Evaluating northern hardwood management using retrospective analysis and diameter distributions

Northern hardwood management was assessed throughout the state of Michigan using data collected on recently harvested stands in 2010 and 2011. Methods of forensic estimation of diameter at breast height were compared and an ideal, localized equation form was selected for use in reconstructing pre-harvest stand structures. Comparisons showed differences in predictive ability among available equation forms which led to substantial financial differences when used to estimate the value of removed timber. Management on all stands was then compared among state, private, and corporate landowners. Comparisons of harvest intensities against a liberal interpretation of a well-established management guideline showed that approximately one third of harvests were conducted in a manner which may imply that the guideline was followed. One third showed higher levels of removals than recommended, and one third of harvests were less intensive than recommended. Multiple management guidelines and postulated objectives were then synthesized into a novel system of harvest taxonomy, against which all harvests were compared. This further comparison showed approximately the same proportions of harvests, while distinguishing sanitation cuts and the future productive potential of harvests cut more intensely than suggested by guidelines. Stand structures are commonly represented using diameter distributions. Parametric and nonparametric techniques for describing diameter distributions were employed on pre-harvest and post-harvest data. A common polynomial regression procedure was found to be highly sensitive to the method of histogram construction which provides the data points for the regression. The discriminative ability of kernel density estimation was substantially different from that of the polynomial regression technique.

Perceived Influence and Friendship as Antecedents of Cooperation in Top Management Teams: A Network Approach

Using the relational dyad as unit of analysis this study examines the effects of perceived influence and friendship ties on the formation and maintenance of cooperative relationships between corporate top executives. Specifically, it is argued that perceived influence as well as friendship ties between any two managers will enhance the likelihood that these managers collaborate with each other. Additionally, a negative interaction effect between perceived influence and friendship on cooperation is proposed. The empirical analyses draw on network data that have been collected among all members of the top two organizational levels for the strategy-making process in two multinational firms headquartered in Germany. Applying logistic regression based on QAP the empirical results support our hypotheses on the direct effects between perceived influence, friendship ties, and cooperative relationships in both companies. In addition, we find at least partial support for our assumption that perceived influence and friendship interact negatively with respect to their effect on cooperation. Seemingly, perceived influence is partially substituted by managerial friendship ties.

Limited managerial attention and corporate aging

As firms have more assets in place, more of management’s limited attention is focused on managing assets in place rather than developing new growth options. Consequently, as firms grow older, they have fewer growth options and a lower ability to generate new growth options. This simple theory predicts that Tobin’s q falls with age. Further, competition in the product market is expected to slow down the decrease in Tobin’s q because it forces firms to look for alternative sources of rents. Similarly, greater competition in the labor market reduces the decrease in Tobin’s q with age because old firms are in a better position to hire employees that can help with innovation. In contrast, competition in the market for corporate control should accelerate the decline because it forces management to focus more on managing assets in place whose performance is more directly observable than on developing growth options where results may not be observable for some time. We find strong support for these predictions in tests using exogenous variation in competition.

Corporate Aging and Takeover Risk

Although growth opportunities fade and profitability declines as firms mature, older firms are no more likely to be acquired than young firms are. This article documents and explains that phenomenon. We argue that, because mature organizations are rationally less flexible, they are more costly to integrate and therefore comparatively unattractive acquisition candidates. The evidence supports this explanation of the negative age dependence of takeover hazard. The evidence also shows that negative exogenous shocks to merger benefits further reduce the takeover hazard of mature firms. We test many alternative explanations and find no evidence that they can explain the hazard decline.

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

Limited managerial attention and corporate aging

As firms have more assets in place, more of management’s limited attention is focused on managing assets in place rather than developing new growth options. Consequently, as firms grow older, they have fewer growth options and a lower ability to generate new growth options. This simple theory predicts that Tobin’s q falls with age. Further, competition in the product market is expected to slow down the decrease in Tobin’s q because it forces firms to look for alternative sources of rents. Similarly, greater competition in the labor market reduces the decrease in Tobin’s q with age because old firms are in a better position to hire employees that can help with innovation. In contrast, competition in the market for corporate control should accelerate the decline because it forces management to focus more on managing assets in place whose performance is more directly observable than on developing growth options where results may not be observable for some time. We find strong support for these predictions in tests using exogenous variation in competition

Corporate acquisitions by listed firms: the experience of a comprehensive sample

The sample used includes tender offers, mergers, acquisitions of privately held corporations, and comprehensive acquisitions of other firms' assets. According to the results, the majority of bid announcements prompt significant stock price increases, especially when controlling for partial anticipation problems and relative acquisition size. Furthermore, there is little evidence that firms that engage in "bad" acquisitions are more likely to be taken over.

Die Offenlegung von Management-Transaktionen: Stand der schweizerischen Regelung im internationalen Kontext

Für die an der SWX kotierten Unternehmen besteht seit dem 1. Juli 2005 die Pflicht, Transaktionen in Bezug auf Beteiligungsrechte des Emittenten, welche Angehörige von dessen Management durchführen, der SWX anzuzeigen. In einem ersten Schritt wird die Bedeutung dieser spezifischen Offenlegungspflicht im Zusammenhang sonstiger Ad-hoc-Publizitätspflichten sowie im weiteren Kontext von Corporate Governance erörtert; anschliessend werden Geltungsgrund und normative Reichweite der schweizerischen Regelung vor dem Hintergrund vergleichbarer Regelungen im europäischen Ausland und in den USA analysiert. Abschliessend wird kritisch hinterfragt, ob sich die Verpflichtung zur Offenlegung von Director's Dealings tatsächlich durch die Signal- oder Indikatorfunktion rechtfertigen lässt.

Middle managers' attitudes toward employee assistance programs in the corporate setting

Several studies have shown that successful Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs) have strong management endorsement. Strong management endorsement is defined as positive support in utilizing EAP services for themselves and their employees. This study focuses solely on middle management as opposed to upper or general management support. The study further examines success or lack of success of an EAP by the utilization rate defined as the number of employees over a year period who access EAP services.^ A analytical cross-sectional design was used to compare and observe differences between two groups of middle managers (utilizers and nonutilizers). Middle manager data was collected through a mail questionnaire. The study focused on identifying predictors that influence middle managers' utilization rate specifically: attitude toward EAPs, EAP knowledge level, attitude toward mental health professionals, age, gender, years worked as a middle manager, education level, training, and other possible predictors of utilization. The overall hypothesis states middle manager utilizers of EAP services have more positive attitudes and a better understanding of their EAP than middle management nonutilizers.^ As predicted, nonparametric bivariate results showed significant differences between the two groups. Middle managers in the utilization group (n = 473) tended to show more positive attitudes toward their EAP and mental health professionals and demonstrated greater EAP knowledge compared to the nonutilization group (n = 154). These findings support past studies on variables that influence EAP utilization rates.^ Further variables found to influence middle management utilization were identified by multivariate logistic regression results. These variable were gender (female supervisors), educational levels of employees supervised (employees with lower levels of education), number of employees supervised (greater the number supervised, more likely to utilize), managerial EAP training (trained supervisors) and awareness that problems do influence an employee's productivity.^ These findings strengthen the assertion that middle management's attitudes, as well as other variables may influence utilization. Study findings add new information about important variables specifically influencing middle management who utilize EAPs. An understanding of these variables is essential in developing competent EAP program training and orientation programs for middle managers. ^

Corporate aging and investment decisions

Paper I: Corporate aging and internal resource allocation Abstract Various observers argue that established firms are at a disadvantage in pursuing new growth opportunities. In this paper, we provide systematic evidence that established firms allocate fewer resources to high-growth lines of business. However, we find no evidence of inefficient resource allocation in established firms. Redirecting resources from high-growth to low-growth lines of business does not result in lower profitability. Also, resource allocation towards new growth opportunities does not increase when managers of established firms are exposed to takeover and product market threats. Rather, it seems that conservative resource allocation strategies are driven by pressures to meet investors’ expectations. Our empirical evidence, thus, favors the hypothesis that established firms wisely choose to allocate fewer resources to new growth opportunities as external pressures force them to focus on efficiency rather than novelty (Holmström 1989). Paper II: Corporate aging and asset sales Abstract This paper asks whether divestitures are motivated by strategic considerations about the scope of the firm’s activities. Limited managerial capacity implies that exploiting core competences becomes comparatively more attractive than exploring new growth opportunities as firms mature. Divestitures help stablished firms free management time and increase the focus on core competences. The testable implication of this attention hypothesis is that established firms are the main sellers of assets, that their divestiture activity increases when managerial capacity is scarcer, that they sell non-core activities, and that they return the divestiture proceeds to the providers of capital instead of reinvesting them in the firm. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. Paper III: Corporate aging and lobbying expenditures Abstract Creative destruction forces constantly challenge established firms, especially in competitive markets. This paper asks whether corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to counteract the decline in rents over time. We find a statistically and economically significant positive relation between firm age and lobbying expenditures. Moreover, the documented age-effect is weaker when firms have unique products or operate in concentrated product markets. To address endogeneity, we use industry distress as an exogenous nonlegislative shock to future rents and show that established firms are relatively more likely to lobby when in distress. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that corporate lobbying efforts by established firms forestall the creative destruction process. In sum, our findings suggest that corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to retain profitability in competitive environments.