficiency and are seldom expressed under iron limitation. Here, we investigate the conundrum of why selection does not eliminate this apparent redundancy. We focus on Pseudomonas aeruginosa, a bacterium that can produce two siderophores-the highly efficient but metabolically expensive pyoverdine, and the inefficient but metabolically cheap pyochelin. We found that the bacteria possess molecular mechanisms to phenotypically switch from mainly producing pyoverdine under severe iron limitation to mainly producing pyochelin when iron is only moderately limited. We further show that strains exclusively producing pyochelin grew significantly better than strains exclusively producing pyoverdine under moderate iron limitation, whereas the inverse was seen under severe iron limitation. This suggests that pyochelin is not redundant, but that switching between siderophore strategies might be beneficial to trade off efficiencies versus costs of siderophores. Indeed, simulations parameterized from our data confirmed that strains retaining the capacity to switch between siderophores significantly outcompeted strains defective for one or the other siderophore under fluctuating iron availabilities. Finally, we discuss how siderophore switching can be viewed as a form of collective decision-making, whereby a coordinated shift in behaviour at the group level emerges as a result of positive and negative feedback loops operating among individuals at the local scale.