Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability

One of the striking aspects of recent sovereign debt restructurings is, conditional on default, delay length is positively correlated with the size of "haircut", which is size of creditor losses. In this paper, we develop an incomplete information model of debt restructuring where the prospect of uncertain economic recovery and the signalling about sustainability concerns together generate multi-period delay. The results from our analysis show that there is a correlation between delay length and size of haircut. Such results are supported by evidence. We show that Pareto ranking of equilibria, conditional on default, can be altered once we take into account the ex ante incentive of sovereign debtor. We use our results to evaluate proposals advocated to ensure orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.

Emissions distribution in post-Kyoto international negotiations: a policy

An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future participation of developing countries in international environmental policies will depend on their amount of pay offs inside and outside specific agreements. These studies are aimed at analyzing coalitions stability typically through a game theoretical approach. Though these contributions represent a corner stone in the research field investigating future plausible international coalitions and the reasons behind the difficulties incurred over time to implement emissions stabilizing actions, they cannot disentangle satisfactorily the role that equality play in inducing poor regions to tackle global warming. If we focus on the Stern Review findings stressing that climate change will generate heavy damages and policy actions will be costly in a finite time horizon, we understand why there is a great incentive to free ride in order to exploit benefits from emissions reduction efforts of others. The reluctance of poor countries in joining international agreements is mainly supported by historical responsibility of rich regions in generating atmospheric carbon concentration, whereas rich countries claim that emissions stabilizing policies will be effective only when developing countries will join them.Scholars recently outline that a perceived fairness in the distribution of emissions would facilitate a wide spread participation in international agreements. In this paper we overview the literature about distributional aspects of emissions by focusing on those contributions investigating past trends of emissions distribution through empirical data and future trajectories through simulations obtained by integrated assessment models. We will explain methodologies used to elaborate data and the link between real data and those coming from simulations. Results from this strand of research will be interpreted in order to discuss future negotiations for post Kyoto agreements that will be the focus of the next. Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. A particular attention will be devoted to the role that technological change will play in affecting the distribution of emissions over time and to how spillovers and experience diffusion could influence equality issues and future outcomes of policy negotiations.

Incentives in university technology transfers

There are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms: licensing agreements and the creation of spin-offs. In this paper, we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations, the main incentive issues that appear in this process, and the contractual solutions proposed to address them.

Effects of different Incentives on Attrition and Fieldwork Effort in Telephone Household Panel Surveys

Little is known about sample behavior and fieldwork effects of different incentives introduced in a household panel survey. This is especially true for telephone surveys. In a randomized experiment, the Swiss Household Panel implemented one prepaid and two promised nonmonetary incentives in the range of 10 to 15 Swiss Francs (7-10 e), plus a no incentive control group. The aim of the paper is to compare effects of these incentives especially on cooperation, but also on sample selection and fieldwork effort, separated by the household and the subsequent individual level. We find small positive cooperation effects of the prepaid incentive on both the household and the individual level especially in larger households. Sample composition is affected to a very minor extent. Finally, incentives tend to save fieldwork time and partially the number of contacts needed on the individual level.

Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box : The Relevance of Expressive Voting

This paper explores the impact of citizens' motivation to vote on the pattern of fiscal federalism. If the only concern of instrumental citizens was outcome they would have little incentive to vote because the probability that a single vote might change an electoral outcome is usually minuscule. If voters turn out in large numbers to derive intrinsic value from action, how will these voters choose when considering the role local jurisdictions should play? The first section of the paper assesses the weight that expressive voters attach to an instrumental evaluation of alternative outcomes. Predictions are tested with reference to case study analysis of the way Swiss voters assessed the role their local jurisdiction should play. The relevance of this analysis is also assessed with reference to the choice that voters express when considering other local issues. Textbook analysis of fiscal federalism is premised on the assumption that voters register choice just as 'consumers' reveal demand for services in a market, but how robust is this analogy.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.

Longer-term impacts of mentoring, educational services, and incentives to learn: evidence from a randomized trial in the United States

This paper is the first to use a randomized trial in the US to analyze the short- and long-term educational and employment impacts of an afterschool program that offered disadvantaged high-school youth: mentoring, educational services, and financial rewards with the objective to improve high-school graduation and postsecondary schooling enrollment. The short-term hefty beneficial average impacts quickly faded away. Heterogeneity matters. While encouraging results are found for younger youth, and when the program is implemented in relatively small communities of 9th graders; detrimental longlived outcomes are found for males, and when case managers are partially compensated by incentive payments and students receive more regular reminders of incentives.

Origins and efficiency of the electric industry regulation in Spain, 1910-1936

The aim of this paper is to discover the origins of utility regulation in Spain, and to analyse, from a microeconomic perspective, its characteristics and the impact of regulation on consumers and utilities. Madrid and the Madrilenian utilities are taken as a case study. The electric industry in the period studied was a natural monopoly2. Each of the three phases of production, generation, transmission and distribution, had natural monopoly characteristics. Therefore, the most efficient form to generate, transmit and distribute electricity was the monopoly because one firm can produce a quantity at a lower cost than the sum of costs incurred by two or more firms. A problem arises because when a firm is the single provider it can charge prices above the marginal cost, at monopoly prices. When a monopolist reduces the quantity produced, price increases, causing the consumer to demand less than the economic efficiency level, incurring a loss of consumer surplus. The loss of the consumer surplus is not completely gained by the monopolist, causing a loss of social surplus, a deadweight loss. The main objective of regulation is going to be to reduce to a minimum the deadweight loss. Regulation is also needed because when the monopolist fixes prices at marginal cost equal marginal revenue there would be an incentive for firms to enter the market creating inefficiency. The Madrilenian industry has been chosen because of the availability of statistical information on costs and production. The complex industry structure and the atomised demand add interest to the analysis. This study will also provide some light on the tariff regulation of the period which has been poorly studied and will complement the literature on the US electric utilities regulation where a different type of regulation was implemented.

A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress

This paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce office- motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leadership's objective of controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show fi…rst that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., uni…ed government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of the governing party imposes more party discipline under uni…ed government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbents' aggregate performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better off. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Party discipline; Political agency; Retrospective voting; Office-motivated politicians.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

Does the EU financing system contribute to shadow economic activity?

Financial contributions to the EU budget depend basically on official GDP. This means that countries with higher shadow economic activity contribute less than they should contribute in a system based on actual GDP and therefore could reduce their incentive to fight against such activities. In this paper we investigate if the EU financing system really has an influence on the intensity with which governments in EU member states fight against shadow economic activity. We find that the EU net contributors significantly fight more intensively against shadow economic activity while EU net receivers significantly fight less. As a result, shadow economic activity is higher in net receiver and lower in net contributor countries than it were in comparison with a scenario of nationally balanced EU funding. Quantitatively and averaged over the time period 2001-2007, the diagnosed effect amounts to a stimulation of hidden economic activity by almost 10% for particular economies. JEL classification: C31, D63, F33, H21, H26. Keywords: EU financing system, shadow economy, tax auditing.

Three essays in international finance

Executive Summary The first essay of this dissertation investigates whether greater exchange rate uncertainty (i.e., variation over time in the exchange rate) fosters or depresses the foreign investment of multinational firms. In addition to the direct capital financing it supplies, foreign investment can be a source of valuable technology and know-how, which can have substantial positive effects on a host country's economic growth. Thus, it is critically important for policy makers and central bankers, among others, to understand how multinationals base their investment decisions on the characteristics of foreign exchange markets. In this essay, I first develop a theoretical framework to improve our knowledge regarding how the aggregate level of foreign investment responds to exchange rate uncertainty when an economy consists of many firms, each of which is making decisions. The analysis predicts a U-shaped effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the total level of foreign investment of the economy. That is, the effect is negative for low levels of uncertainty and positive for higher levels of uncertainty. This pattern emerges because the relationship between exchange rate volatility and 'the probability of investment is negative for firms with low productivity at home (i.e., firms that find it profitable to invest abroad) and the relationship is positive for firms with high productivity at home (i.e., firms that prefer exporting their product). This finding stands in sharp contrast to predictions in the existing literature that consider a single firm's decision to invest in a unique project. The main contribution of this research is to show that the aggregation over many firms produces a U-shaped pattern between exchange rate uncertainty and the probability of investment. Using data from industrialized countries for the period of 1982-2002, this essay offers a comprehensive empirical analysis that provides evidence in support of the theoretical prediction. In the second essay, I aim to explain the time variation in sovereign credit risk, which captures the risk that a government may be unable to repay its debt. The importance of correctly evaluating such a risk is illustrated by the central role of sovereign debt in previous international lending crises. In addition, sovereign debt is the largest asset class in emerging markets. In this essay, I provide a pricing formula for the evaluation of sovereign credit risk in which the decision to default on sovereign debt is made by the government. The pricing formula explains the variation across time in daily credit spreads - a widely used measure of credit risk - to a degree not offered by existing theoretical and empirical models. I use information on a country's stock market to compute the prevailing sovereign credit spread in that country. The pricing formula explains a substantial fraction of the time variation in daily credit spread changes for Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia for the 1998-2008 period, particularly during the recent subprime crisis. I also show that when a government incentive to default is allowed to depend on current economic conditions, one can best explain the level of credit spreads, especially during the recent period of financial distress. In the third essay, I show that the risk of sovereign default abroad can produce adverse consequences for the U.S. equity market through a decrease in returns and an increase in volatility. The risk of sovereign default, which is no longer limited to emerging economies, has recently become a major concern for financial markets. While sovereign debt plays an increasing role in today's financial environment, the effects of sovereign credit risk on the U.S. financial markets have been largely ignored in the literature. In this essay, I develop a theoretical framework that explores how the risk of sovereign default abroad helps explain the level and the volatility of U.S. equity returns. The intuition for this effect is that negative economic shocks deteriorate the fiscal situation of foreign governments, thereby increasing the risk of a sovereign default that would trigger a local contraction in economic growth. The increased risk of an economic slowdown abroad amplifies the direct effect of these shocks on the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. through two channels. The first channel involves a decrease in the future earnings of U.S. exporters resulting from unfavorable adjustments to the exchange rate. The second channel involves investors' incentives to rebalance their portfolios toward safer assets, which depresses U.S. equity prices. An empirical estimation of the model with monthly data for the 1994-2008 period provides evidence that the risk of sovereign default abroad generates a strong leverage effect during economic downturns, which helps to substantially explain the level and the volatility of U.S. equity returns.

Functional late outgrowth endothelial progenitors isolated from peripheral blood of burned patients.

BACKGROUND: Bioengineered skin substitutes are increasingly considered as a useful option for the treatment of full thickness burn injury. Their viability following grafting can be enhanced by seeding the skin substitute with late outgrowth endothelial progenitor cells (EPCs). However, it is not known whether autologous EPCs can be obtained from burned patients shortly after injury. METHODS: Late outgrowth EPCs were isolated from peripheral blood sampled obtained from 10 burned patients (extent 19.6±10.3% TBSA) within the first 24h of hospital admission, and from 7 healthy subjects. Late outgrowth EPCs were phenotyped in vitro. RESULTS: In comparison with similar cells obtained from healthy subjects, growing colonies from burned patients yielded a higher percentage of EPC clones (46 versus 17%, p=0.013). Furthermore, EPCs from burned patients secreted more vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) into the culture medium than did their counterparts from healthy subjects (85.8±56.2 versus 17.6±14pg/mg protein, p=0.018). When injected to athymic nude mice 6h after unilateral ligation of the femoral artery, EPCs from both groups of subjects greatly accelerated the reperfusion of the ischaemic hindlimb and increased the number of vascular smooth muscle cells. CONCLUSIONS: The present study supports that, in patients with burns of moderate extension, it is feasible to obtain functional autologous late outgrowth EPCs from peripheral blood. These results constitute a strong incentive to pursue approaches based on using autotransplantation of these cells to improve the therapy of full thickness burns.

Inventory and description of disease management programs in Switzerland

Background: Disease management, a system of coordinated health care interventions for populations with chronic diseases in which patient self-care is a key aspect, has been shown to be effective for several conditions. Little is known on the supply of disease management programs in Switzerland. Objectives: To systematically search, record and evaluate data on existing disease management programs in Switzerland. Methods: Programs met our operational definition of disease management if their interventions targeted a chronic disease, included a multidisciplinary team and lasted at least 6 months. To find existing programs, we searched Swiss official websites, Swiss web-pages using Google, medical electronic database (Medline), and checked references from selected documents. We also contacted personally known individuals, those identified as possibly working in the field, individuals working in major Swiss health insurance companies and people recommended by previously contacted persons (snow ball strategy). We developed an extraction grid and collected information pertaining to the following 8 domains: patient population, intervention recipient, intervention content, delivery personnel, method of communication, intensity and complexity, environment and clinical outcomes (measures?). Results: We identified 8 programs fulfilling our operational definition of disease management. Programs targeted patients with diabetes, hypertension, heart failure, obesity, alcohol dependence, psychiatric disorders or breast cancer, and were mainly directed towards patients. The interventions were multifaceted and included education in almost all cases. Half of the programs included regularly scheduled follow-up, by phone in 3 instances. Healthcare professionals involved were physicians, nurses, case managers, social workers, psychologists and dietitians. None fulfilled the 6 criteria established by the Disease Management Association of America. Conclusions: Our study shows that disease management programs, in a country with universal health insurance coverage and little incentive to develop new healthcare strategies, are scarce, although we may have missed existing programs. Nonetheless, those already implemented are very interesting and rather comprehensive. Appropriate evaluation of these programs should be performed in order to build upon them and try to design a generic disease management framework suited to the Swiss healthcare system.