A measure of rationality and welfare

There is evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates fromthe classical principle of maximization. This evidence raises at least two importantquestions: (i) how severe the deviations are and (ii) which method is the best forextracting relevant information from choice behavior for the purposes of welfare analysis.In this paper we address these two questions by identifying from a foundationalanalysis a new measure of the rationality of individuals that enables the analysis ofindividual welfare in potentially inconsistent subjects, all based on standard revealedpreference data. We call such measure minimal index.

Immigration and the survival of the welfare state

This paper analyzes the political sustainability of the welfare state in a model where immigration policy is also endogenous. In the model, the skills of the native population are affected by immigration and skill accumulation. Moreover, immigrants affect future policies, once they gain the right to vote. The main finding is that the long-run survival of redistributive policies is linked to an immigration policy specifying both skill and quantity restrictions. In particular, in steady state the unskilled majority admits a limited inflow of unskilled immigrants in order to offset growth in the fraction of skilled voters and maintain a high degree of income redistribution.Interestingly, equilibrium immigration policy shifts from unrestricted skilled immigration,when the country is skill-scarce, to restricted unskilled immigration, as the fraction of native skilled workers increases. The analysis also suggests a new set of variables that may help explain international differences in immigration restrictions.

Resistance to reform: Reconsidering the role of individual-specific uncertainty

Individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of reform beingenacted and sustained. Reform may be more likely to be enacted because amajority of agents might end up losing little from reform and a minoritygaining a lot. Under certainty, reform would therefore be rejected, butit may be enacted with uncertainty because those who end up losing believethat they might be among the winners. Reform may be more likely to besustained because, in a realistic setting, reform will increase theincentives of agents to move into those economic activities that benefit.Agents who respond to these incentives will vote to sustain reform infuture elections, even if they would have rejected reform under certainty.These points are made using the trade-model of Fernandez and Rodrik (AER,1991).

The impact of firing costs on turnover and unemployment: Evidence from the Colombian labour market reform

Reductions in firing costs are often advocated as a way of increasingthe dynamism of labour markets in both developed and less developed countries. Evidence from Europe and the U.S. on the impact of firing costs has, however, been mixed. Moreover, legislative changes both in Europe and the U.S. have been limited. This paper, instead, examines the impact of the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990, which substantially reduced dismissal costs. I estimate the incidence of a reduction in firing costs on worker turnover by exploiting the temporal change in the Colombian labour legislation as well as the variability in coverage between formal and informal sector workers. Using a grouping estimator to control for common aggregate shocks and selection, I find that the exit hazard rates into and out of unemployment increased after the reform by over 1% for formal workers (covered by the legislation) relative to informal workers (uncovered). The increase of the hazards implies a net decrease in unemployment of a third of a percentage point, which accounts for about one quarter of the fall in unemployment during the period of study.

Markups, gaps and the welfare costs of business fluctuations

In this paper we present a simple theory-based measure of the variations in aggregate economic efficiency: the gap between the marginal product of labor and the household s consumption/leisure tradeoff. We show that this indicator corresponds to the inverse of the markup of price over social marginal cost, and give some evidence in support of this interpretation. We then show that, with some auxilliary assumptions our gap variable may be used to measure the efficiency costs of business fluctuations. We find that the latter costs are modest on average. However, to the extent the flexible price equilibrium is distorted,the gross efficiency losses from recessions and gains from booms may be large. Indeed, we find that the major recessions involved large efficiency losses. These results hold for reasonable parameterizations of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and steady state distortions.

How "Doing Business" jeopardizes institutional reform

Simplifying business formalization and eliminating outdated formalities is often a good way of improving the institutional environment for firms. Unfortunately, the World Bank s "Doing Business" project is harming such policies by promoting a reform agenda that gives them priority even in countries lacking functional business registers, so that the reformed registers keep producing valueless information, but faster. Its methodology also promotes biased measurements that impede proper consideration of the essential tradeoffs in the design of formalization institutions. If "Doing Business" is to stop jeopardizing its true objectives and contribute positively to scientific progress, institutional reform and economic development, then its aims, governance and methodology need to change.

Single mothers and incentives to work: The French experience

This paper analyzes the effect of the 1998 reform of the French single parents allowanceon the labor supply of single mothers with very young children. The reform aimed atencouraging participation by allowing eligible single parents to accumulate benefits andlabor earnings for a limited period of time. Using data from the French EmploymentSurvey, the analysis shows that single mothers affected by the reform had experienced asignificant increase in their employment rate four years after the reform wasimplemented. During the same period, the employment rate of married mothers withyoung children did not experience a significant change, suggesting that at least part ofthe increase was a consequence of the reform. These results provide some evidence thatbenefit schedules that provide financial incentives to work can have significant effectsin getting single moms back to work, even in the presence of very young children.

Hypothesis on immigration and welfare

The number of hypothesis trying to explain which are the reasons behind the decision to migrate to work into a developed country are diverse and at the same time, difficult to test due to the multiplicity of factors which affect it. This papers attempts to move forward trying to disentangle which are the socio-economic factors that explain the differences in the figures of immigrants in the OECD countries. We show empirical evidence about the determinants of the migratory flows to 17 OECD countries from 65 countries in the 1980-2000 period. Our results reveal the importance to differentiate the inflows composition by at least income in the origin countries. Thus, regarding inflows from non-high-income countries, the results suggest that there is a pull effect from monetary and not real income, and then, the welfare magnets hypothesis should be rejected. This group reacts more to the migratory policy than the inflows coming from high-income countries, although those policies designed to slow down the inflows have not been able, in the aggregate, to reduce them.

Will EMU increase eurosclerosis?

In this paper we study the relationship between labor market institutions and monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how optimal monetary policy rules depend on labor institutions (labor adjustment costs, and nominal and real wage rigitidy) and social preferences regarding inflation, employment, and real wages. We also calibrate our model tocompute how the change in social welfare brought about by giving up monetary policy as a result of joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) depends on institutions and preferences. We then use the calibrated model to analyze how EMU affects the incentives for labor market reform, both for reformsthat increase the economy's adjustment potential and for those that affect the long-run unemployment rate.

A dynamic analysis of human welfare in a warming planet

Climate science indicates that climate stabilization requires low GHG emissions. Is thisconsistent with nondecreasing human welfare?Our welfare or utility index emphasizes education, knowledge, and the environment. Weconstruct and calibrate a multigenerational model with intertemporal links provided by education,physical capital, knowledge and the environment.We reject discounted utilitarianism and adopt, first, the Pure Sustainability Optimization (orIntergenerational Maximin) criterion, and, second, the Sustainable Growth Optimization criterion,that maximizes the utility of the first generation subject to a given future rate of growth. We applythese criteria to our calibrated model via a novel algorithm inspired by the turnpike property.The computed paths yield levels of utility higher than the level at reference year 2000 for allgenerations. They require the doubling of the fraction of labor resources devoted to the creation ofknowledge relative to the reference level, whereas the fractions of labor allocated to consumptionand leisure are similar to the reference ones. On the other hand, higher growth rates requiresubstantial increases in the fraction of labor devoted to education, together with moderate increasesin the fractions of labor devoted to knowledge and the investment in physical capital.

A Brief Survey of Child Welfare in Iowa, 1937-1940

History of Child Welfare in Iowa and the studies pertaining to it for the years 1937 and 1940. Includes a table showing number of children and money paid per child through Widow's Pensions for the year 1939.

The History of the Establishment of the Division of Child Welfare of the Social Welfare Department of the State of Iowa, 1938

History of Child Welfare Legislation in the State of Iowa 1838-1898; Establishment of the Iowa State board of Control in 1898 and its influence on Child Welfare Legislation until 1925; Immediate background, organizing and the administration functions of the Child Welfare Division of the Social Welfare Department of the State of Iowa. NOTE: This document has pagination errors.

Report of the Section of Agencies and Institutions Division of Child Welfare State Department of Social Welfare, 1943

History of child and social welfare in the State of Iowa including legal responsibilities, rules and regulations, inspections and licensing and supervision. it also covers cooperation with state agencies. It also describes in detail the histories, functions and problems of individual welfare homes and schools.