Los instrumentos convertibles en acciones para la financiación empresarial en un entorno económico de restricción del crédito bancario

(SPA) Los bonos convertibles en acciones son instrumentos de financiación corporativa que en general comparten varias de las características de las emisiones de deuda senior corporativa, como el pago regular y fijado de cupones, vencimiento definido, momento en el que se repaga la totalidad del principal, y prelación en caso de default con respecto a otras obligaciones crediticias. En cambio, el repago del principal se ofrecerá bajo determinadas circunstancias en acciones de la compañía emisora en una proporción acordada previamente. Pero los instrumentos convertibles son instrumentos heterogéneos que suelen incorporar otras características particulares a cada caso, como son repagos anticipados bajo determinadas condiciones, reducción del ratio de conversión a determinados precios de la acción, pagos compensatorios o "make-whole" y otros. Los instrumentos convertibles son ejemplos de activos híbridos que comparten características de deuda y de capital y por tanto tienen impacto específico en la contabilidad de las empresas y en la posible dilución de sus accionistas. En España y otros países de la periferia de Europa, la emisión de bonos convertibles ha aumentado considerablemente desde el inicio de la crisis financiera, fundamentalmente debido a la restricción de otras formas de crédito empresarial, principalmente los créditos bancarios. En el presente artículo se explican algunas de las características comunes a los bonos convertibles emitidos recientemente por empresas españolas, se analizan las ventajas, y las razones para la emisión de estos activos, y se indican sus implicaciones contables. Los instrumentos convertibles pueden ser una alternativa estable a la deuda bancaria y a la renta fija tradicional en los mercados de capitales para la financiación de las compañías medianas, que tienen menos acceso a fuentes de financiación en situaciones de aversión riesgo por parte de los inversores y entidades financieras. (ENG)Convertible bonds share several characteristics with secure corporate debt, such as the regular coupon payments, fixed maturity and similar seniority in case of default. Nevertheless the investor of the convertible bond has the option of receiving the principal amount repayment at maturity in cash or receiving a previously agreed number of shares. But convertible securities can be complex financial instruments that possess exotic or specific features, such as soft calls, put options, cash options, cash top up features, or make whole amounts. Convertible securities are hybrid instruments that share characteristics of both debt and equity, and therefore suffer an specific accounting treatment under International Financial Reporting Standards, where the issuing company must separately identify the debt and equity components in its financial statements In peripheral European countries and in Spain in particular, convertible issuance has significantly increased since the start of the Global Financial Crisis, an increase mainly driven by the restriction of other forms of credit, namely banking loans. This article summarizes some of the common characteristics of convertible securities, analyzes its advantages for both issuers and investors, and introduces the accounting of convertible bonds. Convertible Bonds can become a viable and stable alternative to bank loans and to high yield or investment grade bonds for the funding of mid-sized corporates which normally have a more difficult access to credit in regional banking crisis or credit restrictive environments.

Opinions in cases of debt, 1748-1749

Opinions rendered in cases brought against Thomas Barker, executor of the estate of Robert Forstor, by James and Roger Barlow (executors of the estate of Thomas Forster), Sibylla Price, and Richard Foster. The attorney for all plaintiffs was Samuel Swann.

[ Warrant for the arrest of Samuel Gray for debt], 1769

A warrant for the arrest and sale of all assets of Gray who was found to owe another merchant Alexander Hill in a recent trial. Also includes appraisal of property by Fairfield and Salter and statement by Sheriff Cudworth.

[Receipt for certificates of funded debt], 1791 January 28

Printed Commissioner's Office receipt form acknowledging three certificates of funded debt received by Caleb Gannett from Nathaniel Appleton, Commissioner of Loans in the State of Massachusetts. The receipt, No. 712, is signed by Gannett and dated January 28, 1791.

Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus. The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area. CEPS Policy Brief No. 289, 27 March 2013

In many eurozone countries, domestic banks often hold more than 20% of domestic public debt, which is an unsatisfactory situation given that banks are highly leveraged and that sovereign debt is inherently subject to default risk within the euro area. This paper by Daniel Gros finds, however, that the relative concentration of public debt on bank balance sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, for there are strong additional incentives for banks in some countries to increase their sovereign. His contribution discusses a number of these regulatory incentives – the most important of which is specific to the euro area – and explores ways in which euro area banks can be weaned from massive investments in government bonds.

Household debt and the European crisis. ECRI Research Report No. 13, June 2013

The fall in economic output all over Europe since 2008 has had important consequences for household liabilities. Major growth in demand and supply for household credit products has generated an increase in household debt, which contributed to growth rates during the pre-crisis period but – in some countries – became household-debt overhangs and helped inflate asset bubbles. In the run-up to the crisis, long-term economic lessons and theories were often overlooked and signs that the economic situation could worsen were ignored. Although not at the core of the crisis, household debt had important consequences for macroeconomic stability, robustness of growth and the depth of recessions. The last ten years in Europe have demonstrated the typical final stage of a household debt cycle: rapid increase and abrupt retrenchment. Widely varying outcomes across Europe enable us to consider the causes of the rapid growth in household debt and draw theoretical lessons that can help policy-makers and academics devise a coherent regulatory response to avoid extremes of the debt cycle in future.

Sovereign debt and its restructuring framework in the Euro area. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/05, August 2013

To compensate for the inflexibility of fixed exchange rates, the euro area needs flexibility through a system of orderly debt restructuring. With virtually no room for macroeconomic manoeuvring since the crisis onset, fiscal austerity has been the main instrument for achieving reductions in public debt levels; but because austerity also weakens growth, public debt ratios have barely budged. Austerity has also implied continued high private debt ratios. And these debt burdens have perpetuated economic stasis. Economic theory,history, and the recent experience all call for a principled debt restructuring mechanism as an integral element of the euro area’s design. Sovereign debt should be recognised as equity (a residual claim on the sovereign), operationalised by the automatic lowering of the debt burden upon the breach of contractually-specified thresholds. Making debt more equity-like is also the way forward for speedy private deleveraging. This debt-equity swap principle is a needed shock absorber for the future but will also serve as the principle to deal with the overhang of ‘legacy’ debt.

The euro area's tightrope walk: debt and competitiveness in Italy and Spain. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/11, September 2013

Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

The distribution of debt across euro area countries : The role of individual characteristics, institutions and credit conditions. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 252, December 2013

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we present an up-to-date assessment of the differences across euro area countries in the distributions of various measures of debt conditional on household characteristics. We consider three different outcomes: the probability of holding debt, the amount of debt held and, in the case of secured debt, the interest rate paid on the main mortgage. Second, we examine the role of legal and economic institutions in accounting for these differences. We use data from the first wave of a new survey of household finances, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, to achieve these aims. We find that the patterns of secured and unsecured debt outcomes vary markedly across countries. Among all the institutions considered, the length of asset repossession periods best accounts for the features of the distribution of secured debt. In countries with longer repossession periods, the fraction of people who borrow is smaller, the youngest group of households borrow lower amounts (conditional on borrowing), and the mortgage interest rates paid by low-income households are higher. Regulatory loan-to-value ratios, the taxation of mortgages and the prevalence of interest-only or fixed-rate mortgages deliver less robust results.

The Sovereign Debt Crisis: Placing a curb on growth (updated edition). CEPS Paperbacks. September 2013

This book provides an update to the major 2012 study by the same authors on the dual role of the public sector as the provider of the ultimate riskless asset and, at the same time, the source of a potential major systemic risk. In this second edition, Brender and his colleagues concentrate again on the tension between the need for the public sector to sustain demand in the face of a deleveraging private sector and the longer-term challenges of sustainability for fiscal policy in the major developed economies of the US, Japan and the euro area. In short, their principal thesis is that sovereign debt is in crisis. This crisis is apparent in the euro area, but it is also real, if at present only latent, in the US and Japan. The book shows how this process has evolved in these three big developed economies – and how their policy choices impact on global financial markets.

The Sovereign Debt Crisis: Placing a curb on growth. CEPS Paperbacks. May 2012

To ward off the threat of a worldwide depression that loomed at the end of the 2000s, governments opted to run up substantial fiscal deficits. In doing so, they sowed the seeds of the sovereign debt crisis. Saddled with often high debt burdens and modest growth prospects, developed countries’ governments must now rebalance their budgets. Doing so too rapidly, however, will choke growth. Faced with this dilemma, Japan and the United States have pursued growth policies while the euro area members are quickly trying to rebalance their budgets. This book explores the respective risks associated with these two strategies. It further investigates the consequences for the international monetary and financial system of developing countries’ public debts ceasing to be risk-free.