Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using words as Data

We present a new way of extracting policy positions from political texts that treats texts not as discourses to be understood and interpreted but rather, as data in the form of words. We compare this approach to previous methods of text analysis and use it to replicate published estimates of the policy positions of political parties in Britain and Ireland, on both economic and social policy dimensions. We “export” the method to a non-English-language environment, analyzing the policy positions of German parties, including the PDS as it entered the former West German party system. Finally, we extend its application beyond the analysis of party manifestos, to the estimation of political positions from legislative speeches. Our “language-blind” word scoring technique successfully replicates published policy estimates without the substantial costs of time and labor that these require. Furthermore, unlike in any previous method for extracting policy positions from political texts, we provide uncertainty measures for our estimates, allowing analysts to make informed judgments of the extent to which differences between two estimated policy positions can be viewed as significant or merely as products of measurement error.

Selection Power and Selection Labor for Information Retrieval

This study examines the relation between selection power and selection labor for information retrieval (IR). It is the first part of the development of a labor theoretic approach to IR. Existing models for evaluation of IR systems are reviewed and the distinction of operational from experimental systems partly dissolved. The often covert, but powerful, influence from technology on practice and theory is rendered explicit. Selection power is understood as the human ability to make informed choices between objects or representations of objects and is adopted as the primary value for IR. Selection power is conceived as a property of human consciousness, which can be assisted or frustrated by system design. The concept of selection power is further elucidated, and its value supported, by an example of the discrimination enabled by index descriptions, the discovery of analogous concepts in partly independent scholarly and wider public discourses, and its embodiment in the design and use of systems. Selection power is regarded as produced by selection labor, with the nature of that labor changing with different historical conditions and concurrent information technologies. Selection labor can itself be decomposed into description and search labor. Selection labor and its decomposition into description and search labor will be treated in a subsequent article, in a further development of a labor theoretic approach to information retrieval.

Third Party Rights of Appeal in Planning: Reflecting on the Experience of the Republic of Ireland

The potential introduction of third party planning appeals in the UK as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998 has increased interest in those countries that have established third party appeal procedures. The closest of these is the Republic of Ireland, which has had a third party right of appeal since 1963. This paper describes the impact these appeals have had on planning in the Irish Republic by explaining the appeal process, describing past trends and providing background information on the parties that engage in third party appeals. An overall assessment of the Republic’s experience is given and the paper concludes with a few comparative remarks relating this to planning and rights discourse in the UK

Making 'party identification' more versatile: operationalising the concept for the multiparty setting

The conventional operationalisation of the concept of party identification is not appropriate for the multiparty setting. I offer new measures that facilitate multiple, and negative as well as positive, identities. Using survey evidence from Northern Ireland, these new measures are validated in a number of ways and their role in a comprehensive model of voting is illustrated.

Multi-Party Negotiation When Agents Have Subjective Estimates of Bargaining Powers

This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it.