The effects of corporate social performance on the cost of corporate debt and credit ratings

This study investigates the differential impact that various dimensions of corporate social performance have on the pricing of corporate debt as well as the assessment of the credit quality of specific bond issues. The empirical analysis, based on an extensive longitudinal data set, suggests that overall, good performance is rewarded and corporate social transgressions are penalized through lower and higher corporate bond yield spreads, respectively. Similar conclusions can be drawn when focusing on either the bond rating assigned to a specific debt issue or the probability of it being considered to be an asset of speculative grade.

Psychological contracts and independent sales contractors: an examination of the predictors of contractor-level outcomes

Over the past decade, the independent sales contractor (ISC) has emerged as both an important distribution channel and a management challenge. This study makes two contributions to this evolving field. First, it explores the interrelations of the psychological contract with sales performance, voluntary turnover and organisational advocacy of ISCs, which have hitherto been largely unexplored. Second, it examines differences between high- and low-performing sales contractors on these linkages, due to findings in the literature that a small number of sales contractors often achieve a majority of sales. Based on survey data as well as 7 years of contractor-level data related to sales performance and voluntary turnover (n = 189), results indicate that psychological contract fulfilment and perceived dependency are important determinants of subsequent sales performance, voluntary turnover and organisational advocacy, with significant differences reported between high- and low-performing ISCs. A notable finding pertinent for sales managers responsible for managing ISCs is that high-performing sales contractors are motivated by psychological contract fulfilment and a low perception of dependency, while low-performing sales contractors are more likely to act as advocates for the firm due to perceived dependency, but may concurrently engage in organisational advocacy as a means to leave the firm.

The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance

Previous research has suggested collateral has the role of sorting entrepreneurs either by observed risk or by private information. In order to test these roles, this paper develops a model which incorporates a signalling process (sorting by observed risk) into the design of an incentivecompatible menu of loan contracts which works as a self-selection mechanism (sorting by private information). It then tests this Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model, using the 1998 US Survey of Small Business Finances. It reports for the first time that: high type entrepreneurs are more likely to pledge collateral and pay a lower interest rate; and entrepreneurs who transfer good signals enjoy better contracts than those transferring bad signals. These findings suggest that the Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt finance than either the sorting-by-observed-risk or the sorting-by-private information paradigms on their own.

Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) and efficient design of contracts in developing countries. Behavioral insights from a natural field experiment

The use of economic incentives for biodiversity (mostly Compensation and Reward for Environmental Services including Payment for ES) has been widely supported in the past decades and became the main innovative policy tools for biodiversity conservation worldwide. These policy tools are often based on the insight that rational actors perfectly weigh the costs and benefits of adopting certain behaviors and well-crafted economic incentives and disincentives will lead to socially desirable development scenarios. This rationalist mode of thought has provided interesting insights and results, but it also misestimates the context by which ‘real individuals’ come to decisions, and the multitude of factors influencing development sequences. In this study, our goal is to examine how these policies can take advantage of some unintended behavioral reactions that might in return impact, either positively or negatively, general policy performances. We test the effect of income's origin (‘Low effort’ based money vs. ‘High effort’ based money) on spending decisions (Necessity vs. Superior goods) and subsequent pro social preferences (Future pro-environmental behavior) within Madagascar rural areas, using a natural field experiment. Our results show that money obtained under low effort leads to different consumption patterns than money obtained under high efforts: superior goods are more salient in the case of low effort money. In parallel, money obtained under low effort leads to subsequent higher pro social behavior. Compensation and rewards policies for ecosystem services may mobilize knowledge on behavioral biases to improve their design and foster positive spillovers on their development goals.

Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies

Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on the strategic choice of firms' owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test whether firms' owners compensate their managers through contracts combining own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms' owners choose relative performance over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms' owners successfully induce a more aggressive behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit maximization.

The effects of corporate and country sustainability characteristics on the cost of debt: an international investigation

We investigate the relationship between corporate and country sustainability on the cost of bank loans. We look into 470 loan agreements signed between 2005 and 2012 with borrowers based in 28 different countries across the world and operating in all major industries. Our principal findings reveal that country sustainability, relating to both social and environmental frameworks, has a statistically and economically impactful effect on direct financing of economic activity. An increase of one unit in a country's sustainability score is associated with an average decrease in the cost of debt by 64 basis points. Our international analysis shows that the environmental dimension of a country's institutional framework is approximately twice as impactful as the social dimension, when it comes to determining the cost of corporate loans. On the other hand, we find no conclusive evidence that firm-level sustainability influences the interest rates charged to borrowing firms by banks. Our main findings survive a battery of robustness tests and additional analyses concerning subsamples, alternative sustainability metrics and the effects of financial crisis.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Construction contracts: law and management. 5th edition

The fifth edition of this best-selling textbook has been thoroughly revised to provide the most up-to-date and comprehensive coverage of the legislation, administration and management of construction contracts. It now includes comparison of working with JCT, NEC3 and FIDIC contracts, throughout. In line with new thinking in construction management research, this authoritative guide is essential reading for every construction undergraduate and is an extremely useful source of reference for practitioners.

Handling Mitigating Circumstances for Electronic Contracts

Electronic contracts are a means of representing agreed responsibilities and expected behaviour of autonomous agents acting on behalf of businesses. They can be used to regulate behaviour by providing negative consequences, penalties, where the responsibilities and expectations are not met, i.e. the contract is violated. However, long-term business relationships require some flexibility in the face of circumstances that do not conform to the assumptions of the contract, that is, mitigating circumstances. In this paper, we describe how contract parties can represent and enact policies on mitigating circumstances. As part of this, we require records of what has occurred within the system leading up to a violation: the provenance of the violation. We therefore bring together contract-based and provenance systems to solve the issue of mitigating circumstances.

Determining the Trustworthiness of New Electronic Contracts

Expressing contractual agreements electronically potentially allows agents to automatically perform functions surrounding contract use: establishment, fulfilment, renegotiation etc. For such automation to be used for real business concerns, there needs to be a high level of trust in the agent-based system. While there has been much research on simulating trust between agents, there are areas where such trust is harder to establish. In particular, contract proposals may come from parties that an agent has had no prior interaction with and, in competitive business-to-business environments, little reputation information may be available. In human practice, trust in a proposed contract is determined in part from the content of the proposal itself, and the similarity of the content to that of prior contracts, executed to varying degrees of success. In this paper, we argue that such analysis is also appropriate in automated systems, and to provide it we need systems to record salient details of prior contract use and algorithms for assessing proposals on their content. We use provenance technology to provide the former and detail algorithms for measuring contract success and similarity for the latter, applying them to an aerospace case study.

Electronic Business Contracts between Services

Electronic contracts mirror the paper versions exchanged between businesses today, and offer the possibility of dynamic, automatic creation and enforcement of restrictions and compulsions on service behaviour that are designed to ensure business objectives are met. Where there are many contracts within a particular application, it can be difficult to determine whether the system can reliably fulfil them all, yet computer-parsable electronic contracts may allow such verification to be automated. In this chapter, we describe a conceptual framework and architecture specification in which normative business contracts can be electronically represented, verified, established, renewed, and so on. In particular, we aim to allow systems containing multiple contracts to be checked for conflicts and violations of business objectives. We illustrate the framework and architecture with an aerospace aftermarket example.

Using Normative Markov Decision Processes for Evaluating Electronic Contracts: A Case Study in a Simulated Aerospace Aftermarket

Before signing electronic contracts, a rational agent should estimate the expected utilities of these contracts and calculate the violation risks related to them. In order to perform such pre-signing procedures, this agent has to be capable of computing a policy taking into account the norms and sanctions in the contracts. In relation to this, the contribution of this work is threefold. First, we present the Normative Markov Decision Process, an extension of the Markov Decision Process for explicitly representing norms. In order to illustrate the usage of our framework, we model an example in a simulated aerospace aftermarket. Second, we specify an algorithm for identifying the states of the process which characterize the violation of norms. Finally, we show how to compute policies with our framework and how to calculate the risk of violating the norms in the contracts by adopting a particular policy.