CO2 emissions from a spark ignition engine operatin on natural-hydrogen blends (HCNG)

The addition of hydrogen to natural gas could be a short-term alternative to today’s fossil fuels, as greenhouse gas emissions may be reduced. The aim of this study is to evaluate the emissions and performance of a spark ignition engine fuelled by pure natural gas, pure hydrogen, and different blends of hydrogen and natural gas (HCNG). Increasing the hydrogen fraction leads to variations in cylinder pressure and CO2 emissions. In this study, a combustion model based on thermodynamic equations is used, considering separate zones for burned and unburned gases. The results show that the maximum cylinder pressure rises as the fraction of hydrogen in the blend increases. The presence of hydrogen in the blend leads to a decrease in CO2 emissions. Due to the properties of hydrogen, leaner fuel–air mixtures can be used along with the appropriate spark timing, leading to an improvement in engine emissions with no loss of performance.

An Empirical Analysis of the Spanish Gas Price Structure

We can say without hesitation that in energy markets a throughout data analysis is crucial when designing sophisticated models that are able to capture most of the critical market drivers. In this study we will attempt to investigate into Spanish natural gas prices structure to improve understanding of the role they play in the determination of electricity prices and decide in the future about price modelling aspects. To further understand the potential for modelling, this study will focus on the nature and characteristics of the different gas price data available. The fact that the existing gas market in Spain does not incorporate enough liquidity of trade makes it even more critical to analyze in detail available gas price data information that in the end will provide relevant information to understand how electricity prices are affected by natural gas markets. In this sense representative Spanish gas prices are typically difficult to explore given the fact that there is not a transparent gas market yet and all the gas imported in the country is negotiated and purchased by private companies at confidential terms.

Potential effects of gas hydrate on human welfare

For almost 30 years. serious interest has been directed toward natural gas hydrate, a crystalline solid composed of water and methane, as a potential (i) energy resource, (ii) factor in global climate change, and (iii) submarine geohazard. Although each of these issues can affect human welfare, only (iii) is considered to be of immediate importance. Assessments of gas hydrate as an energy resource have often been overly optimistic, based in part on its very high methane content and on its worldwide occurrence in continental margins. Although these attributes are attractive, geologic settings, reservoir properties, and phase-equilibria considerations diminish the energy resource potential of natural gas hydrate. The possible role of gas hydrate in global climate change has been often overstated. Although methane is a “greenhouse” gas in the atmosphere, much methane from dissociated gas hydrate may never reach the atmosphere, but rather may be converted to carbon dioxide and sequestered by the hydrosphere/biosphere before reaching the atmosphere. Thus, methane from gas hydrate may have little opportunity to affect global climate change. However, submarine geohazards (such as sediment instabilities and slope failures on local and regional scales, leading to debris flows, slumps, slides, and possible tsunamis) caused by gas-hydrate dissociation are of immediate and increasing importance as humankind moves to exploit seabed resources in ever-deepening waters of coastal oceans. The vulnerability of gas hydrate to temperature and sea level changes enhances the instability of deep-water oceanic sediments, and thus human activities and installations in this setting can be affected.

Desenvolvimento de um método para diagnose de falhas na operação de navios transportadores de gás natural liquefeito através de redes bayesianas.

O Gás Natural Liquefeito (GNL) tem, aos poucos, se tornado uma importante opção para a diversificação da matriz energética brasileira. Os navios metaneiros são os responsáveis pelo transporte do GNL desde as plantas de liquefação até as de regaseificação. Dada a importância, bem como a periculosidade, das operações de transporte e de carga e descarga de navios metaneiros, torna-se necessário não só um bom plano de manutenção como também um sistema de detecção de falhas que podem ocorrer durante estes processos. Este trabalho apresenta um método de diagnose de falhas para a operação de carga e descarga de navios transportadores de GNL através da utilização de Redes Bayesianas em conjunto com técnicas de análise de confiabilidade, como a Análise de Modos e Efeitos de Falhas (FMEA) e a Análise de Árvores de Falhas (FTA). O método proposto indica, através da leitura de sensores presentes no sistema de carga e descarga, quais os componentes que mais provavelmente estão em falha. O método fornece uma abordagem bem estruturada para a construção das Redes Bayesianas utilizadas na diagnose de falhas do sistema.

Approximation to EU Technical Standards with and without the Promise of Membership: the Cases of Slovakia and Ukraine. EU Diplomacy Paper 02/2013

This paper aims to identify the extent to which the non-promise of membership of the European Union (EU) precludes the motivation of Ukraine as European Neighbourhood Policy country to adopt EU policies in the field of market access, namely technical standards and regulations. Its approximation approach is compared to the fast-tracked accession of Slovakia, which was driven by a clear-cut membership promise. Furthermore, the paper elaborates whether the conclusion of an Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, provides sufficient incentives for Ukraine to continue reforming its quality infrastructure in order to gain access to the Single European Market. Finally, scenarios of possible developments of EU-Ukraine relations are deliberated in the context of the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle. The paper argues that market access provides sufficient stimulus for third countries to adhere to EU technical standards – even in the absence of a clear and credible promise of future EU membership. Yet, in the case of Ukraine, the country’s relations with Russia appear to compete with its EU approximation process, resulting for the time being in Ukraine attempting to pursue a balanced dual cooperation with both the EU and Russia.

Ukraine-A week of testing red lines ahead. CEPS Commentaries, 3 March 2014

Despite the rapidly escalating situation in Ukraine, Michael Emerson discerns in this CEPS Commentary a very slim margin of possibility that cooler heads may still prevail in the Crimean peninsula and allow a return to a mundane and peaceful normality.

Putin's 'couldn't care less' attitude towards Russia's international commitments. CEPS Commentaries, 5 March 2014

By militarily invading and annexing Crimea, Russia has acted in breach of its obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Yet the Kremlin seems unfazed that it is violating general principles of international law. This seems emblematic for the ‘can’t care less’ attitude of Putin’s Russia. Moscow allows itself to be inconsistent with its own commitments and is reneging on its own words. This has all the trappings of a panicking dictatorship, which crushes dissent at home and portrays confidence in winning a great battle with enemies abroad. How can anyone now trust what Putin’s Russia says or commits to in the future?

Ukraine: Can meaningful reform come out of conflict? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/08, August 2014

Apart from threats to its national security and territorial integrity, Ukraine faces serious economic challenges. These result from the slow pace of economic and institutional reform in the previous two decades, the populist policies of the Yanukovych era and the consequences of the conflict with Russia. The new Ukrainian authorities have made pro-reform declarations, but these do not seem to be supported sufficiently by concrete policy measures, especially in the critical areas of fiscal, balance-of-payment and structural adjustment. Also, the international financial aid package granted to Ukraine has not been accompanied by sufficiently strong policy conditionality. Ukraine urgently needs a complex programme of far-reaching economic and institutional reform, which will include both short-term fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment measures and medium- to long-term structural and institutional changes. Energy subsidies and the low retirement age are the two critical policy areas that require adjustment to avoid sovereign default and a balance-of-payments crisis.

Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. CEPS Working Document No. 400, September 2014

While EU and US sanctions against Russia over its aggression in Ukraine, and Russia’s counter-sanctions, are much discussed due to their evident political significance, less attention has been given to Russia’s punitive sanctions against the three Eastern European states – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – that have signed with the EU Association Agreements (AA), which include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) provisions. This paper therefore documents these trade policy restrictions and embargoes imposed by Russia, and provides some first indications of their impact. The immediate impact on trade flows, especially for agri-food products, has been substantial, albeit with some leakage through Belarus. The main instrument for the Russian measures has been allegations of non-conformity with Russian technical standards, although the correlation of these allegations with movements in Russia’s geopolitical postures makes it obvious that the Russian technical agencies are following political guidelines dressed up as scientific evidence. These measures also push the three states into diversifying their trade marketing efforts in favour of the EU and other world markets, with Georgia already having taken significant steps in this direction, since in its case the Russian sanctions date back to 2006. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s threat to cancel CIS free trade preferences infiltrated trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia, leading on 12 September to their proposed postponement until the end of 2015 of the ‘provisional’ implementation of a large part of the AA/DCFTA. This was immediately followed on 16 September by ratification of the AA/DCFTA by both the Rada in Kyiv and the European Parliament, which will lead to its full and definitive entry into force when the 28 EU member states have also ratified it. However Putin followed the day after with a letter to Poroshenko making an abusive interpretation of the 12 September understanding.

Ukraine on the edge. EPC Commentary, 24 April 2014

During the past six months Ukraine has been through a revolution, its Crimean peninsula has been annexed by Russia and its territorial integrity continues to be challenged. With ongoing unrest in three Eastern regions, a peace deal recently agreed in Geneva hangs by a thread as pro-Russian separatists continue to occupy numerous public buildings and international actors remain divided over how long to wait for Russia to implement the accord before placing new sanctions. While the West accuses Russia of provoking and influencing the unrest, Russia points the finger at Ukraine’s interim leadership which it claims is illegal and “fascist”.

Integrating Ukraine and Moldova in EU's energy security plans. EPC Commentary, 23 June 2014

Vulnerability in the EU’s internal energy market has been made starker since the Russia-Ukraine crisis, highlighting specifically the importance of upstream energy linkages. March this year saw the European Council calling for a comprehensive plan to reduce the EU’s energy dependence. The European Commission responded to this call with a communication on Energy Security published on 28 May, in time for another European Council at the end of June, at which a decision is anticipated.

Ukraine: sovereign decentralisation or federalism without sovereignty? OSW Commentary No. 133, 18.04.2014

A key element of Russia’s policy towards the new government of Ukraine concerns demands for a constitutional reform that would transform the country from a unitary into a federal state in a way that would considerably privilege the eastern and southern regions. Such a change to Ukraine’s administrative system would enable Moscow to put pressure on Ukraine’s central government via the regions. In order to achieve its objectives, Russia has been pressuring Kyiv to establish a constitutional assembly in a form that would guarantee the endorsement of solutions dictated by Russia. In other words, Russia has been demanding, in what is practically an ultimatum, that Ukraine give up one of the fundamental sovereign rights of a state, the right to freely determine its system of government. Transforming Ukraine into a federal state is an unacceptable idea, primarily because the intention behind Russia’s demands is to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, both through the content of the proposed changes and the way in which they are to be implemented. However, keeping in place the current, centralist model of state governance is not a feasible alternative. Ukraine will have to grant its regions broad self-governance powers, including the power to hold local referendums, and to transfer a considerable portion of the prerogatives currently held by the state to the local self-governments, along with adequate financial resources. That is because decentralisation along these lines is the only way forward towards a modern democracy in Ukraine. Russia’s policy has forced Kyiv to undertake legislative work on constitutional reform as a matter of urgency, rather than waiting until a new parliament is elected in which the new, post-Maidan balance of political power will be reflected, as political logic would require. The first draft of the constitutional amendments (of which no details are known at this stage) is to be presented in mid-May, and is expected to come into force in early autumn. However, whether these plans can be put into practice depends on further developments in the eastern part of Ukraine, because (among other reasons) if a state of emergency is introduced, the constitutional amendment process will have to be suspended.

Crimean Tatars after Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. OSW Commentary No. 141, 30.06.2014

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars face the necessity of working out a modus vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand, the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with Kyiv would favour opposing the present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with Moscow is that Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return to Ukraine, which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficulties in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars.

Gazprom's expansion in the EU - co-operation or domination? OSW Report, April 2008

The energy sector, especially with regard to natural gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the character of this co-operation has given rise to increasing doubts both in Brussels and among the EU member states. The questions have emerged whether this co-operation does not make the EU excessively dependent on Russian energy supplies, and whether Gazprom's presence in the EU will not allow Moscow to interfere in the proces of devising the EU energy policy. This report is intended to present the factual base and data necessary to provide accurate answers to the foregoing questions. The first part of the report presents the scope and character of Gazprom's economic presence in the EU member states. The second part shows the presence of the EU investors in Russia. The data presented has been provided by the International Energy Agency, European Commission, the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Some of the data is the result of calculations made by the Centre for Eastern Studies' experts who were basing on the data provided by energy companies, the specialist press and news agencies.

The gas target model for the Visegard 4 Region: conceptual analysis. OSW Report, May 2013

The similarity of issues and geographical proximity have led the Visegrad 4 countries (V4) to undertake closer collaboration in natural gas policy, notably by agreeing on a common security of supply strategy, including regional emergency planning, and a common implementation of the Gas Target Model (GTM) that European regulators have proposed for the medium-long term design of the EU gas market, and which has been endorsed by the Madrid Regulatory Forum. As a contribution to this collaboration, the present paper will analyse how the GTM may be implemented in the V4 region, with a view to maximize the benefits that arise from joint implementation. A most relevant conclusion of the GTM is that markets should be large enough to attract market players and investments, so that sufficient diversity of sources may be reached and market power indicators are kept below dangerous levels. In most cases, this requires physical and/or virtual interconnection of present markets, which is also useful to achieve the required security of supply standards, as envisaged in the Regulation 994/2010/EC.