The Re-emergence of Russia and its Collision Course with Europe. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 4, March 2014

From the Introduction. In order to understand the historical roots of the current geopolitical confrontation between the EU and Russia, we have to go back to the end of the Cold War and to the catastrophic decade that it was followed by in Russian history. The dissolution of the USSR imposed serious economic hardship for Russia and for all the ex-communist East-European states. Russia was the hardest hit amongst them, as the center of the USSR's economic system it suffered most from the dissolution of regional economic ties. This crisis was just deepened by the IMF's privatization and reform campaign, which imposed austerity measures and state-asset privatization as a “shock-therapy” answer to the country's economic problems. This policy package did nothing to save Russia from economic collapse (which eventually happened in 1998), the only thing it achieved was an even stronger social and economic crisis and the enrichment of the rent-seeking ex-communist top bureaucrats by state-assets, which were sold out under-priced through diverse channels of corruption

The harsh reality of Ukraine's fiscal arithmetic. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/07, June 2015

Ukraine is struggling with both external aggression and the dramatically poor shape of its economy. The pace of political and institutional change has so far been too slow to prevent the deepening of the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises, while business confidence continues to be undermined. • Unfortunately, the 2015 International Monetary Fund Extended Fund Facility programme repeats many weaknesses of the 2014 IMF Stand-by Arrangement: slow pace of fiscal adjustment especially in the two key areas of energy prices and pension entitlements, lack of a comprehensive structural and institutional reform vision, and insufficient external financing to close the expected balance-of-payments gap and allow Ukraine to return to debt sustainability in the long term. • The reform process in Ukraine must be accelerated and better managed. A frontloaded fiscal adjustment is necessary to stabilise public finances and the balance-of-payments, and to bring inflation down. The international community, especially the European Union, should offer sufficient financial aid backed by strong conditionality, technical assistance and support to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.

The 2015 Greek Referendum. EPIN Commentary No. 24, 3 July 2015

The Greek government called a snap referendum on the proposals advanced by the EU partners and creditor, i.e. the draft Agreement submitted by the EU/IMF to the Eurogroup of 25 June 2015. There has been a major controversy among Greek constitutional lawyers about whether this referendum meets constitutional requirements. No doubt, the constitutional validity of this referendum could be challenged on pure normative terms (nature of the question, time limit); yet this shock call for a referendum appeared as the only political solution for the Greek government facing the dilemma of whether to take the plunge of having five-months of negotiations transformed into a negative-sum game.

Ukraine on the financial front – the problem of Ukraine’s foreign public debt. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 178|05.08.2015

One of the key challenges that Ukraine is facing is the scale of its foreign debt (both public and private). As of 1st April it stood at US$ 126 billion, which is 109.8% of the country’s GDP. Approximately 45% of these financial obligations are short-term, meaning that they must be paid off within a year. Although the value of the debt has fallen by nearly US$ 10 billion since the end of 2014 (due to the private sector paying a part of the liabilities), the debt to GDP ratio has increased due to the recession and the depreciation of the hryvnia. The value of Ukraine’s foreign public debt is also on the rise (including state guarantees); since the beginning of 2015 it has risen from US$ 37.6 billion to US$ 43.6 billion. Ukraine does not currently have the resources to pay off its debt. In this situation a debt restructuring is necessary and this is one of the top priorities for the Ukrainian government as well as for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its assistance programme. Without this it will be much more difficult for Ukraine to overcome the economic crisis.

Greece’s poor growth prospects. CEPS Commentary, 21 August 2015

Four years ago – almost to the day – when the question of Greece’s debt sustainability was being intensely debated, these same authors argued that Greece would face strong headwinds in its effort to ‘grow solvent’. With the third rescue package dealing with the immediate liquidity issues in the works, and concerns being voiced by the IMF as well as other actors, they find in this CEPS Commentary that the issue is once again pertinent.

Flashlight Europe N°3–April 2015. Greece – What else?

The first hundred days in office have become a benchmark for every new government. Early in May, the Tsipras coalition government will reach this date. Given the difficult financial, economic and social situation in Greece, there was no such thing as a closed season for Alexis Tsipras from day one on, and he himself could not have expected one. After all, his new government acceded office with a political agenda demanding nothing less than an end to austerity and the submission to a reform programme seen as unduly imposed on Greece by its creditors, the EU and the IMF.

Filling the gap: open economy considerations for more reliable potential output estimates. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/11, October 2015

This paper argues that the Phillips curve relationship is not sufficient to trace back the output gap, because the effect of excess demand is not symmetric across tradeable and non-tradeable sectors. In the non-tradeable sector, excess demand creates excess employment and inflation via the Phillips curve, while in the tradeable sector much of the excess demand is absorbed by the trade balance. We set up an unobserved-components model including both a Phillips curve and a current account equation to estimate ‘sustainable output’ for 45 countries. Our estimates for many countries differ substantially from the potential output estimates of the European Commission, IMF and OECD. We assemble a comprehensive real-time dataset to estimate our model on data which was available in each year from 2004-15. Our model was able to identify correctly the sign of pre-crisis output gaps using real time data for countries such as the United States, Spain and Ireland, in contrast to the estimates of the three institutions, which estimated negative output gaps real-time, while their current estimates for the pre-crisis period suggest positive gaps. In the past five years the annual output gap estimate revisions of our model, the European Commission, IMF, OECD and the Hodrick-Prescott filter were broadly similar in the range of 0.5-1.0 percent of GDP for advanced countries. Such large revisions are worrisome, because the European fiscal framework can translate the imprecision in output gap estimates into poorly grounded fiscal policymaking in the EU.

Greece as an example of “post-politics” in the eurozone. EPIN Commentary No. 28/9 November 2015

The negotiations between Greece and the EU and IMF tested the unity, limits, stamina and financial interdependence of eurozone member states. Greece emerged wounded from the fray, but Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has established beyond doubt his dominance in Greek politics, in defiance of partisan competitors at home and his counterparts’ wishes in the rest of Europe. In this EPIN Commentary the authors argue that – beyond the political significance of SYRIZA’s third electoral victory in seven months – this vote of confidence brings certain characteristics of both Greek and EU politics into sharper relief. The high-risk political activism undertaken by Syriza’s leadership in the first half of 2015 has (re)opened the debate about what kind of EU we live in, and contributed to the creation of another type of discourse in Europe – one that has so far been the preserve of established elites.

Countries under Adjustment Programmes: What role for the ECB? CEPS Special Report No. 124, December 2015

Providing ‘technical assistance/advice’ on programmes for countries under financial stress is well within the mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB). Being fully part of the Troika, however, is a different role. Formally the ECB does not participate in the ‘decision-making’ on programmes (decisions are taken by the Finance Ministers – and the IMF). However, the ECB is part of the ‘decision-shaping’ process. These two roles have often been confused. The ECB should interpret its formal role in future ESM (European Stability Mechanism) programmes as narrowly as possible. Providing advice but avoid taking part in the operational work of programme surveillance. The ECB should de facto leave the Troika. At any rate, future incidents like the Italian or Spanish letters will be superseded by the OMTs (outright monetary transactions) and an Irish-type situation would be shaped by the legal framework of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the potential funding from the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). An additional issue for the ECB is internal coherence: Its six-member Executive Board manages the participation in the Troika, monetary policy is decided by the Governing Council and banking supervision is under the Supervisory Board, separated in principle by Chinese walls from the (rest of the) ECB.

Belarus at a crossroads. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2016/02 January 2016

Highlights: • Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus has maintained a largely non-market economic system. This did not prevent rapid growth of its economy over a sustained period up to 2011. However, the period of economic growth in Belarus seems to be over.The factors that underpinned Belarus’s growth, mainly the beneficial external environment, have gradually disappeared. As a result, the country is confronted by the need to start the far-reaching programme of market-oriented economic reforms and macroeconomic stabilisation which it tried to avoid for so long. Reform will not be easy, economically and politically. • The potential hardship facing Belarus could be at least partly cushioned by external assistance, in the first instance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. However, the IMF has relatively fresh memories of the failure of its 2009-10 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Belarus, which provided substantial balance-of payments support, but which was derailed by its too-narrow focus on monetary and fiscal quantitative performance criteria, and by insufficient reform commitment on the Belarusian side. Other donors, such as the European Union, might be reluctant to offer assistance as long as Belarus does not improve its poor human rights record and start some political reforms.

Financial assistance to Greece: Three programmes. EPC Discussion Paper, 26 February 2016

There are a lot of myths surrounding the bailout money that was given to Greece. Many people still believe that the money never went to the Greek people, but to the Greek and European banks; that the intervention of the euro-area governments and the IMF dealt almost exclusively with the Greek debt; that very little money was used to finance Greek public expenditure; that most Greek debt was reimbursed; that no cuts were made to the stock of Greek government bonds on the market; and, finally, that so far, no cuts have been made to the debt of the Greek state towards the euro-area countries. In this Discussion Paper, Fabio Colasanti debunks some of those myths by taking stock of the numbers behind the financial support given to Greece by the countries of the euro-area and the IMF. Examining the three bailout programmes in detail, he discusses the reasons for and against a restructuring of the Greek public debt in 2010, its implementation in 2012, the degree in which the Greek debt towards the euro-area countries has already been cut, and the scope for further cuts. Finally, the paper explains how both issues were and are still dominated by internal political considerations, both in the creditor countries and in Greece.

Trends in LDC external debt /

Description based on: 1983-89.

Post-Bretton Woods evidence on PPP under different exchange rate regimes

This article investigates the behaviour of exchange rates across different regimes for a post-Bretton Woods period. The exchange rate regime classification is based on the classification of Frankel et al. (2004) who condensed the 10 categories of exchange rate regimes reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) into three categories. Panel unitroot tests and panel cointegration are used to examine the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) hypothesis. The latter test is used to check for both the weak and strong forms of PPP. The panel unit-root tests show no evidence of PPP and suggest there is no difference in the behaviour of exchange rates across different regimes. However, failure to detect PPP across any of the regimes could be due to structural breaks. This assumption is reinforced by the results of cointegration tests, which suggest that there exists at least a weak form of PPP for the different regimes. The evidence for strong PPP decreases as the exchange rate regime moves away from a flexible exchange rate regime.

Az átalakuló globális pénzügyi szabályozórendszer kérdései = Dilemmas of the changing global financial regulation system

Erősődő igény van a jelenlegi sokoldalú nemzetközi felügyeleti rendszer reformjára úgy, hogy az a nemzeti gazdaságpolitikák nemzetközi hatásait is figyelembe vegye. Ehhez át kell reformálni a jelenlegi globális pénzügyi szabályozási rendszert, de ki kell alakítani a nemzeti gazdaságpolitikák egymásra hatásának koordinációját is. Ide tartozik a globális külső sokkok csillapítására szolgáló anti-ciklikus finanszírozás, a nemzetközi adózási együttműködés fokozása, a nemzetközi adósságfinanszírozás tökéletesítése, vagy a globális fizetésieszköz-tartalékok és a fizetési rendszer viszonya. Ez utóbbi területen az SDR kiterjedtebb használatának feltételeit kell kimunkálni. A jelenlegi globális intézmények – WTO, Nemzetközi Valutaalap, Világbank – alapos megújítása elkerülhetetlen. A globális gazdasági koordináció intézményi kereteinek kidolgozása viszont még várat magára. A G20-ak csoportja – bár fontos reformokat kezdeményezett –, nem tekinthető a világgazdasági egyensúlytalanságok megoldása letéteményesének. A cél csak olyan globális intézményi struktúra lehet, amely egyaránt képes a világ nagy számú gazdaságai közötti koordinációs feladatok megoldására, s a döntések végrehajtásának kikényszerítésére. / === / The present multilateral international surveillance system needs to be reformed with an eye on international repercussions of national economic policies. The present global financial architecture, the coordination of interplays of national economic policies must be modified. An anti-cyclical financing capable of absorbing global external shocks, strengthening of international tax cooperation, improving international debt financing or the relations between global financial reserves and the global payment system might be part and parcel of this process. A more extended use of SDR could be worked out. Reforms of the present global institutions – the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank – cannot be avoided any further. Institutional frameworks of global economic coordination mechanism have still not been worked out. The Group of 20 (G-20) cannot be seen as the sole player in fighting world economic disequlibria. A global institutional system is envisaged, which is able to implement economic coordination among national economic units and to enforce the implementation of decisions taken. At present there is no global institution dealing with coherence and consistency of global issues. Reforming present institutions and/or designing new ones are possible options. The basis for such an international coordination must involve general acceptance of principles, transparent implementation, and enforcement of decisions taken.

A condição de saúde do trabalhador moto-taxista do município de Caicó-RN no contexto da precarização

The restructuring process has caused several changes in the workplace since the 1970s in Brazil these changes were more significant during the 1990s, with the implementation of neoliberal policies and the submission of the country's determinations of the IMF and World Bank . In this context, expression wins the increase in structural unemployment and the growth of informality as a mitigating practice the lack of formal employment. At present the activity of mototaxi driver has grown in the municipalities of small, medium and large size of the country. In Caicó / RN, as well as other municipalities, this activity has been presented as an alternative livelihood in the face of rising unemployment. Considering that this is a precarious and risky activity, we wondered about which health conditions of workers in the municipality of mototaxi driver Caicó in the context of job insecurity? What is the perception that this employee has about the health-disease process and its relationship to your work? How to setup the access of motorcycle taxi drivers the right to health and social security? The research sought to examine the health conditions of the workers of the municipality of mototaxi driver Caicó / RN in the context of job insecurity. From the methodological point of view the study worked with documentary research, semi-structured interview and questionnaire with open and closed questions with a sample population of motorcycle taxi drivers of the city, in the period August-September 2013 The results revealed that these workers are if constantly exposed to various risks inherent to the profession as well as the space in which it conducts its business activities, in this case the traffic being traffic accidents and urban violence one of the greatest risks identified by motorcycle taxi drivers in the present study