Do firms always want to learn from corporate venture capital investments?

In this paper, the learning intentions and outcomes for corporate venture capital are questioned. Through qualitative research in the oil and gas sector, we identified a desire to control the direction and pace of innovation as the main driver for this type of investments. A new model and framework for CVC are presented. Contrary to the traditional model of CVC, which features a dyadic relation between corporate investor and venture entrepreneur, our model shows that CVC investments create a more complex conjoint of relations between multiple stakeholders. These relations challenge the neo-Schumpeterian model of competition. Using the grounded theory approach, we created a theoretical framework explaining and predicting outcomes of corporate venture capital other than learning. At firm level, our framework conceptualizes CVC programs as dynamic capabilities, and suggests a competitive advantage for the corporate investor through its ability to faster and better integrate the new technology. At market level, we proposed that CVC investments positively affect the pace of innovation in the market through an increased speed of acceptance of technologies supported by corporate investors.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Tangibilidade, classe de ativos e estrutura de capital das empresas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA

This study aims to investigate the influence of the asset class and the breakdown of tangibility as determinant factors of the capital structure of companies listed on the BM & FBOVESPA in the period of 2008-2012. Two current assets classes were composed and once they were grouped by liquidity, they were also analyzed by the financial institutions for credit granting: current resources (Cash, Bank and Financial Applications) and operations with duplicates (Stocks and Receivables). The breakdown of the tangible assets was made based on its main components provided as warrantees for loans like Machinery & Equipment and Land & Buildings. For an analysis extension, three metrics for leverage (accounting, financial and market) were applied and the sample was divided into economic sectors, adopted by BM&FBOVESPA. The data model in dynamic panel estimated by a systemic GMM of two levels was used in this study due its strength to problems of endogenous relationship as well as the omitted variables bias. The found results suggest that current resources are determinants of the capital structure possibly because they re characterized as proxies for financial solvency, being its relationship with debt positive. The sectorial analysis confirmed the results for current resources. The tangibility of assets has inverse proportional relationship with the leverage. As it is disintegrated in its main components, the significant and negative influence of machinery & equipment was more marked in the Industrial Goods sector. This result shows that, on average, the most specific assets from operating activities of a company compete for a less use of third party resources. As complementary results, it was observed that the leverage has persistence, which is linked with the static trade-off theory. Specifically for financial leverage, it was observed that the persistence is relevant when it is controlled for the lagged current assets classes variables. The proxy variable for growth opportunities, measured by the Market -to -Book, has the sign of its contradictory coefficient. The company size has a positive relationship with debt, in favor of static trade-off theory. Profitability is the most consistent variable in all the performed estimations, showing strong negative and significant relationship with leverage, as the pecking order theory predicts

Ofensiva do Capital e Desmobilização das Forças do Trabalho: As Estratégias Gerenciais Burguesas para a Desarticulação das Classes Trabalhadoras

The problematic that gives shape to this research is the question of the historical process of demobilization of the movement of the working classes in your accented contemporary moment. Their object of study, however, and that it particularizes, it relates to a portion this problematic; it relates to set of determinations that comprise a broader set of determinations of this historical process: it is a set of determinations forged and mediated by bourgeois strategies of management for the conformation of the circumstances necessary for the domination and for the conduct of labor force on operations in work processes for the production of surplus value. What we investigated are, because, the strategies of disarticulation that the bourgeoisie utilizes, under the mantle of subsidies conceptual and interventive of its management of work processes and the sieve of class struggles, to obstruct the union of workers; hamper the movements proletarians. Managerial strategies that intentionally or unintentionally, instill in the social relations of production means to produce and reproduce, activate and reactivate conditions of incitement of individualism and competition between the workers themselves. We shall see, thus, by analyzing means, centrally, from some of the fundamentals of disarticulation in the managerial strategies bourgeois and some of the fundamental strategies of management bourgeois hegemonized with the restructuring productive of 1970, that the disarticulation, and also the demobilization, is a concrete condition, is an objective condition, that is beyond a question that can be "solved" only by enlightenment cognitive, only by formation criticism intellectual. In everyday of the work spaces permeated by managerial strategies bourgeois there elements, then, operating as a material force putting difficulties important for the articulation of the workers, the solidarity of the proletariat; elements that constitute obstacle significant to an awareness of class and belonging; elements act in favor of the atomization of the worker - even if engenders, in the same process, as a contradiction, potentiality of resistance and fight the forces of labor

Human capital formation and the linkage between trade and poverty: the cases of Costa Rica and Nicaragua

Includes bibliography

Building community social capital

Includes bibliography

Desenvolvimento regional e capital social: uma abordagem para a microrregião de Presidente Prudente - SP

Pós-graduação em Geografia - FCT

Distritos industriais como condições gerais para a reprodução do capital em Piracicaba (SP)

Pós-graduação em Geografia - IGCE

Participação, controle e Serviço Social na política municipal de assistência social de Uberaba/MG: tensão entre a radicalização democrática e as estratégias de reprodução do capital

Pós-graduação em Serviço Social - FCHS

Análise organizacional do partido da social democracia brasileira no estado de São Paulo (1988-2006): a estrutura relacional e o capital político

Pós-graduação em Ciências Sociais - FCLAR

Gramsci, o capital supranacional e o novo teorema da política

Gramsci é um autor da atualidade, teórico da mundialização do capitalismo, mas ainda desconhecido, mesmo no campo do marxismo, entre as suas tendências dominantes. Pensar a globalização, o século XXI, a nova conjuntura política nos quadros da contemporaneidade é um desafio intelectual da maior relevância que tem, em Gramsci – certamente para surpresa de uns e negação de outros –, uma de suas fontes mais estimulantes e reveladoras. É fascinante desvendar em seus escritos teses indispensáveis para refletirmos alguns dos principais temas do momento em horizontes mundiais.

Corporate Venture Capital: How established firms use external resources to create new competencies

This Doctoral Dissertation is triggered by an emergent trend: firms are increasingly referring to investments in corporate venture capital (CVC) as means to create new competencies and foster the search for competitive advantage through the use of external resources. CVC is generally defined as the practice by non-financial firms of placing equity investments in entrepreneurial companies. Thus, CVC can be interpreted (i) as a key component of corporate entrepreneurship - acts of organizational creation, renewal, or innovation that occur within or outside an existing organization– and (ii) as a particular form of venture capital (VC) investment where the investor is not a traditional and financial institution, but an established corporation. My Dissertation, thus, simultaneously refers to two streams of research: corporate strategy and venture capital. In particular, I directed my attention to three topics of particular relevance for better understanding the role of CVC. In the first study, I moved from the consideration that competitive environments with rapid technological changes increasingly force established corporations to access knowledge from external sources. Firms, thus, extensively engage in external business development activities through different forms of collaboration with partners. While the underlying process common to these mechanisms is one of knowledge access, they are substantially different. The aim of the first study is to figure out how corporations choose among CVC, alliance, joint venture and acquisition. I addressed this issue adopting a multi-theoretical framework where the resource-based view and real options theory are integrated. While the first study mainly looked into the use of external resources for corporate growth, in the second work, I combined an internal and an external perspective to figure out the relationship between CVC investments (exploiting external resources) and a more traditional strategy to create competitive advantage, that is, corporate diversification (based on internal resources). Adopting an explorative lens, I investigated how these different modes to renew corporate current capabilities interact to each other. More precisely, is CVC complementary or substitute to corporate diversification? Finally, the third study focused on the more general field of VC to investigate (i) how VC firms evaluate the patent portfolios of their potential investee companies and (ii) whether the ability to evaluate technology and intellectual property varies depending on the type of investors, in particular for what concern the distinction between specialized versus generalist VCs and independent versus corporate VCs. This topic is motivated by two observations. First, it is not clear yet which determinants of patent value are primarily considered by VCs in their investment decisions. Second, VCs are not all alike in terms of technological experiences and these differences need to be taken into account.

Spatial Disparity and Dynamic Trajectory of Convergence in China: Construction and Application of a Composite Index of Regional Development

China is a large country characterized by remarkable growth and distinct regional diversity. Spatial disparity has always been a hot issue since China has been struggling to follow a balanced growth path but still confronting with unprecedented pressures and challenges. To better understand the inequality level benchmarking spatial distributions of Chinese provinces and municipalities and estimate dynamic trajectory of sustainable development in China, I constructed the Composite Index of Regional Development (CIRD) with five sub pillars/dimensions involving Macroeconomic Index (MEI), Science and Innovation Index (SCI), Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), Human Capital Index (HCI) and Public Facilities Index (PFI), endeavoring to cover various fields of regional socioeconomic development. Ranking reports on the five sub dimensions and aggregated CIRD were provided in order to better measure the developmental degrees of 31 or 30 Chinese provinces and municipalities over 13 years from 1998 to 2010 as the time interval of three “Five-year Plans”. Further empirical applications of this CIRD focused on clustering and convergence estimation, attempting to fill up the gap in quantifying the developmental levels of regional comprehensive socioeconomics and estimating the dynamic convergence trajectory of regional sustainable development in a long run. Four clusters were benchmarked geographically-oriented in the map on the basis of cluster analysis, and club-convergence was observed in the Chinese provinces and municipalities based on stochastic kernel density estimation.

Optimal compliance with emission constraints: dynamic characteristics and the choice of technique

The paper analyzes how to comply with an emission constraint, which restricts the use of an established energy technique, given the two options to save energy and to invest in two alternative energy techniques. These techniques differ in their deterioration rates and the investment lags of the corresponding capital stocks. Thus, the paper takes a medium-term perspective on climate change mitigation, where the time horizon is too short for technological change to occur, but long enough for capital stocks to accumulate and deteriorate. It is shown that, in general, only one of the two alternative techniques prevails in the stationary state, although, both techniques might be utilized during the transition phase. Hence, while in a static economy only one technique is efficient, this is not necessarily true in a dynamic economy.