Bundeswehr 3.0: The political, military and social dimensions of the reform of the German armed forces. OSW Point of View Number 28, May 2012

This reform of the Bundeswehr, launched in 2011, is the latest of the three decisive stages in the post-war transformation of the German armed forces. The reform aims at “constructing” the armed forces anew in the political, military and social dimensions.The present paper presents the evolution of the role of the armed forces in German foreign and security policy and the ongoing process of “constructing” a new Bundeswehr. It analyses the process of redefining the objectives and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s participation in international operations, its current military transformation, and changes in its image and social identity. It also presents the implications of this broader transformation for political and military.

Closing the gap? Military co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. OSW Report, December 2012

The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.

Trading off sovereignty. The outcome of Belarus's integration with Russia in the security and defence field. OSW Commentary No. 107, 2013-04-25

Although the Republic of Belarus is constitutionally designated as a neutral country1, it is in fact closely connected with Russia’s own security and defence architecture. Within the Union State of Belarus and Russia, the armed forces are integrated to an extent unequalled in the world. A legacy of the Soviet division of labour, the Belarusian defence industry complex remains structurally dependent on Russia, which is its main raw material provider, outlet for exports and intermediary on world markets. Bilateral military cooperation also builds on the perception of common threats and partly shared security interests. Hence it unfolds regardless of the disputes that sporadically sour relations between Minsk and Moscow, standing out as the main achievement of the Union State – if not the only one.

Energy Union: Can Europe learn from Japan’s joint gas purchasing? CEPS Commentary, 11 December 2014

Japan’s two major electricity producing companies reached a preliminary agreement recently to establish a joint venture for the procurement of fossil fuel resources, primarily liquefied natural gas (LNG). The authors of this commentary ask whether this commercial initiative could serve as an example to Europe of how to increase the negotiating power of individual EU member states. They conclude that a private joint gas procurement company may indeed offer a solution for EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, instead of yet another source of confrontation. Given the political volatility in the region, it could well be the key to balancing out the need for security of supply with an offer to guarantee security of demand, thereby creating the climate for stable commercial relations.

Russia's interest in the Mistral: the political and military aspects. OSW Commentary No. 41, 2010-10-11

The negotiations over Russia’s purchase of French Mistral-class multipurpose assault ships, which were intensified in 2010, have gained a significant political dimension. The prospects of such a spectacular acquisition of large and expensive assault ships from one of NATO’s member states are being used by Russia to demonstrate that it has opened a new stage of relations with Western Europe. Paris has welcomed Russia’s desire to embark on military cooperation; for France, the Mistral deal has become a convenient tool to prove that relations with Russia are becoming increasingly normal, and that Russia poses no threat to the European security.

No more compulsory engagement. The emancipation of German security policy. OSW Commentary no. 57, 2011-07-18

Germany’s stance on Libya at the UN Security Council and its later decision not to take part in the military intervention gave rise to heated controversy both in Germany and abroad. At home, this was criticised as “an enormous mistake of historic impact”1; while abroad this raised questions about Germany’s willingness to co-operate with its key Western allies. With its decision on Libya, Germany sealed the process of making its security policy independent from the stances of the US and France. It thus ceased to feel any compulsion to provide not only military engagement but also political support for overseas operations initiated by its key allies, even if these are legitimised by the UN Security Council. Germany’s stance, apart from finishing off a certain process, is also setting a starting point for a discussion inside Germany about its military engagement in international security policy. This will bring about a more assertive and selective approach to cooperation with NATO and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

A weak link? Germany in the Euro-Atlantic security system. OSW Point of View Number 47, January 2015

The political, military and economic parameters of German power influence the vision of the international order that Berlin favours. Politically, Germany is a regional power in the EU with considerable diplomatic potential. Economically, it is the world's third largest power with growing global trade and investment links. At the same time, Germany's military potential is limited and the German strategic culture makes the country sceptical about the use of military instruments. Berlin is thus essentially interested in maintaining peace and stability, both in Europe and globally, and in developing diplomatic mechanisms to manage regional and global crises and conflicts. The German preference for dialogue and compromise in conflict situations in the regional and global dimensions may increasingly pose a risk to maintaining the cohesion and credibility of NATO – both from the perspective of the USA and Germany’s allies from Central-Eastern and Northern Europe.

The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations - The Case of EUFOR TCHAD / RCA. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2008

On 28 January 2008 the European Union launched the military operation EUFOR in Chad and the Central African Republic. Its mandate was to contribute to the security of the civilian population, the numerous refugees from neighboring Darfur and the local presence of the United Nations. This paper describes and analyses the planning process of this operation at the political-strategic and military-strategic levels with the aim of understanding how the military instrument was intended to generate the desired political effects. The paper argues that, from a military perspective, the EUFOR operation is based on the concept of humanitarian deterrence: the threat of military force is used to discourage potential spoilers from targeting the civilian population. As with any military operation, the planning of EUFOR was plagued by various elements of friction. At least some of this friction seems to flow from the mismatch in expectations between the political-strategic and military-strategic levels. The various political and military-technical constraints within which the operation was planned resulted in an operational posture that is less decisive than what the political ambitions would have suggested.

European Foreign and Security Policy since the Lisbon Treaty – From Common to single? ZEI Discussion Paper C226, 2014

Since the Lisbon Treaty, all organizational conditions have been created for the systematic use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Military and civil structures, especially the operational headquarters and associated common structures like transport command, have been established. Until now there has been limited activity in crisis resolution, outside of Bosnia and Macedonia, and therefore little has been done in replacement of NATO. It is therefore difficult to assess the development of the common policy on conflict prevention and crisis management and it has been shown that in all cases NATO should come into play as planned from the outset.

The European Union and global security: is the EU becoming the indispensable partner? EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 11, April 2014

The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ‘crisis cycle’, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ‘comprehensive approach’). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU’s intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles in addressing conflict situations? This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU’s hesitant role in crisis management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU’s security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at nontraditional security. Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the region.

America’s global defence predicament – Why the Asia ‘rebalancing’ has little significance for European security. Egmont Paper No. 72, December 2014

Summary. This paper argues that the Obama Administration’s Asia ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ is mainly a rhetorical construct that has very little substantive effect on US security policy. In contrast to the widely held belief that a renewed emphasis on Asia would place meaningful restrictions on America’s willingness and ability to deal with European security problems there is little evidence to support this argument nor is it well-grounded conceptually. Furthermore, undue emphasis on this aspect of American policy has detracted attention from more important developments in Washington’s capacity to effectively project military power.

Does Europe Need a Common Foreign & Security Policy? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 06.1, 15 September, 1996

CFSP's performance is widely regarded as weak. Why did Europe's stance in world politics not improve with the Treaty of Maastricht? The article analyses the present policy approach and the institutionalist and militarystrategic reform proposals. It is argued that policy and proposals suffer from drawbacks leading to an uncomprehensive formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Both do not provide CFSP with a necessary strategy but instead largely duplicate existing organizations. Furthermore, they propose concepts that are not viable because member states do not agree on a common defense policy. In addition, they fail to offer answers adequate to today's challenges, which are not primarily military in nature. Instead, a socioeconomic security policy appears to be a more realistic option. It is necessary because no other organization provides it sufficiently; it is viable because member states could agree on iti and it is adequate because the stabilization of countries in Eastern Europe is best achieved by social and economic policy-and not by military deterrence.

America's global defence predicament-Why the Asia 'rebalancing' has little significance for European security. Egmont Paper No. 72, December 2014

This paper argues that the Obama Administration’s Asia ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ is mainly a rhetorical construct that has very little substantive effect on US security policy. In contrast to the widely held belief that a renewed emphasis on Asia would place meaningful restrictions on America’s willingness and ability to deal with European security problems there is little evidence to support this argument nor is it well-grounded conceptually. Furthermore, undue emphasis on this aspect of American policy has detracted attention from more important developments in Washington’s capacity to effectively project military power.

The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of Russia's military doctrine. OSW Point of View 50, May 2015

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service