The known unknowns and the unknown unknowns of the EMU. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/18, October 2012

Extensive prior research on the economics of European monetary union highlighted some potential risks (the known unknowns) but overlooked others (the unknown unknowns). Asymmetries among participating countries, the potentially destabilising character of a one-size-fits all monetary policy, the weakness of adjustment mechanisms, the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline, the possibility of sovereign solvency crises and their adverse consequences were all known and understood. But policymakers often relied on a complacent reading of the evidence. • The potential for financial disruption was vastly underestimated. Economists generally did not consider, or underestimated, the possibility of balance of payment crises such as those experienced by southern European countries, or the risk of a feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. • Remedying EMU’s systemic deficiencies is on the policy agenda. Banking union would go a long way towards addressing the fault lines. The urgent question for economists is if it is going to be enough and, if not, what else should complement the ‘bare-bones’ EMU of Maastricht.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.

Monetary policy and banking supervision: coordination instead of separation. CEPS Policy Brief No. 286, 12 December 2012

Introduction. Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be ‘Chinese walls’ between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be “independents” in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.

Technological innovation in the context of PPPs: incentives, opportunities and actions

From a construction perspective, Public-Private Partnership projects (PPPs) are often credited as providing real incentives for the actors involved as well as a business environment that is conducive to innovation and improved practices. The validity of four common rhetorical arguments used to promote the PPP procurement route is explored: collaborative working, design freedom, long-term commitment and risk transfer. Particular interest is given to the extent to which espoused intentions correlate with experienced realities in allowing actors involved in the design and construction phases to be presented with, and able to exploit, opportunities for technological innovation. It is argued that there is reason to be cautious in fully accepting the purported benefits of the PPP framework and that the arguments often presented need to be revised. Alternative interpretations are provided.

Economic models and algorithms for distributed systems

Distributed computing paradigms for sharing resources such as Clouds, Grids, Peer-to-Peer systems, or voluntary computing are becoming increasingly popular. While there are some success stories such as PlanetLab, OneLab, BOINC, BitTorrent, and SETI@home, a widespread use of these technologies for business applications has not yet been achieved. In a business environment, mechanisms are needed to provide incentives to potential users for participating in such networks. These mechanisms may range from simple non-monetary access rights, monetary payments to specific policies for sharing. Although a few models for a framework have been discussed (in the general area of a "Grid Economy"), none of these models has yet been realised in practice. This book attempts to fill this gap by discussing the reasons for such limited take-up and exploring incentive mechanisms for resource sharing in distributed systems. The purpose of this book is to identify research challenges in successfully using and deploying resource sharing strategies in open-source and commercial distributed systems.