749 resultados para Seminários teológicos
Resumo:
The paper analyses a general equilibrium model with financiaI markets in which households may face restrictions in trading financiaI assets such as borrowing constraints and collateral (restricted participation model). However, markets are not assumed to be incomplete. We consider a standard general equilibrium model with H > 1 households, 2 periods and S states of nature in the second period. We show that generically the set of equilibrium allocations ia indeterminate, provided the existence of at least one nominal asset and one household for who some restriction is binding. Suppose there are C > 1 commodities in each state of nature and assets pays in units of some commodity. In this case for each household with binding restrictions it is possible to reduce the set of feasible assets trading and obtain a new equilibrium that utility improve alI those households. There is however an upper bound on the number of households to be improved related to the number of states of nature and the number of commodities. In particular, if the number of households ia smaller than the number of states of nature it is possible to Pareto improve any equilibrium by reducing the feasible choice set for each household.
Resumo:
The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.
Resumo:
This paper studies the male homicide rate and its relation to economic variables in the states of Minas Gerais, São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro between 1981 and 1997. The novelty of our approach is the construction of homicide rates specific for each age between 15 and 40 years old. The economic variables' coefficients are significant1y different from zero for the population between 15 and 19 years old. As expected, an increase in real wage and a decrease in inequality reduce the rate of homicide. Surprisingly, a decrease in the unemployment rate seems to increase the rate ofhomicide. Most coefficients, however, converge to zero as a generation gets older, becoming non-significant for the population aged 20 years old or more. We also identify an inertia component in the homicide rate: generations with higher homicide rates when young also tend to have higher homicide rates over the remain of their life cycle. Therefore, if economic variables induce a high rate of homicide among young people in a certain year, this high rate tend to persist over the generation life cycle independent1y of the economy later behavior. Regressions are performed using a reformulation of the standard Logit model that incorporates a lagged dependent variable.
Resumo:
This paper constructs a unit root test baseei on partially adaptive estimation, which is shown to be robust against non-Gaussian innovations. We show that the limiting distribution of the t-statistic is a convex combination of standard normal and DF distribution. Convergence to the DF distribution is obtaineel when the innovations are Gaussian, implying that the traditional ADF test is a special case of the proposed testo Monte Carlo Experiments indicate that, if innovation has heavy tail distribution or are contaminated by outliers, then the proposed test is more powerful than the traditional ADF testo Nominal interest rates (different maturities) are shown to be stationary according to the robust test but not stationary according to the nonrobust ADF testo This result seems to suggest that the failure of rejecting the null of unit root in nominal interest rate may be due to the use of estimation and hypothesis testing procedures that do not consider the absence of Gaussianity in the data.Our results validate practical restrictions on the behavior of the nominal interest rate imposed by CCAPM, optimal monetary policy and option pricing models.
Resumo:
This paper introduces a residual based test where the null hypothesis of c:&InOvement between two processes with local persistenc~ can be tested, even under the presence of an endogenous regressor. It, therefore, fills in an existing lacuna in econometrics, in which longrun relationships can also be tested if the dependent and independent variables do not have a unit root, but do exhibit local persistence.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the effects of the mlmmum wage on both, eammgs and employment, using a Brazilian rotating panel data (Pesquisa Mensal do Emprego - PME) which has a similar design to the US Current Population Survey (CPS). First an intuitive description of the data is done by graphical analysis. In particular, Kemel densities are used to show that an increase in the minimum wage compresses the eamings distribution. This graphical analysis is then forrnalized by descriptive models. This is followed by a discussion on identification and endogeneity that leads to the respecification of the model. Second, models for employment are estimated, using an interesting decomposition that makes it possible to separate out the effects of an increase in the minimum wage on number of hours and on posts of jobs. The main result is that an increase in the minimum wage was found to compress the eamings distribution, with a moderately small effect on the leveI of employment, contributing to alleviate inequality.
Resumo:
We study the direct and indirect ownership structure of Brazilian corporations and their market value and risk by the end of 1996 and 1998. Ownership is quite concentrated with most companies being controlled by a single direct shareholder. We find evidence that indirect control structures may be used to concentrate control even more rather than to keep control of the company with a smaller share of total capital. The greater the concentration of voting rights then less the value of the fmn should be due to potential expropriation ofrninority shareholders. We fmd evidence that when there is a majority shareholder and when indirect ownership structures are used without the loss of control, corporate valuations are greater when control is dilluted through the indirect ownership structure. This evidence is consistent with the existence of private benefits of control that can be translated as potential minority shareholder expropriation.
Resumo:
Brazil's erratic economic growth in the 80's has taken its toll on telecommunications irifrastructure. Although investment in telecommunications infrastructure has recently recovered, quality of data and voice transmission is below user's expectations. Therefore, upgrading the Brazilian telecommunications infrastructure in order to meet increased demand from IT users requires new ways of interaction between the public and the private sector.
Resumo:
In the past ten years the struggle for land in Brazil has taken the shape of invasions of private land by welI organized groups of land less squatters. It is argued in this paper that these invasions and the resulting contlicts are a direct response to the land reform program which has been adopted by the govemment since 1985. which is based on the expropriation of farms and the creation of settlement projects. The set of formal and informal institutions which compromise the land reform program are used as the background for a game-theory model of rural contlicts. T estable implications are derived trom this model with particular emphasis on the etfect of policy variables on violence. These are then tested with panel data at state levei from 1988 to 1995. - It is shown that govemment policy which has the intent of reducing the amount of violence has the opposite etfect of leading to more incentives for contlicts.
Resumo:
This paper contributes to the literature on aid and economic growth. We posit that it is not the levei of aid flows per se but the stability of such flows that determines the impact of aid on economic growth. Three measures of aid instability are employed. One is a simple deviation from trend, and measures overall instability. The other measures are based on auto-regressive estimates to capture deviations from an expected trend. These measures are intended to proxy for uncertainty in aid receipts. We posit that such uncertainty will influence the relationship between aid and investment and how recipient governments respond to aid, and will therefore affect how aid impacts on growth. We estimate a standard cross-country growth regression including the leveI of aid, and find aid to be insignificant (in line with other results in the literature). We then introduce measures of instability. Aid remains insignificant when we account for overall instability. However, when we account for uncertainty (which is negative and significant), we find that aid has a significant positive effect on growth. We conduct stability tests that show that the significance of aid is largely due to its effect on the volume of investment. The finding that uncertainty of aid receipts reduces the effectiveness of aid is robust. When we control for this, aid appears to have a significant positive influence on growth. When the regression is estimated for the sub-sample of African countries these findings hold, although the effectiveness of aid appears weaker than for the full sample.