Attitudes to entry fees to National Parks: Results and policy implications from a Queensland case study

Examines visitor attitudes and whether visitors are willing to pay to enter Lamington National Park and under what circumstances they would do so. First a sample of visitors is asked a general (normative) question as to whether visitors should pay to visit Lamington National Park and in another question (positive) they are asked whether they would be more willing to pay if the money collected would be invested in the park to improve visitor facilities and for conservation work. The results show that visitors are more willing to accept the ‘user-pays’ principle if the money will be used for the benefit of the national park and its visitors. It was found that foreigners are more in support for a ‘user-pay’ fee than Australians, and among Australians, those visitors from Queensland are the least willing to accept the idea of a user-pay fee to enter the park. The results indicate that if visitors can be shown the benefits (both for visitors and for conservation) of charging an entry fee, then visitors are more likely to support such a concept than when they are unaware of the benefits of a user-fee. The study shows that on average foreigners are willing to pay more than Australians. Finally, the regression results identify significant factors influencing visitors’ attitudes and suggested amounts to visit the national park.

Notes on market failure and the Paretian (Kaldor-Hicks) relevance and irrelevance of unfavourable externalities

The following are notes that have been distributed by me over the last few years to students in Environmental Economics at The University of Queensland. They give particular attention to whether externalities are Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks relevant from a policy point of view. Externalities are Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto irrelevant if no change is possible for which gainers could compensate losers. Both absolute and marginal externalities may be Kaldor-Hicks relevant. Infra-marginal negative externalities are often, but not always, Kaldor-Hicks irrelevant. There are at least two cases where such externalities can be relevant. First, the absolute impact of the negative externality may be so great that the source of the externality should be eliminated. Secondly, if the externality arises from production, its nature may depend on the type of production technique adopted. Although for the technique adopted, an infra-marginal negative externality occurs. That is Paretian irrelevant given that choice of this technique is the only available possibility, alternative techniques may actually be available in practice. Some of these may generate even smaller total external effects and be socially preferable. Both cases are outlined and illustrated in these notes. The analysis reveals the dangers of relying on marginalism for deciding on environmental policy. Total (external) effects are often of great social and economic importance and appropriate social choices cannot be made on the basis of marginalism alone.

Testing for Market Power in Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output Industries: The Australian Grains and Oilseeds Industries

Recent empirical studies have found significant evidence of departures from competition in the input side of the Australian bread, breakfast cereal and margarine end-product markets. For example, Griffith (2000) found that firms in some parts of the processing and marketing sector exerted market power when purchasing grains and oilseeds from farmers. As noted at the time, this result accorded well with the views of previous regulatory authorities (p.358). In the mid-1990s, the Prices Surveillence Authority (PSA 1994) determined that the markets for products contained in the Breakfast Cereals and Cooking Oils and Fats indexes were "not effectively competitive" (p.14). The PSA consequently maintained price surveillence on the major firms in this product group. The Griffith result is also consistent with the large number of legal judgements against firms in this sector over the past decade for price fixing or other types of non-competitive behaviour. For example, bread manufacturer George Weston was fined twice during 2000 for non-competitive conduct and the ACCC has also recently pursued and won cases against retailer Safeway in grains and oilseeds product lines.