Who is susceptible to conjunction fallacies in category-based induction?

Recent evidence suggests that the conjunction fallacy observed in people's probabilistic reasoning is also to be found in their evaluations of inductive argument strength. We presented 130 participants with materials likely to produce a conjunction fallacy either by virtue of a shared categorical or a causal relationship between the categories in the argument. We also took a measure of participants' cognitive ability. We observed conjunction fallacies overall with both sets of materials but found an association with ability for the categorical materials only. Our results have implications for accounts of individual differences in reasoning, for the relevance theory of induction, and for the recent claim that causal knowledge is important in inductive reasoning.

How many processes underline category-based induction? Effect of conclusion specificity and cognitive ability

Two studies investigated participants' sensitivity to the amount and diversity of the evidence when reasoning inductively about categories. Both showed that participants are more sensitive to characteristics of the evidence for arguments with general rather than specific conclusions. Both showed an association between cognitive ability and sensitivity to these evidence characteristics, particularly when the conclusion category was general. These results suggest that a simple associative process may not be sufficient to capture some key phenomena of category-based induction. They also support the claim that the need to generate a superordinate category is a complicating factor in category-based reasoning and that adults' tendency to generate such categories while reasoning has been overestimated.

Assessment of fighting ability in animal contests

Selection should favour accurate information gathering regarding the likely costs and benefits of continued conflict. Here we consider how variation in the abilities of contestants to assess resource-holding potential (RHP) influences fights. This has been examined in various game theory models. However, discriminating between assessment strategies has proven difficult and has resulted in confusion. To add clarity, we group existing models into three main types that differ in the information about RHP that contestants are presumed to gather: (1) pure self-assessment, (2) cumulative assessment and (3) mutual assessment. Within this framework we outline methods advocated to discriminate successfully between the three main assessment models. We discuss support for each model, before highlighting a number of conflicting and inconclusive studies, leading us to consider alternative approaches to investigate assessment. Furthermore, we examine support for newly emerging concepts such as 'varying degrees of assessment', 'switching assessment' strategies and the possibility of contestants adopting different assessment strategies within a fight involving distinctive roles. We suggest future studies will benefit by judicious use of a battery of techniques to determine how animals settle contests. Finally, we highlight difficulties with current game theory models, and raise concerns regarding the use of certain behavioural criteria to accept or reject a model, particularly since this may conflict with evidence for a given assessment strategy. Furthermore, the failure of existing models to account for newly emerging concepts points to limitations of their use and leads us to challenge game theoreticians to develop upon them. (C) 2009 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Information gathering and decision making about resource value in animal contests

Contestants are predicted to adjust the cost of a fight in line with the perceived value of the resource and this provides a way of determining whether the resource has been assessed. An assessment of resource value is predicted to alter an animal's motivational state and we note different methods of measuring that state. We provide a categorical framework in which the degree of resource assessment may be evaluated and also note limitations of various approaches. We place studies in six categories: (1) cases of no assessment, (2) cases of internal state such as hunger influencing apparent value, (3) cases of the contestants differing in assessment ability, (4) cases of mutual and equal assessment of value, (5) cases where opponents differ in resource value and (6) cases of particularly complex assessment abilities that involve a comparison of the value of two resources. We examine the extent to which these studies support game theory predictions and suggest future areas of research. (C) 2008 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.