Iceland’s contested European Policy: The Footprint of the Past - A Small and Insular Society. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 01/2013

Introduction. Iceland’s domestic politics and foreign affairs are undergoing drastic changes. After an economic crash, violent protests on the streets of Reykjavik for the first time in Iceland’s history contributed to the defeat of the government. The party system has been altered. A turn has been taken towards Europe after the United States left the island, first by closing its military base in 2006 and then by its clear stance not to assist the country in its economic difficulties. The former close relations with the superpower are unlikely ever to be restored. The EU membership application is placing severe constraints on political parties which are split on the issue and has put in jeopardy the unity of the first left majority in the Icelandic parliament, the Althingi. Society is in a state of flux after an unprecedented economic downscaling and the collapse of almost its entire financial sector – which had boomed rapidly beginning in the mid-1990s. The credibility of politicians, the parliament and the media is in ruins. Iceland’s smallness and its location on the geographical map – one could also say the geopolitical map – has had a profound influence on its domestic and foreign affairs. Iceland is closely associated with the other Nordic states and has adopted many of their domestic characteristics, with important exceptions. On the other hand, the country has come under American influence – geographically, it straddles the Mid-Atlantic rift – and has limited its participation in the European project. Its geographical location in the middle of the North Atlantic has led to a notion that the country’s culture is unique and should be protected by all available means. Politicians continue to play the ‘nationalistic uniqueness’ card with considerable success even though the country has been swept by globalization. Rapid modernization (which only really began in the Second World War with British and American occupations) and sudden engagement with the outside world (which only extended to the general public in the last quarter of the twentieth century) are still slowly but steadily making their mark on the country’s foreign policy. The country’s political discourse and foreign policy still bear the hallmark of the past, i.e. of a small and insular society This paper will address the political developments in Iceland since the 2008 economic crash and place it in a historical context. The aim is to understand Iceland’s present foreign policy and, in particular, the highly contested decision by its government in 2009 to apply for membership of the European Union. The paper is divided into five sections in addition to this introduction and the concluding remarks. First, it starts by explaining the importance in Iceland of a political discourse based on the concept of independence which dates back to the historical narrative of the settlement period. This section will also examine Iceland’s close relations with the other Nordic states – despite important differences between it and the others. Second, the paper will analyse the importance of the party system, i.e. the dominance of the centre-right in Icelandic politics, and the changed nature of the system. Third, it examines how Iceland further distinguishes itself from the other Nordic states in many important features. Fourthly, the paper analyses the country’s three main foreign policy priorities in the post-war period, i.e. extensions of the Exclusive Economic Zone, firm defence arrangements with the US and membership of NATO, and the drive for better market access for marine products – including a partial engagement in the European project. Fifthly, the paper examines how the country’s smallness, in terms of its central administrative capacity, has affected its domestic and foreign policy-making. The concluding section summarizes the main findings concerning the political and historical obstacles that the Social Democratic Alliance faces in its hard-fought battle to change the country’s European Policy.

The sultans of swing: Turkey's stance on integration with the European Union. OSW Point of View Number 37, November 2013

Despite a rise in anti-EU rhetoric and a growing assertiveness in Ankara’s relations with Brussels, Turkey will continue to seek closer integration with the European Union in the coming years. The current stalemate in the accession process has been a source of irritation to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government. Nonetheless, a complete collapse of accession talks would be a much worse scenario for the ruling AKP party. Currently, the government is primarily interested in keeping the negotiation process alive, rather than hoping to gain full membership any time soon. Erdoğan’s government will likely seek to continue the accession talks because the AKP is acutely aware of their importance for the country’s domestic politics, for its the economy, and – although to a lesser extent – for Turkey’s international standing. The opportunity to capitalise on this process will encourage the Turkish government to avoid crises in its relations with the EU, or to at least mitigate the impact of any potential diplomatic fallouts.

Eurasian integration. Russia's attempt at the economic unification of the post-Soviet area. OSW Study 44/2013

In 2009, Vladimir Putin, the then Russian prime minister, gave impetus to the establishment of closer relations within what was then a still narrow group of three countries: Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Russia was determined in embarking on the implementation of the principles of the Customs Union among these three states and, since 2012, within the Common Economic Space as well. This process of integration is intended to bring about the introduction of ‘four freedoms’ in this area: the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. From Moscow’s point of view, building up such integration structures is especially necessary in order to counteract the economic expansion of the European Union and China. It also feels it is important to take measures against the loosening of the bonds between the CIS countries and Russia. At the same time, close co-operation is expected to guarantee for Russia that the strong politico-economic influences in this area will be maintained. Despite the numerous limitations of the integration process, such as the small number of the participating states or limited progress in implementing the CES, this is still the most advanced integration programme in the region seen since the collapse of the USSR. Progress in putting the rules of the Customs Union into practice can be seen as a success for Moscow. In turn, the formation of the CES is still at an early stage, and it is difficult to determine at this point to what extent the three countries will harmonise their markets.

China vs. Central Asia. The achievements of the past two decades. OSW Study 45/2013

The collapse of the USSR brought about conditions conducive to the dynamic development of relations between Central Asia and China. These relations have evolved from deep mistrust to the continually growing Chinese presence primarily in the region’s economy but also increasingly in its politics. Central Asia is playing a growing role in those areas of the economy which China sees as strategic (in particular in energy and communications). China’s ambitions and capabilities with regard to new areas and its geopolitical competitors are also being tested here. For the time being, it can be said that China has achieved vast success: its offer is appealing for the region, and Beijing has outpaced its Western rivals and has seriously challenged Russia’s position in the region. It remains, however, an open question whether China will be able to maintain and secure its present achievements and trends, which will be a serious challenge given the eternal instability in the region and Russia’s reintegration ambitions.

Preventing collapse in Ukraine: The EU should finance the grass roots directly. CEPS Commentary, 10 December 2014

With the aim of averting the total collapse of the Ukrainian economy, Daniel Gros and Steven Blockmans urge the EU to ​offer a minimum of macro-financial assistance to improve governance, fight corruption and harmonise laws with the EU acquis, while beefing up financing channelled directly to the grass roots.

The 'tribal areas' of the Caucasus: The North Caucasus - an enclave of 'alien civilisation' within the Russian Federation. OSW Study 34/2010

Militant Islam is currently the greatest threat to security and stability in the Russian part of the Caucasus. However, even though the armed Islamic underground is capable of organising terrorist attacks and carrying out actions of sabotage, it seems too weak to bring about any change in the Caucasus’s political status quo. Besides, militant Islam is merely a symptom (albeit the most radical and spectacular) of a much wider process, namely the widening civilisational gap between Russia and the North Caucasus, initiated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The key elements of this process are as follows: the spontaneous re-Islamisation of social life and the dynamic growth of Islam's political influence; the de-Russification of the region; and the ongoing marginalisation of secular intellectuals. As a result, the North Caucasus, and principally Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, are turning into an enclave separated from the rest of the Russian Federation by a growing civilisational gap, and becoming increasingly different from the rest of Russia. This situation may recall the tribal areas of Pakistan inhabited by Pashtuns (FATA) along the Afghan border.

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 21/2010

The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.

Syria and Lebanon: Diverging paths of state unsustainability. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 6/June 2011

Any analysis of the prospects for stability and sustainability in the states of Syria and Lebanon reveals the strong ties that exist between these two countries and the impact of external influences on their overall development. Their trajectories, while starkly divergent in terms of the challenges confronting them at present, converge on a path of long-term unsustainability. Lebanon is in the midst of yet another transition phase, triggered by the collapse of Hariri’s government in January 2011. The current situation might be described as one of deteriorating status quo; the state is performing poorly in terms of its delivery of fundamental public services and its institutional legitimacy is tenuous in the face of emerging para-state structures and latent (occasionally active) violence. In Syria, challenges to the sustainability of the state have evolved dramatically since the beginning of 2011, and are now nearing a tipping point. In view of the mounting unrest and violence in the country, the future prospects for its economic and political development are dim. More ominously, the risk of widespread conflict, with sectarian overtones, cannot be discounted.

It’s not just Russia: Currency crisis in the Commonwealth of independent states. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/01, February 2015

The currency crisis that started in Russia and Ukraine during 2014 has spread to neighbouring countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The collapse of the Russian ruble, expected recession in Russia, the stronger US dollar and lower commodity prices have negatively affected the entire region, with the consequence that the European Union's entire eastern neighbourhood faces serious economic, social and political challenges because of weaker currencies, higher inflation, decreasing export revenues and labour remittances, net capital outflows and stagnating or declining GDP. •The crisis requires a proper policy response from CIS governments, the International Monetary Fund and the EU. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Donbass requires rapid resolution, as the first step to return Russia to the mainstream of global economic and political cooperation. Beyond that, both Russia and Ukraine need deep structural and institutional reforms. The EU should deepen economic ties with those CIS countries that are interested in a closer relationship with Europe. The IMF should provide additional assistance to those CIS countries that have become victims of a new regional contagion, while preparing for the possibility of more emerging-market crises arising from slower growth, the stronger dollar and lower commodity prices.

The EU regime on biofuels in transport: Still in search of sustainability. Egmont Paper No. 68, July 2014

Like other regions of the world, the EU is developing biofuels in the transport sector to reduce oil consumption and mitigate climate change. To promote them, it has adopted favourable legislation since the 2000s. In 2009 it even decided to oblige each Member State to ensure that by 2020 the share of energy coming from renewable sources reached at least 10% of their final consumption of energy in the transport sector. Biofuels are considered the main instrument to reach that percentage since the development of other alternatives (such as hydrogen and electricity) will take much longer than expected. Meanwhile, these various legislative initiatives have driven the production and consumption of biofuels in the EU. Biofuels accounted for 4.7% of EU transport fuel consumption in 2011. They have also led to trade and investment in biofuels on a global scale. This large-scale expansion of biofuels has, however, revealed numerous negative impacts. These stem from the fact that first-generation biofuels (i.e., those produced from food crops), of which the most important types are biodiesel and bioethanol, are used almost exclusively to meet the EU’s renewable 10% target in transport. Their negative impacts are: socioeconomic (food price rises), legal (land-grabbing), environmental (for instance, water stress and water pollution; soil erosion; reduction of biodiversity), climatic (direct and indirect land-use effects resulting in more greenhouse gas emissions) and public finance issues (subsidies and tax relief). The extent of such negative impacts depends on how biofuel feedstocks are produced and processed, the scale of production, and in particular, how they influence direct land use change (DLUC) and indirect land use change (ILUC) and the international trade. These negative impacts have thus provoked mounting debates in recent years, with a particular focus on ILUC. They have forced the EU to re-examine how it deals with biofuels and submit amendments to update its legislation. So far, the EU legislation foresees that only sustainable biofuels (produced in the EU or imported) can be used to meet the 10% target and receive public support; and to that end, mandatory sustainability criteria have been defined. Yet they have a huge flaw. Their measurement of greenhouse gas savings from biofuels does not take into account greenhouse gas emissions resulting from ILUC, which represent a major problem. The Energy Council of June 2014 agreed to set a limit on the extent to which firstgeneration biofuels can count towards the 10% target. But this limit appears to be less stringent than the ones made previously by the European Commission and the European Parliament. It also agreed to introduce incentives for the use of advanced (second- and third-generation) biofuels which would be allowed to count double towards the 10% target. But this again appears extremely modest by comparison with what was previously proposed. Finally, the approach chosen to take into account the greenhouse gas emissions due to ILUC appears more than cautious. The Energy Council agreed that the European Commission will carry out a reporting of ILUC emissions by using provisional estimated factors. A review clause will permit the later adjustment of these ILUC factors. With such legislative orientations made by the Energy Council, one cannot consider yet that there is a major shift in the EU biofuels policy. Bolder changes would have probably meant risking the collapse of the high-emission conventional biodiesel industry which currently makes up the majority of Europe’s biofuel production. The interests of EU farmers would have also been affected. There is nevertheless a tension between these legislative orientations and the new Commission’s proposals beyond 2020. In any case, many uncertainties remain on this issue. As long as solutions have not been found to minimize the important collateral damages provoked by the first generation biofuels, more scientific studies and caution are needed. Meanwhile, it would be wise to improve alternative paths towards a sustainable transport sector, i.e., stringent emission and energy standards for all vehicles, better public transport systems, automobiles that run on renewable energy other than biofuels, or other alternatives beyond the present imagination.

The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

Homo Jihadicus. Islam in the former USSR and the phenomenon of the post-Soviet militants in Syria and Iraq. OSW REPORT 2015-09-21

The post-Soviet area, along with the countries of the Middle East, North Africa and Western Europe, have become one of the main global exporters of Islamic militants. Currently on the territory of Syria, and to a lesser extent of Iraq, there are several thousands of foreign fighters from the post-Soviet states. The causes of the war migration from the former USSR states to the Middle East have their roots in the dynamic changes taking place inside Islam in the post-Soviet area: primarily the growth of Salafism and militant Islam, as well as the internationalisation and globalisation of the local Islam. The deep political, economic, social and ideological changes which Muslims underwent after the collapse of the USSR, led to the creation of a specific group within them, for which Islam in its radical form became the main element of their identity. Homo sovieticus, without fully eradicating his Soviet part, became Homo jihadicus who not only identifies himself with the global Ummah, but is also ready to leave his country and join jihad beyond its borders in the name of the professed ideas.

Pliocene-Pleistocene stack of globally distributed benthic stable oxygen isotope records

We present a 5.3-Myr stack (the ''LR04'' stack) of benthic d18O records from 57 globally distributed sites aligned by an automated graphic correlation algorithm. This is the first benthic delta18O stack composed of more than three records to extend beyond 850 ka, and we use its improved signal quality to identify 24 new marine isotope stages in the early Pliocene. We also present a new LR04 age model for the Pliocene-Pleistocene derived from tuning the delta18O stack to a simple ice model based on 21 June insolation at 65 N. Stacked sedimentation rates provide additional age model constraints to prevent overtuning. Despite a conservative tuning strategy, the LR04 benthic stack exhibits significant coherency with insolation in the obliquity band throughout the entire 5.3 Myr and in the precession band for more than half of the record. The LR04 stack contains significantly more variance in benthic delta18O than previously published stacks of the late Pleistocene as the result of higher resolution records, a better alignment technique, and a greater percentage of records from the Atlantic. Finally, the relative phases of the stack's 41- and 23-kyr components suggest that the precession component of delta18O from 2.7-1.6 Ma is primarily a deep-water temperature signal and that the phase of d18O precession response changed suddenly at 1.6 Ma.