426 resultados para Sanctions
Resumo:
O desafio de encontrar novos meios de administrar as organizaes pblicas, os quais no estivessem limitados aos indicadores financeiros e contbeis, foi a grande motivao para o surgimento do planejamento estratgico nas instituies de ensino superior, atravs de um sistema de gesto estratgica que traduz a misso e a estratgia de organizaes, anlise do ambiente interno e externo a organizao. Esta dissertao aborda a questo da modernizao da gesto, atravs de um estudo de caso de carter descritivo realizado na Universidade Federal do Par (UFPA), de como foi implantado o processo para aprimorar o sistema de planejamento institucional com vistas a buscar solues conjuntas aos problemas enfrentados pelo fator negativo - precariedade do sistema de planejamento - diagnosticado no Plano de Desenvolvimento Institucional da UFPA 2001-2010, tendo a Pr-Reitoria de Planejamento e Desenvolvimento Institucional PROPLAN, como Unidade Central de Planejamento, responsvel em desenvolver e implantar instrumentos gerenciais, padronizados, uniformizando as diretrizes gerais oferecendo a todos os segmentos da universidade um eixo comum, norteador das polticas da Universidade, observadas as peculiaridades da sua configurao multicampi. O objetivo principal desta dissertao identificar as aes estabelecidas no processo para aprimorar o sistema de planejamento institucional visando reduzir a precariedade do sistema de planejamento na Universidade Federal do Par. A metodologia utilizada a pesquisa qualitativa e como tcnica de coleta de dados utilizou-se a pesquisa documental. Os resultados encontrados indicam que a preocupao com estratgias na gesto universitria, so fatos relativamente recentes e que se encontra em profundas transformaes, sendo que, no perodo analisado, a preocupao maior se d nas unidades acadmicas. Foi possvel observar que as fases do processo de planejamento das aes no se realizam completamente em todas as Unidades e Campi, pois o sistema de acompanhamento do processo de planejamento, praticamente no existiu. Por conseguinte, at ento, inexistia uma cultura de planejamento na organizao, com a ausncia de integrao das aes de planejamento entre as Unidades Acadmicas e a Unidade Central de Planejamento, contribuindo, assim, com a precariedade do Sistema de Planejamento Institucional na UFPA. Conclui-se assim, que houve um avano nas mudanas planejadas e executadas, tornando a UFPA uma organizao isomrfica, as unidades da UFPA que enfrentam as mesmas condies ambientais, foram compelidas a imitarem umas as outras, as caractersticas organizacionais foram modificadas consensualmente, atravs de decises colegiadas, por meio de uma gesto democrtica, tornando, assim, os elementos estruturais isomrficos, consistindo ento, conforme a teoria, em estruturas organizacionais que refletem uma realidade socialmente construda. Mas, apesar de ter ocorrido um avano nas mudanas planejadas e executadas, a universidade utiliza determinados mecanismos no porque acredite que a tornem mais eficaz, mas porque so mecanismos impostos, por presses externas, a universidade tem que cumprir atos formais, regras, leis e sanes, numa relao de dominao e dependncia, configurando-se o isomorfismo institucional coercitivo. Como, tambm, conclui-se conforme informaes coletadas que no ocorreu uma mudana organizacional no sentido amplo, e sim, algumas modificaes especficas. Avaliando-se, ento, pode-se dizer que a UFPA conseguiu tornar suas Unidades homogneas nas prticas administrativas, especificamente na prtica de planejar, na busca de aperfeioar o sistema de planejamento das aes da UFPA ao se observar que, das vinte e oito Unidades regimentalmente constitudas at 2006, dezenove elaboraram Planos de Gesto para o perodo de 2002 a 2009, representando que 64% das unidades realizaram as aes planejadas na sua totalidade. E, 36%, nove Unidades no constituram Planos de Gesto, no utilizaram, instrumentos gerenciais padronizados, uniformizando as diretrizes gerais oferecendo a todos os segmentos da universidade um eixo comum, norteador das polticas da Universidade.
Resumo:
Coordenao de Aperfeioamento de Pessoal de Nvel Superior (CAPES)
Resumo:
Ps-graduao em Agronegcio e Desenvolvimento - Tup
Pacta sunt servanda versus the social role of contracts: the case of Brazilian agriculture contracts
Resumo:
This study explores the instability created by contradictory court decisions related with contract breaches. Forward marketing contracts represent an important source of resources to finance Brazilian agriculture, however a large number of contract breaches were observed during a period of marked increase in soy prices. The study analyzed 161 judicial appeal decisions and a survey was carried with 70 farmers. The results show the difference of judges' interpretation and the existence of second order effects. The effects of court decisions were more requirements of guarantees and the reduction in the number of contracts. Those soybean farmers who did not breach their contracts have also been negatively affected by the strategic reactions of trading and processing companies. The concept of "social function of the contract" introduced in Brazilian civil code led to a higher degree of instability in contracts, raising transaction costs and motivating private economic sanctions.
Resumo:
Estudo transversal que avaliou a qualidade dos registros de enfermagem sobre ressuscitao cardiopulmonar. Foram revisados 42 pronturios de pacientes em uma unidade de terapia intensiva, utilizando o protocolo Utstein. Houve predomnio de homens (54,8%), idade de 21 a 70 anos (38,1%), correo de cardiopatias adquiridas (42,7%), com mais de um dispositivo pr-existente (147). Como causa imediata de parada cardiorrespiratria, predominou hipotenso (48,3%) e como ritmo inicial, bradicardia (37,5%). Apenas a hora do bito e hora da parada foram registradas em 100% da amostra. No foi registrado treinamento dos profissionais em Suporte Avanado de Vida. As causas da parada e ritmo inicial foram registrados em 69% e 76,2% da amostra. Compresses torcicas, obteno de vias areas prvias e desfibrilao foram registradas em menos de 16%. Os registros foram considerados de baixa qualidade, podendo incorrer em sanes legais aos profissionais e no permitindo a comparao da efetividade das manobras com outros centros.
Resumo:
The recent reform in European antitrust enforcement is embodied in Regolation n. 1/2003/ Ce and related Communications. Since 2004 when it came into force, some crytical assessments can already be made. The work starts from some technical analysis of the reform, under a procedural perspective, to assess the proceedings real impact on parties rights and to criticize its limits. Decentralisation has brought about more complicacies, since community procedural systems are not harmonized, neither in their administrative rules, nor in their civil proceedings, which are all involved in the European antitrust network. Therefore, antitrust proceedings end un as being more jurisdictional in their effects than in their guarentees, which is a flaw to be mended by legislators. National laws shoud be harmonized, community law should be clarified and the system should turn more honestly towards a rationalized jurisdiction-cented mechanism. Otherwise, parties defense rights and the overall efficiency are put into doubt. Italy is a good exemple of how many colmlicacies can outburst from national procedures and national decentralised application. An uncertain pattern of judicial control, together with unclear relationships among the institutions to cooperate in the antitrust network can produce more problems than they aim to solve. As to the private enforcement, Regulation n.1 does not even attempt to give precise regulation to this underdeveloped sector. A continual comparison with U.S. system has brought the Commission to become aware both of the risks and of the advanteges of an increased civil antitrust litigation in fronto of national judges. In order to substain a larger development of this parallel and, presently, difficult way of judicial compensation, it is presently ongoing a consultation among states to find suitable incentives to make private enforcement more appealing and effective. The solution to this lack of private litigation is not to be sought in Regulation n. 1 which calls into action national legislators and proceedures to implement further improvements. As a conclusion, Regulation n. 1 is the outpost of an ambitious community design to create an efficient control mechanism over antitrust violations. It focuses on Commission proceedings, powers and sanctions in order to establish deterrence, then it highlights civil litigation perspectives and it involves directly states into antitrust application. It seems that more could be done to technically shape administrative proceedings in a more jurisdictionally oriented form, then to clarify respective roles and coordination mecanisms in order to prevent difficulties easy to forsee. Some of jurisprudential suggestions have been accepted, but much more is left to be done in the future to improve european antitrust enforcement system.
Resumo:
The research path has developed through a double direction: the analysis of fiscal tort and juridical means of reaction introduced into the system of taxation. The fiscal tort is a case that can be used as a comparison tool among national systems. Indeed, principles that regulate the fiscal tort has shared in the national systems even if the formation of the system has been different. Further, as a natural part of the research, the comparison between national and community systems has been crucial. Finally, the study of the sanctions without fiscal tort, that is indirect sanctions, had allowed to expand research also to the link between community jurisprudence and national systems.
Resumo:
One of the ways by which the legal system has responded to different sets of problems is the blurring of the traditional boundaries of criminal law, both procedural and substantive. This study aims to explore under what conditions does this trend lead to the improvement of society's welfare by focusing on two distinguishing sanctions in criminal law, incarceration and social stigma. In analyzing how incarceration affects the incentive to an individual to violate a legal standard, we considered the crucial role of the time constraint. This aspect has not been fully explored in the literature on law and economics, especially with respect to the analysis of the beneficiality of imposing either a fine or a prison term. We observed that that when individuals are heterogeneous with respect to wealth and wage income, and when the level of activity can be considered a normal good, only the middle wage and middle income groups can be adequately deterred by a fixed fines alone regime. The existing literature only considers the case of the very poor, deemed as judgment proof. However, since imprisonment is a socially costly way to deprive individuals of their time, other alternatives may be sought such as the imposition of discriminatory monetary fine, partial incapacitation and other alternative sanctions. According to traditional legal theory, the reason why criminal law is obeyed is not mainly due to the monetary sanctions but to the stigma arising from the communitys moral condemnation that accompanies conviction or merely suspicion. However, it is not sufficiently clear whether social stigma always accompanies a criminal conviction. We addressed this issue by identifying the circumstances wherein a criminal conviction carries an additional social stigma. Our results show that social stigma is seen to accompany a conviction under the following conditions: first, when the law coincides with the society's social norms; and second, when the prohibited act provides information on an unobservable attribute or trait of an individual -- crucial in establishing or maintaining social relationships beyond mere economic relationships. Thus, even if the social planner does not impose the social sanction directly, the impact of social stigma can still be influenced by the probability of conviction and the level of the monetary fine imposed as well as the varying degree of correlation between the legal standard violated and the social traits or attributes of the individual. In this respect, criminal law serves as an institution that facilitates cognitive efficiency in the process of imposing the social sanction to the extent that the rest of society is boundedly rational and use judgment heuristics. Paradoxically, using criminal law in order to invoke stigma for the violation of a legal standard may also serve to undermine its strength. To sum, the results of our analysis reveal that the scope of criminal law is narrow both for the purposes of deterrence and cognitive efficiency. While there are certain conditions where the enforcement of criminal law may lead to an increase in social welfare, particularly with respect to incarceration and stigma, we have also identified the channels through which they could affect behavior. Since such mechanisms can be replicated in less costly ways, society should first try or seek to employ these legal institutions before turning to criminal law as a last resort.
Resumo:
La legge n. 146 del 1990 ha istituito la Commissione di garanzia per lattuazione della legge sullo sciopero nei servizi pubblici essenziali, unauthority deputata al controllo delleffettivo bilanciamento del diritto di sciopero con gli altri diritti della persona di rango costituzionale nel caso dei servizi pubblici essenziali. Ad essa spettano alcuni poteri tra di loro eterogenei. Accanto a poteri propulsivi e sanzionatori, essa possiede poteri di tipo normativo. La legge prevede, infatti, che le prestazioni indispensabili e le altre misure necessarie al contemperamento siano determinate da accordi tra il datore di lavoro e le associazioni sindacali, mentre per il lavoro autonomo da codici di autoregolamentazione forniti da ognuna delle categorie interessate. Gli accordi e i codici di autoregolamentazione devono essere, comunque, sottoposti al vaglio della Commissione di garanzia la quale in ultimo stabilisce se essi siano idonei a realizzare il bilanciamento dei diritti in questione. Quando i soggetti indicati dalla legge non provvedano alla redazione dei suddetti atti, la Commissione interviene con lemanazione di una provvisoria regolamentazione, la quale possiede natura di regolamento, giacch partecipa dei caratteri della generalit ed astrattezza propri delle norme di legge. In effetti, anche altre authorities possiedono un potere normativo, che si sostanzia alle volte in un regolamento indipendente, altre in un regolamento simile ai regolamenti delegati ed altre al regolamento esecutivo. Poich la legge n. 146 del 1990 prevede quali siano gli istituti idonei a realizzare il bilanciamento (preavviso, proclamazione scritta, procedure di raffreddamento e conciliazione, intervallo minimo, misure indicative delle prestazioni indispensabili), la provvisoria regolamentazione possiede i caratteri del regolamento esecutivo.
Resumo:
Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.
Resumo:
Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.
Resumo:
During the mid 80 19s and the early 90 19s the Banking sector of the CEMAC sub-region experienced crisis. This could be seen from the numerous liquidation of Banks within the sub-region during this period, microfinance establishments found a place as an alternative financial institution involved in the provision of savings and loans to the masses. The exercise of the activities of microfinance necessitates an application for approval form the monetary authority. Their potential managers and auditors must equally apply and obtain a license before functioning. After this approval has been obtained the microfinance establishment must register with the National Credit Council and the Trade and Personal Property Credit Register. // Durant les annes 80 et au dbut des annes 90 le secteur Bancaire de la sous-rgion CEMAC on vcue une crise, ceci pouvait ce voit par de nombreuse liquidation des Banques au sein de la sous-rgion pendant cette priode. Les Etablissement de Micro finance ont trouve une place comme une institution financire alternative simpliquant dans la fourniture de lpargne et des prts pour la masses. Mais l'exercice de l'activit de microfinance exige une demande d'agrment remise par l'autorit montaire aprs confirmation de la commission bancaire. Mais avant que cet agrment soit remis, ils doivent fournir certain documents et informations. Les microfinances sont galement oblige de fournir certaines documents et information s'il veut offrir un agence dans un du tat membre de la CEMAC. Quand cette agrment est remise il sont les obligations administrative et professionnelle a remplir. Ceci consiste de sinscrire auprs du Conseil National du Crdit et le Registre du Commerce et du Crdit Mobilier, adhrer a une Association Professionnelle, mais ils sont le choix adhrer un rseau ou de poursuivre les activits indpendamment. L'autorit montaire peut unilatralement retrait la dcision d'agrment pour un raison ou l'autre. Cependant, la dcision de retrait de l'agrment est assujettir un appel devant le conseil d'administration de la BEAC. La commission bancaire a prvu un ensemble de sanctions pour s'assurer que une personne ou tablissement en dfaut soit appelle en ordre. // Cameroon, Micro-finance, CEMAC, COBAC, Legislation
Resumo:
The United States Federal and State laws differentiate between acceptable (or, legal) and unacceptable (illegal) behavior by prescribing restrictive punishment to citizens and/or groups that violate these established rules. These regulations are written to treat every person equally and to fairly serve justice; furthermore, the sanctions placed on offenders seek to reform illegal behavior through limitations on freedoms and rehabilitative programs. Despite the effort to treat all offenders fairly regardless of social identity categories (e.g., sex, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, age, ability, and gender and sexual orientation) and to humanely eliminate illegal behavior, the American penal system perpetuates de facto discrimination against a multitude of peoples. Furthermore, soaring recidivism rates caused by unsuccessful re-entry of incarcerated offenders puts economic stress on Federal and State budgets. For these reasons, offenders, policy-makers, and law-abiding citizens should all have a vested interest in reforming the prison system. This thesis focuses on the failure of the United States corrections system to adequately address the gender-specific needs of non-violent female offenders. Several factors contribute to the gender-specific discrimination that women experience in the criminal justice system: 1) Trends in female criminality that skew womens crime towards drug-related crimes, prostitution, and property offenses; 2) Mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes that are disproportionate to the crime committed; 3) So-called gender-neutral educational, vocational, substance abuse, and mental health programming that intends to equally rehabilitate men and women, but in fact favors men; and 4) The isolating nature of prison structures that inhibits smooth re-entry into society. I argue that a shift in the placement and treatment of non-violent female offenders is necessary for effective rehabilitation and for reducing recidivism rates. The first component of this shift is the design and implementation of gender- responsive treatment (GRT) rather than gender-neutral approaches in rehabilitative programming. The second shift is the utilization of alternatives to incarceration, which provide both more humane treatment of offenders and smoother reintegration to society. Drawing on recent scholarship, information from prison advocacy organizations, and research with men in an alternative program, I provide a critical analysis of current policies and alternative programs, and suggest several proposals for future gender- responsive programs in prisons and in place of incarceration. I argue that the expansion of gender-responsive programming and alternatives to incarceration respond to the marginalization of female offenders, address concerns about the financial sustainability of the United States criminal justice system, and tackle high recidivism rates.
Resumo:
This article details the American experience of welfare reform, and specifically its experience instituting workfare programs for participants. In the United States, the term "welfare" is most commonly used to refer to the program for single mothers and their families, formerly called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and now, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). In 1996, politicians "ended welfare as we know it" by fundamentally changing this program with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). The principal focus of the 1996 reform is mandatory work requirements enforced by sanctions and strict time limits on welfare receipt. While PRWORA's emphasis on work is not new, the difference is its significant ideological and policy commitment to employment, enforced by time limits. When welfare reform was enacted, some of its proponents recognized that welfare offices would have to change in order to develop individualized workfare plans, monitor progress, and impose sanctions. The "culture" of welfare offices had to be changed from being solely concerned with eligibility and compliance to individual, intensive casework. In this article, I will discuss how implementing workfare programs have influenced the relationship between clients and their workers at the welfare office. I start by describing the burdens faced by offices even before the enactment of welfare reform. Local welfare offices were expected to run programs that emphasized compliance and eligibility at the same time as workfare programs, which require intensive, personal case management. The next section of the paper will focus on strategies welfare offices and workers use to navigate these contradictory expectations. Lastly, I will present information on how clients react to workfare programs and some reasons they acquiesce to workfare contracts despite their unmet needs. I conclude with recommendations of how to make workfare truly work for welfare clients.