El Derecho norteamericano como impulsor de la responsabilidad civil del fabricante por productos defectuosos

Investigación elaborada a partir de una estancia en la Columbia Law School of New York, Estados Unidos, entre los meses de septiembre y noviembre del 2006. El Derecho comunitario europeo y español regulan la reparación de los daños causados por el uso o la proximidad de un producto defectuoso mediante gracias al impulso ideológico ejercido por la jurisprudencia norteamericana. El principio de responsabilidad objetiva rector de la directiva europea es fruto de un transfondo operado en los Estados Unidos en los años sesenta, coincidiendo con la revolución tecnològica y el inicio de la producción y del consumo masivos. Tales fenómenos suscitaron la búsqueda de mecanismos jurídicos aptos para canalizar la reparación de los daños inherentes a las actividades industriales tecnológicamente avanzadas. Su principal efecto fue la preocupación por una más justa distribución social de los llamados “costes del progreso”, preocupación que, jurídicamente, desembocó en la solución de la responsabilidad aun sin culpa del fabricante por los daños derivados de su producción industrial. El mérito de tal solución corresponde a determinados teóricos norteamericanos de la responsabilidad empresarial, quienes, inspirándose en ideas formuladas a inicios del siglo XX por los especialistas en Derecho laboral, concluyeron que es la empresa productora quien está en mejor situación de soportar el coste del accidente industrial: al imponerse al fabricante una responsabildad desvinculada de su eventual culpa en la causación del accidente, repercutirá en el precio de sus productos el coste del seguro de responsabilidad civil que se verá abocado a contratar para hacer frente a su responsabilidad objetiva o por riesgo, de manera que el coste de los accidentes acabará siendo soportado por el público consumidor al pagar el sobreprecio de los productos que adquiere. Las repercusiones de tal construcción han sido tanto normativas como judiciales.

Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives

The 1998 Spanish reform of the Personal Income Tax eliminated the 15% deduction for private medical expenditures including payments on private health insurance (PHI) policies. To avoid an undesirable increase in the demand for publicly funded health care, tax incentives to buy PHI were not completely removed but basically shifted from individual to group employer-paid policies. In a unique fiscal experiment, at the same time that the tax relief for individually purchased policies was abolished, the government provided for tax allowances on policies taken out through employment. Using a bivariate probit model on data from National Health Surveys, we estimate the impact of said reform on the demand for PHI and the changes occurred within it. Our findings suggest that the total probability of buying PHI was not significantly affected. Indeed, the fall in the demand for individual policies (by 10% between 1997 and 2001) was offset by an increase in the demand for group employer-paid ones, so that the overall size of the market remained virtually unchanged. We also briefly discuss the welfare effects on the state budget, the industry and society at large.

China´s new labour contract law: no harm to employment?

In January 2008, China imposed a new labour contract law. This new law is the most significant reform to the law of employment relations in mainland China in more than a decade. The paper provides a theoretical framework on the inter-linkages between labour market regulation, option value and the choice and timing of employment. All in all, the paper demonstrates that the Labour Contract Law in it´s own right will have only small impacts upon employment in the fast-growing Chinese economy. On the contrary, induced increasing unit labour costs represent the real issue and may reduce employment.

"Public on the outside, private on the inside": the organizational hybridization, sense of belonging and identity strategies of the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland

A number of studies show that New Public Management reforms have altered the current identity benchmarks of public officials, particularly by hybridizing values or management practices. However, existing studies have largely glossed over the sense of belonging of officials when their organization straddles the concerns of public service and private enterprise, so that the boundary between public and private sector is blurred. The purpose of this article is precisely to explore this sense of belonging in the context of organizational hybridization. It does so by drawing on the results of research conducted among the employees of a public unemployment insurance fund in Switzerland. On the one hand, the analysis shows how much their markers of belonging are hybrid, multiple and constructed in negative terms (with regard to the State), while indicating that the working practices of the employees point to an identity that is nevertheless closely bound with the public sector. On the other hand, the analysis shows that the organization plays strategically with its State status, by exploiting either its private or public identity in line with the needs related to its external image. The article concludes with a discussion of the results highlighting the strategic functionality of the hybrid identity of the actors.

Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

Prevalence of frailty indicators and association with socioeconomic status in middle-aged and older adults in a swiss region with universal health insurance coverage : a population-based cross-sectional study

Frailty prevalence in older adults has been reported but is largely unknown in middle-aged adults. We determined the prevalence of frailty indicators among middle-aged and older adults from a general Swiss population characterized by universal health insurance coverage and assessed the determinants of frailty with a special focus on socioeconomic status. Participants aged 50 and more from the population-based 2006-2010 Bus Santé study were included (N = 2,930). Four frailty indicators (weakness, shrinking, exhaustion, and low activity) were measured according to standard definitions. Multivariate logistic regressions were used to determine associations. Overall, 63.5%, 28.7%, and 7.8% participants presented no frailty indicators, one frailty indicator, and two or more frailty indicators, respectively. Among middle-aged participants (50-65 years), 75.1%, 22.2%, and 2.7% presented 0, 1, and 2 or more frailty indicators. The number of frailty indicators was positively associated with age, hypertension, and current smoking and negatively associated with male gender, body mass index, waist-to-hip ratio, and serum total cholesterol level. Lower income level but not education was associated with higher number of frailty indicators. Frailty indicators are frequently encountered in both older and middle-aged adults from the Swiss general population. Despite universal health insurance coverage, household income is independently associated with frailty.

An Analysis of the Electoral Use of Policy on Law and Order by New Labour

There has been much debate regarding the electoral strategy adopted by New Labour in the lead-up to and then during their time in government. This paper addresses the issue from the perspective of left/right and libertarian/authoritarian considerations by examining data on individual attitudes from the British Social Attitudes survey between 1986 and 2009. The analysis indicates that New Labour’s move towards the right on economic and public policy was the main driver towards attracting new centrist voters and could thus be labelled ‘broadly’ populist. The move towards a tougher stance on law and order was more ‘narrowly’ populist in that it was used more to minimise the reduction in support from Labour’s traditional base on the left than to attract new votes.

Okun’s law – A meta analysis

This paper seeks to identify whether there is a representative empirical Okun’s Law coefficient (OLC) and to measure its size. We carry out a meta regression analysis on a sample of 269 estimates of the OLC to uncover reasons for differences in empirical results and to estimate the ‘true’ OLC. On statistical (and other) grounds, we find it appropriate to investigate two separate subsamples, using respectively (some measure of) unemployment or output as dependent variable. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, there is evidence of type II publication bias in both sub-samples, but a type I bias is present only among the papers using some measure of unemployment as the dependent variable. Second, after correction for publication bias, authentic and statistically significant OLC effects are present in both sub-samples. Third, bias-corrected estimated true OLCs are significantly lower (in absolute value) with models using some measure of unemployment as the dependent variable. Using a bivariate MRA approach, the estimated true effects are -0.25 for the unemployment sub-sample and -0.61 for the output-sub sample; with a multivariate MRA methodology, the estimated true effects are -0.40 and -1.02 for the unemployment and the output-sub samples respectively.

How do technical change and technological distance influence the size of the Okun’s Law coefficient?

How does technical change influence the size of the Okun’s Law coefficient? Using a nonlinear version of Okun’s Law augmented with technical change and technological distance, we show that the impact of output movements on unemployment variations is influenced by the imitation or innovation origins of technical change

Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.